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ABSTRACT 
 
 
How powerful are Canada’s big city mayors? Do mayors have the power to lead 
in Canada’s cities? What does mayoral power in Canada look like, and what can 
we learn about Canadian urban politics by examining it?  
 
This project explores these and other questions by engaging in the first broad 
study of urban mayors in Canada. It is often said that Canada has “weak” 
mayors, or a “weak mayor system” – terms borrowed from an American context 
referring to the limited executive power of Canadian mayors relative to many of 
their American peers. This study examines the Canadian mayoralty in its own 
context, through close examination of the role and power of the mayor in ten 
Canadian cities. Mayoral power is examined “on paper,” comparing the legal and 
institutional powers of mayors across cities; and, “in practice,” informed by 
interviews with mayors and those who work most closely with them. A new 
model for understanding mayoral power is advanced.  
 
This project finds that Canada does not have “weak mayors” nor does it have a 
“weak mayor system.” These terms reflect a narrow definition of mayoral power. 
In Canada, where the role and power of the mayor is largely undefined, 
institutional variables emerge as less important in practice than the type of 
leadership provided by the mayor. Canadian mayors are expected to 
simultaneously serve in three distinct roles – as political leaders, as executive 
leaders, and as community leaders – with each role involving different resources. 
Mayors are being uniquely positioned at the nexus of the network of actors who 
are engaged in local government, with an unparalleled ability to shape the 
engagement of these actors by virtue of their leadership (or lack of leadership). 
As a result, mayors play a shaping role in the governance of Canada’s cities. 
This is the power of a Canadian mayor.  
 
Mayors are important leaders in Canada, but they are often misunderstood. This 
study begins to address outstanding questions about the role and power of the 
mayor, while raising larger issues about leadership capacity in Canada’s cities. It 
is the beginning of a potentially much larger research agenda – and a 
contribution to a needed discussion about strengthening leadership in Canada’s 
cities.  
 
KEYWORDS: Mayors, local government, power, leadership, urban politics, cities  
		
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
 
This project began in a boardroom at City Hall following the sudden resignation 
of the mayor – an event that sparked some chaos, much confusion and an 
unrelenting curiosity for me about the role of Canadian mayors. Exploring this 
topic has proven to be a profoundly fulfilling pursuit, and one which would not 
have been possible without the support of many individuals worthy of thanks. 
 
First, my advisor Prof. Andrew Sancton has been a steady source of wisdom, 
guidance and encouragement for this project from beginning to end. I am grateful 
to have had the opportunity to study with someone who is deservedly regarded 
as one of Canada’s leading local government scholars, and I have learned much 
from him through this experience. This project also spanned major changes in 
nearly every aspect of my life. I have benefitted tremendously from having a 
supervisor who cared not only about the research project but also the overall 
success of his student, academically and beyond. He set an example I will aspire 
to emulate when working with students in the future.  
 
Second, both this project and I benefitted from the guidance of other scholars. 
Prof. Tom Urbaniak provided helpful suggestions at key points during the project, 
including reviewing the project proposal and the final draft. Profs. David Siegel, 
Martin Horak, Zack Taylor and Neil Bradford provided thoughtful, insightful and 
challenging questions during the exam process – including some suggestions 
now reflected in this dissertation, and other broader considerations have 
provoked new curiosities that will influence my work in the future. Their 
comments have surely improved the final product. Any remaining errors or 
oversights are mine alone. 
 
Finally, I am grateful for the unwavering love and support from my family 
throughout this project, and in the personal and professional journey it has 
crossed. The accomplishment of reaching this finish line belongs to them.  
 
 
Kate Graham 
October 2018 
 
 
 
		
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
 
 
Abstract 
Acknowledgements 
 
Chapter 1 | Introduction  
Chapter 2 | The Mayoralty in Canada  
Chapter 3 | Research Question, Methodology and Definitions  
 
 
 
1 
12 
40 
 
PART I: MAYORAL POWER “ON PAPER” 
Chapter 4 | Provincially Granted Authority   
Chapter 5 | Locally Granted Authority  
 
 
66 
80 
 
PART II: MAYORAL POWER “IN PRACTICE” 
Chapter 6 | Perceptions of Power  
Chapter 7 | Political, Executive and Community Leadership 
Chapter 8 | A Model of Mayoral Power  
 
PART III: APPLYING THE MODEL 
Chapter 9 | Toronto: A Tale of Three Mayors 
 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 10 | Leading Canada’s Cities?  
 
 
 
96 
118 
183 
 
 
201 
 
 
242 
 
Appendices 253 
Bibliography  261 
Vitae  278 
 
 
 
		
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of mayor-council and council-manager forms of 
government  
Table 2: Yates’ model of mayoral leadership 
Table 3: Interviews completed, by perspective 
Table 4: Language describing the role of the mayor in provincial 
legislation 
Table 5: Overview of general municipal and city-specific legislation  
Table 6: Mayoral authority in provincial legislation, by city 
Table 7: Comparison of mayoral authority in provincial legislation 
Table 8: Council composition, by city   
Table 9: Mayoral appointment powers  
Table 10: Status of mayoral role versus councillor role 
Table 11: Resources provided to the mayor 
Table 12: Parties and confidential meetings 
Table 13: Mayoral power within council 
Table 14: Mayoral authority through institutional arrangements 
Table 15: Summary of institutional variables 
Table 16: Responses to question, "Do you think the role of the mayor 
is well understood?” 
Table 17: Use of words ‘lead,’ ‘leader’ and ‘leadership,’ by perspective 
Table 18: Common Responses to “How would you describe the role of 
the mayor?” 
Table 19: Frequency of the word ‘power,’ by perspective 
Table 20: Perceptions of mayoral power, by city and perspective 
 
29 
 
34 
63 
70 
 
73 
75 
78 
82 
83 
85 
86 
88 
89 
91 
92 
103 
 
104 
105 
 
107 
109 
 
 
 
		
LIST OF TABLES (CONT’D)  
 
 
 
Table 21: Roles mentioned in response to question, “How would you 
describe the role of the mayor?” by perspective 
Table 22: Summary of interview responses, by role  
Table 23: Expectations of mayors, by leadership role 
Table 24: Expectations of mayors, by frequency expressed  
Table 25: Power resources of mayors 
Table 26: Perceptions of mayoral power within the Greater Toronto 
Area 
Table 27: Mayoral power in practice – Mayors Miller, Ford and Tory 
Table 28: Perceptional of mayoral power, urban vs. rural  
 
 
114 
 
115 
120 
121 
194 
228 
 
232 
249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Svara’s mayor in council-manager cities interactions model  
Figure 2: The role of the Canadian mayor 
Figure 3: Mayoral power in Canada 
 
36 
187 
192, 231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
LIST OF CHARTS 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Mayoral power “on paper” and “in practice” 
Chart 2: Perceptions of mayoral power, by province  
110 
112, 248 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It’s a big job. You’re the quarterback, the referee, the equipment manager, and 
the cheerleader – all at the same time. You’re seen as the person who controls 
everything, sometimes way beyond local government jurisdiction and definitely 
beyond what you actually control. People think you’re in charge, but you’re not 
really. When people are unhappy, they call you. It doesn’t matter what they are 
unhappy about – a big political issue, a family tragedy, or what happened on 
their morning commute – they call, and they want results. They reach to the 
leader who is closest to the people, and that’s the mayor.  
 
The role keeps evolving. It’s moved from a ‘chief magistrate’ to one that is 
something of a celebrity. But the bottom line is, it’s an awful lot of work and few 
people really understand it. It’s a job like no other.”  
 
         - Former Canadian Mayor  
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 | INTRODUCTION  
 
 
“You don’t understand the job of the mayor!”1 
It was November 18, 2013, a particularly tense afternoon in the Council 
Chambers of Canada’s largest city. Toronto City Council had gathered for a 
special meeting to remove of some of the powers of then Mayor Rob Ford. Since 
his election as Mayor in 2010, Ford had been embroiled in scandal: reports of 
drunk driving, drug possession and domestic violence; a conflict of interest 
lawsuit, resulting in temporary removal from office; sexually explicit comments 
about the Mayor’s wife and a staff member; accusations of the Mayor attending 
official functions while intoxicated, sexually assaulting a former mayoral 
candidate, and smoking cocaine in a downtown bar; and, a Toronto Police 
investigation into the Mayor’s activities.2 The Mayor’s antics had become 
spectacle. It was the first time in memory when a Canadian mayor captured 
sustained international media attention.3 American comedian Jimmy Kimmel 
																																																								
1 Toronto City Council Special Meeting, November 18, 2013.  
2 For a thorough chronicle of Ford’s activities, see: Robyn Doolittle, Crazy Town: The Rob Ford 
Story (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2014); John Filion, The Only Average Guy: Inside the Uncommon 
World of Rob Ford (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2015); and, Rob Ford and Doug Ford, 
Ford Nation: Two Brothers, One Vision, The Story of the People’s Mayor (Toronto: HarperCollins 
Publishers Limited, 2016). A chronicle of National Post coverage has also been published as a 
book: How Rob Ford Happened: A History of the Toronto Mayor from the Pages of the National 
Post (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2013).  
3 A book authored by the Rob Ford and his brother Doug (2016) includes several stories that 
reflect the extent of Mayor Ford’s international fame during the peak of the scandal. For example, 
Doug recalls a trip to LA with his brother. “From the minute we hit the streets of LA, the whole 
experience was pretty surreal. Jimmy Kimmel himself picked us up. And from there, everybody 
down there seemed to already know who Rob was. We’d walk down the street and tour buses 
would stop and people would jump out to get their pictures taken with him. Our friend Kevin 
		
2 
introduced Ford to his show by stating that the Mayor had “tripped, bumped, 
danced, argued and smoked his way into our national consciousness."4 
 When a new video of Mayor Ford using drugs and uttering death threats 
surfaced in November 2013, Council reached its breaking point. Mainstream and 
social media flooded with discussions about what could be done to address the 
ridicule and embarrassment faced by the City of Toronto from the behaviors of its 
now infamous Mayor. Despite mounting pressure, the Mayor remained unwilling 
to resign, and calls on Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne to take action were met 
with reluctance to get involved. “The City of Toronto has a Mayor and Council 
that were elected by the residents of Toronto and must be accountable to them. 
It is up to the municipal level of government to address the issues they face,” 
stated the Premier. “It is not the provincial government’s role, nor its intention, to 
impose its preferences upon that government.”5  
 And so on November 18, 2013, Toronto City Council held a special 
meeting to discuss what could be done about the Mayor. The Mayor presided 
over parts of the meeting as his Council colleagues deliberated on how to limit 
his powers, and reduce the resources provided to support his position. The 
advice from city staff was clear: Council did not have the ability to impeach the 
Mayor from office, nor could it remove any of the Mayor’s statutory power as 
established in provincial legislation, namely being the head of Council and chief 																																																																																																																																																																				
O’Leary […] was blown away by the attention Rob was getting, in a city already full of the biggest 
celebrities in the world. ‘Rob was just like a rock star,’ Kevin told us.” (210)  
4 Jimmy Kimmel Show, March 4 2014.  
5  Quote as recorded in Robert Brenzie, “Rob Ford Crisis: Wynne lays out conditions for 
intervening,” Toronto Star (November 13, 2013).  
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executive officer of the City of Toronto.6 However, Council could take away any 
of the Mayor’s powers which Council itself had granted through policy or bylaw, 
such as the authority to make committee appointments, chair the Executive 
Committee, and a number of other procedural privileges. Motions to strip the 
Mayor of his Council-delegated authorities, and to significantly reduce the 
resources allocated to support the function of the Mayor’s Office, passed with 
strong majorities. Perhaps in title alone, Mayor Ford retained his statutory post 
as the head of Council and chief executive officer of the City of Toronto.  
The debate waged on for nearly five hours, involving even a minor 
physical altercation between the Mayor and a Councillor.7 Throughout the 
debate, Council members revealed varying perceptions about the nature of the 
Mayor’s power. “We don’t have to take away his statutory powers. He’s already 
done that, in the hearts and the minds of thousands of people across this city. I 
believe, Mister Mayor, that you have lost the ability to lead this city.”8 Another 
Councillor framed it this way: “in the business world, there are very prescriptive 
steps that boards would take should the CEO have admitted to smoking cocaine 
or driving drunk. […] Some of those would be warnings […] or indeed, the 
removal of the CEO.”9 The Mayor’s most loyal supporters called the meeting “a 
																																																								
6 Toronto City Council Special Meeting, November 18, 2013. 
7 As reported by Mendleson and Edwards in the Toronto Star (November 18, 2013), “At one 
particularly heated point, the red-faced mayor bolted towards the public gallery. Councillor Pam 
McConnell was bumped by the mayor in the drama and fell backwards, but did not lose her 
footing. The mayor helped her get upright and then walked away smiling. People shouted, 
‘Shame!’ at the mayor while others applauded.” 
8 Toronto City Council Special Meeting, November 18, 2013. 
9 Ibid.  
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Kangaroo court”10 in contemplating actions described as illegal and 
undemocratic. At one point, an unsuccessful motion was tabled to ask the 
province to call an election for the mayor and all councillor positions, challenging 
whether council should have the authority to make decisions about removing the 
powers of a democratically elected mayor. “This Council is trampling over every 
person’s democratic right. There are 383,000 people who voted for the Mayor. 
[…] If the objective is to take away the Mayor’s powers, I will be offended and so 
will anyone else who wants to carry out the agenda of the electorate.”11 The 
debate reflected the broader community discussion, which had dominated 
Toronto headlines and media commentary alike for months. Some Torontonians 
felt Mayor Ford’s behaviours were causing harm and shame to Toronto.12 Others 
felt the Mayor’s fame had increased the city’s international profile.13 Or perhaps 
the Mayor’s antics had no bearing whatsoever on the life of the city. The garbage 
continued to get picked up, services were delivered, and life went on in Toronto.  
The words of an exasperated Councillor to his colleagues diagnosed an 
underlying issue. “You don’t understand the job of the mayor!”14 This exclamation 
to the council of Canada’s largest city captures a foundational problem that 																																																								
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.  
12 In the words of one Councillor during the November 18, 2013 meeting, “The mayor has created 
a crazy train!” 
13 Mayor Ford’s brother, Doug Ford (2016), offers a particularly generous account of how his 
brother’s profile impacted Toronto’s international reputation. “Before Rob Ford, people outside 
Canada had no idea about what Toronto is all about and how great a city it is. Rob’s personal 
issues aside, tourism in Toronto was booming, buildings were going up everywhere, and there 
was no negative impact on our economy. If anything, as far as the city’s fortunes went, all of 
Rob’s issues were having a positive impact. People from all over the world wanted to come and 
visit” (212).  
14 Toronto City Council Special Meeting, November 18, 2013. 
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extends far beyond any particular mayor or saga or the walls of Toronto City 
Hall. It reflects a critical issue facing local governments and cities across 
Canada: remarkably little is known about the role and power of Canadian 
mayors. The responsibilities of mayors in Canada are “vague”15 and “generally 
quite unclear.”16 There is no ‘job description’ for mayors; in fact, there are more 
than 50 pieces of provincial legislation in Canada prescribing duties of mayors,17 
not including thousands of municipal by-laws and policies. It is often said that 
Canada has “weak mayors,” yet the public believe mayors are powerful.18 There 
have been calls to increase the institutional position and resources of mayors,19 
and yet the relative importance of these factors in Canada remains an open 																																																								
15 James Lightbody, City Politics, Canada (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 156. 
16 Andrew Sancton, “Mayors as Political Leaders,” in Maureen Mancuso, Richard G. Price and 
Ronald Wagenberg, eds., Leaders and Leadership in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 175.  
17 See list in Appendix A. 
18 In October 2015, Ipsos Public Affairs conducted a survey of more than 12,000 Canadians. In 
support of this research project, a question was included asking respondents to indicate whether 
they agree or disagree with the statement, “Canadian mayors have the power to make things 
happen in their communities” using a standard Likert scale. The survey results found that most 
Canadians believe that mayors have the power to make things happen in their communities. 
Overall, 72.1% of respondents agreed with the statement, including 17% who indicated strong 
agreement and 55.1% who indicated moderate agreement. 22% of respondents disagreed with 
the statement, including 4.9% who strongly disagreed, and 17.1% who moderately disagreed. 
See Appendix B for more details.  
19 Interest in adopting “strong mayor” features for the mayoralty in Canada emerges periodically, 
particularly when the broader municipal legislation is under review (for example, during 
discussions about the City of Toronto Act under Mayor David Miller’s tenure). Benjamin Barber’s 
popular book, If Mayors Ruled the World (2013), calls for strengthened mayors and the creation 
of a Global Parliament of Mayors. In other jurisdictions, much focus has been invested into 
investigating a bolstered institutional position of the mayor. For European examples, see: Henry 
Back, Hubert Heinelt and Annick Magnier, eds., The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the 
Changing Context of Local Democracy (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag fur 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2006); Hubert Heinelt, Annick Magnier, Marcello Cabria, and Herwig 
Reynaert, eds., Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018); Robin Hambleton and David Sweeting, “U.S.-Style Leadership for English 
Local Government?” Public Administration Review (64:4, 2004): 474-488.  
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question. A surprisingly small volume of literature exists on the topic. To date, 
there has not been a comprehensive study on mayors in Canada, and 
foundational questions about the nature of mayoral power remain unanswered.   
This project aims to address this gap by engaging in the first broad study 
of urban mayors in Canada. This project is not about the antics of Mayor Rob 
Ford, or any other individual mayor for that matter. Rather, it examines the 
Canadian mayoralty in ten cities to understand the role itself, and the extent to 
which Canadian mayors have the power to drive change in their cities – while 
investigating the contested concept of mayoral power itself. It is an inductive 
exploration into an understudied topic with important democratic and practical 
implications. Ultimately, this project aims to contribute new knowledge and 
advance a needed conversation about strengthening governance and leadership 
in Canada’s cities.  
Engaging in the study of mayors in Canada is fraught with challenge. In a 
recent article, Tom Urbaniak sets an agenda for studying mayors in Canada, 
recognizing the lack of a theoretical foundation and need to build a literature 
“almost literally from scratch.”20 He articulates the challenges of building a theory 
of mayoral leadership: the contested core concepts of “power,” “leadership” and 
“strong/weak mayor;” the numerous variables to be considered including 
personality, interests, and institutional features; methodological challenges 
arising from the sheer number of municipalities and variation among them; and, 																																																								
20 Tom Urbaniak, “Studying Mayoral Leadership in Canada and the United States,” International 
Journal of Canadian Studies v.49  (2014), 206. 
		
7 
the different approaches engaged in the study of urban politics. Despite these 
challenges, Urbaniak points to the importance of this endeavor:  
These intellectual dilemmas should not discourage the study of municipal 
leadership, considering the growing political focus on cities and 
municipalities, and increasing public concern about urban poverty, 
infrastructure, air quality, finances, public safety, and the conservation of 
vibrant communities. Cultivating local political leadership—and the 
conditions for such leadership to be effective and directed to salient 
purposes—may indeed be one of the most important social and public-
policy objectives of our time.21  
 
Canada’s cities play a critical role in many of the most important policy issues 
facing the nation, and yet rudimentary questions about local leadership and 
mayoral power remain unanswered. Therefore, the mayoralty in Canada is a 
worthy and timely object of academic examination.  
No single study can wholly address this knowledge gap. This study does 
not pretend to explain everything about mayors in Canada. In fact, it does not 
even examine all types of mayors in Canada.22 By focusing on mayors in 
Canada’s cities, little is learned which can be directly applied to small or rural 
communities, for example, as the mayoralty may be very different in those 
contexts (although the extent to which this is true is also unknown). Further, this 
study does not provide any broad predictive power. There are approximately four 
thousand municipalities and mayors in Canada, and many variables by which to 
segregate them – structure, size, scope, language, region, geography, legislative 																																																								
21 Ibid, 222.  
22 This study does not even examine all mayors in the cities in the sample, as there are many 
borough mayors in Montreal that are not examined. Additionally, not all heads of council in 
Canadian municipalities are referred to as “mayors.” Other common terms include warden or 
reeve, or in the case of regional municipalities, chair. The scope of this study also does not 
include an examination or comparison of the role of different types of heads of council in Canada.  
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context, and so on – so it would be impossible for any study to offer conclusions 
or findings which universally apply across Canada, or span the dimension of 
time. Instead, this study takes an inductive approach to examining the role and 
power of urban mayors in ten Canadian cities. It begins by analyzing data, 
identifying patterns, and drawing conclusions. It challenges assumptions and 
advances a new model for understanding mayoral power in a Canadian context. 
It is a starting point for a potentially much larger research agenda. 
 
Study Overview  
  A common format for presenting the findings of cross-case studies is to 
provide a chapter dedicated to each case and to present a comparative analysis 
at the end. This study is not organized this way. Instead, it is presented as a 
progressive investigation of mayoral power in Canada. Introductory chapters set 
the context for this investigation through a review of relevant literature and 
existing knowledge. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the mayoralty, drawing 
on Canadian and American sources. Previous studies of mayoral power are 
summarized. Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed in this study, 
including an overview of the case selection, a discussion of key terms such as 
“power” and “leadership” and how they are treated, and a summary of the 
research methods applied.  
 The first substantive investigation is presented in Part I, providing an 
institutional examination of mayoral power in ten cities. Here the mayoralty is 
understood as a central institution within local governments in Canada, with 
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powers established and defined through legislation and shaped by local 
arrangements in each city. Chapter 4 compares the formal or legal authority of 
mayors across cities, drawing from provincial legislation and municipal bylaws. 
Chapter 5 considers the varied local arrangements in each of the ten cities and 
how they empower mayors, such as the presence of political parties, resources 
provided to mayors, and other considerations. What emerges from these 
chapters is an institutional picture of the power of urban mayors, which although 
varied across Canada, is generally quite limited.  
 In an environment where mayoral power – on paper – is limited, are there 
other resources that mayors draw upon in practice to exercise power? Do the 
institutional variables of mayoral power matter? Part II takes up this challenge as 
the second substantive investigation of this study, examining mayoral power “in 
practice” drawing upon interviews with mayors and those who work most closely 
with them in each city. A narrative inquiry method is engaged that privileges the 
perspectives of those with direct experience.23 Chapter 6 presents a summary of 
the interview data, identifying perceptions of mayoral power in each of the cities 
in the study. A key finding is that perceptions of power “in practice” do not align 
with power “on paper” – in other words, institutional variations in mayoral power 
do not translate into perceptions of power. Instead, mayoral power is presented 
as a more complex concept involving interactions with various other actors 
																																																								
23 D. Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly, Narrative Inquiry: Experience and Story in 
Qualitative Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004); Sonia M. Ospina and Jennifer Dodge, 
“It’s About Time: Catching Method Up to Meaning – the Usefulness of Narrative Inquiry in Public 
Administration Research,” Public Administration Review Vol. 65, No. 2 (March-April 2005).  
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engaged in local government. Chapter 7 presents a more detailed summary of 
the role and expectations of mayors in practice, showcasing how mayors 
exercise power in their capacities as political, executive and community leaders. 
The final chapter of Part II presents a new model for understanding mayoral 
power in Canada, based upon the data presented in the previous chapters. The 
chapter argues that the “power” of a Canadian mayor is not found in legislation 
or bylaw, and it cannot be understood through traditional institutional categories 
(“strong mayor” or “weak mayor’”). Instead, the power of mayors in Canada 
emerges from being uniquely positioned at the nexus of the network of actors 
engaged in local government, and an ability to draw on various resources to 
shape, condition, enable or limit the engagement of these actors.  
 Part III applies this model through a closer examination of the mayoralty in 
the City of Toronto. A span of three mayors over 15 years is examined, paying 
close attention to the power of each mayor in their work with council, 
administration and the community on high profile initiatives during their 
respective tenures. The chapter examines Mayor David Miller’s quest for 
increased power and autonomy for the City of Toronto, Mayor Rob Ford’s efforts 
to “stop the gravy train” at City Hall, and Mayor John Tory’s pursuit of the 
SmartTrack commuter rail line. The chapter illustrates a picture of mayoral power 
in practice, and offers an example of how the model can be applied to examine 
power and governance at the local level.  
 The study concludes with Chapter 10, revisiting the central research 
question about mayoral power, and summarizes the findings of the study. 
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Traditionally, the power of mayors in Canada has been discounted in the 
academic literature, as a result of a narrow definition of mayoral power. It is 
argued that Canadian mayors, in practice, have the capacity to be enormously 
powerful, but in unexpected and less obvious ways. The study concludes by 
advancing larger questions about the capacity for effective local leadership in 
Canada’s cities, identifying an agenda for future research.  
“You don’t understand the job of the mayor!”24 captures a foundational 
issue facing cities across Canada: the role of the mayor is confused and 
misunderstood; simultaneously underestimated and overestimated. This has 
troubling practical and democratic implications for local government in Canada. 
This study aims to address outstanding questions about the role and power of 
mayors, while engaging in important and needed conversations about the 
leadership of Canada’s cities. It is hoped that the findings of this study offer new 
knowledge about local government and urban politics in Canada to the field of 
political science, and will be helpful for those engaged in the study of local 
government, public policy, political science, and related academic fields. The 
study may assist policy makers engaged in municipal issues, particularly when 
making decisions which shape the ability of mayors and those engaged in local 
government to lead in their cities.    
Finally, it is hoped that this research is of value to individuals who work 
closely with mayors – and perhaps even to mayors themselves.   
 																																																								
24 Toronto City Council Special Meeting, November 18, 2013.  
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Chapter 2 | THE MAYORALTY IN CANADA 
 
 
The mayoralty is a global institution, existing on every populated continent 
and dating back centuries. The term ‘mayor’ derives from the Latin maior or 
magnus – meaning great – and its use dates at least back to the 12th century 
when the title of ‘portreeve’ was replaced with ‘mayor’ for the appointed chief 
officer of London, England. At the time, the post was considered mostly 
ceremonial as “the symbolic first citizen of the locality.”25 The term ‘mayor’ came 
into use in various jurisdictions at other points in time. Paris was led by a ‘provost 
of the merchants’ until the incumbent was shot on the steps of City Hall following 
the Storming of the Bastille in 1789, and the city’s first ‘mayor’ was elected the 
following day.  
Today, the term ‘mayor’ generally refers to the highest-ranking local 
official. In most but not all contexts, the mayor is the head of an elected council 
or some form of local governance structure. However, there is variation in the 
role26 across nations – and often, as in Canada, between sub-national 
jurisdictions. Some countries have a tradition of appointed mayors, while others 
																																																								
25 Colin Copus, Leading the Localities: Executive mayors in English local governance 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 23. 
26 Garrand (2007) states, “[T]he pattern of mayoral government is not unified; mayors exist at 
different tiers of local government, or share the local political landscape with indirectly elected 
counterparts; in other states the elected mayor is the only form of local political leadership; and in 
others only the council-appointed leader exists. Further, mayoral powers, responsibilities, 
relationships with political parties and influence with government also vary. […] Mayors come to 
office through a range of voting systems, hold an array of powers and responsibilities, and have a 
relationship with their council that is party driven by institutional arrangements, partly by cultural 
and political factors, and partly by the personality of the mayor.” (9) 
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have directly elected mayors,27 only recently including Britain.28 Copus 
characterizes some nations, such as New Zealand, Canada and Norway, as 
having “politically weak” mayors, contrasting them with France, Italy, Germany, 
and the United States, where mayors are “politically strong.”29 Italian mayors can 
select their own executive body, which can include non-council members, and 
have the unilateral ability to appoint or remove members at any time. 30 French 
mayors are strong, considered “the locus of local power and decisions.”31 
																																																								
27 According to Copus (2006), several European countries including Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia, and South American nations including Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatamala, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela all moved to 
directly elected mayors in the 1990s. 
28 A distinctive feature of the mayoralty in Britain is the separation between the mayor and the 
head of council, rendering the position of mayor to be primarily ceremonial in purpose and 
function. In most British cities and towns, the mayor presides over council meetings but is 
apolitical and acts in an ambassadorial role. The political head of council, on the other hand, is 
the leader of the majority party. However, over the past two decades, significant change has 
occurred. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s ‘reform agenda’ included the introduction of strong, 
executive and directly elected mayors as a means of promoting interest and understanding of 
local government. The 2000 Local Government Act introduced several changes including a shift 
towards an executive model of decision making (compared to a committee-based model) with a 
cabinet of ruling party members, and greater powers over the delivery of services. The Act 
provides that citizens of any county, district or city can, through referendum, select to directly 
elect their mayors. To date, approximately 30 referendums have been held, and most have 
decided against the directly electing their mayors. Observers claim this is due to skepticism from 
sitting councillors, and concerns that consolidating executive power. The City of London is one of 
community that has opted for direct election and an executive model. On May 7, 1998, 1.2 million 
people (or 72%) voted in the Greater London Authority Referendum in support of creating a 
Greater London Authority composed of a directly elected mayor and assembly. London’s first 
elected mayor came into power in 2000 and later defeated by Conservative candidate in 2008. 
The Mayor of London now holds more executive responsibility, including over strategic planning, 
emergency services, transport, economic development, and power to create development 
corporations within the Greater London Authority. 
29 Colin Copus, Leading the Localities: Executive mayors in English local governance, 17. 
30 Ibid, 17. 
31 Oliver Borraz, “Mayoral Leadership in France,” in Oliver Borraz et al, Local Leadership and 
Decision Making: A Study of France, Germany, United States and Britain (London: LGC 
Communications, 1994).  
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Differences aside,32 Garrand argues the mayoralty has come to be viewed as a 
central institution in local government in communities around the world: 
Overall, the mayoralty is a socially and political significant institution. It 
represents one answer to problems posed by the ever-growing size, 
complexity and impersonality of towns and cities. Civic heads provide a 
symbolic centre that can try to give meaning to notions of community in 
increasingly unpromising urban places. […] They are seen to represent a 
single direct centre of political authority, with power derived both from how 
their roles are formally defined and from the ways they manage to use a 
variety of political resources to expand those roles.33  
 
The mayoralty has evolved from a ceremonial role to one often associated with 
power, whether real or perceived, and tied to notions of community, local identity 
and sense of place. Much can be learned through an examination of literatures 
related to the mayoralty, as critical context to inform the study of urban mayors in 
Canada. This chapter presents a summary of three distinct but important 
literatures: first, a brief overview of the history of the mayoralty in Canada, as a 
foundation for understanding the current landscape of Canada’s cities; second, 
themes from existing academic literature on the mayoralty, from both Canada 
and the United States, to understand current knowledge; and third, a summary of 
existing models and theories for understanding mayoral power.  
 
History of the Mayoralty in Canada 
It is difficult to pinpoint the genesis of the mayoralty in Canadian.34 Most 
																																																								
32 For a helpful summary of the mayoral role by country, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayor 
33 John Garrand, Heads of the Local State: Mayors, Provosts and Burgomasters Since 1800, 9.  
34 This is, at least in part, because it is difficult to pinpoint the genesis of Canadian local 
government, and various historic accounts use different starting points. One version of Tindal and 
Tindal (2004) states a mayor and council were elected in 1647 in the Montreal area as the first 
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accounts suggest a point of origin in the 18th century. At the time, the lands that 
would become Canada were composed of British colonies. A new statute in 1793 
enabled British-appointed magistrates to convene meetings of local residents in 
order to select town wardens as “a corporation to represent the whole inhabitants 
of the parish or township” 35 with some power to act on behalf of their inhabitants 
and town property.36 This statute came at a time of rapid population growth. The 
influx of American Loyalists created a need for increased local services, and a 
growing number of petitions were advanced to the British government seeking to 
establish new municipal corporations and increase local autonomy. In 1785, the 
first municipal corporation in what would become Canada was established in 
Saint John, New Brunswick.37 
Perhaps the more significant genesis, however, occurred more than a 
half-century later with the passing of the Municipal Corporations Act (often 
referred to as ‘The Baldwin Act’) in 1849.38 This Act “sketched in outline, at least, 
																																																																																																																																																																				
elected local government in what would become Canada. This model was short-lived, viewed to 
be “a dangerous innovation” by the home government in France, and the mayor and councillors 
all resigned in 1663. This reference, however, was not found in any other texts. The more 
common point of origin cited in Canadian local government textbooks is the establishment of the 
first formally-established municipal corporation in Saint John, New Brunswick in 1785.  
35 Ian MacF. Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations (Toronto: Thomson Reuters 
Canada Limited, 2009), section 8.1. 
36 It should be noted that the power to legislate remained in the hands of the magistrates, and 
only wealthy landowners participated in local elections, so they generally held control over how 
what limited local power was provided would be exercised. The statute also provided local 
residents to select a town clerk, assessors, collectors and pound keeper.  
37 Andrew Sancton, Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective, 2nd Edition (Don Mills: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 4.  
38 14 years earlier, in 1835, the British Government had passed the Municipal Corporations 
Reform Act in England, allowing for a greater range of affairs to be governed locally and through 
more democratic means. Many cite this Act as the template for the Baldwin Act. The Municipal 
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the framework of the municipal system of Canada as it has since continued 
today.”39 The Act stipulated that heads of council in cities and towns would be 
called mayors40 and be selected from within and by the council for a one-year 
period.41 It also provided that mayors would hold specific responsibilities: to 
preside over meetings,42 to summon special meetings as required,43 to serve as 
an ex officio Justice of the Peace within the municipal boundary,44 and to 
administer oaths.45 Heads of council could resign at any time and successors 
would be selected in the same manner in which the departing incumbent was 
selected.46 This is the earliest legal foundation for the role of the mayor in 
Canada, and as identified in Chapter 4, many of these basic tenets of the role 
remain in place today. 
In 1867, the British North America Act (now the Constitution Act, 1867) 
established Canada as a constitutional monarchy with continued recognition of 
the British Crown as its head of state. The Constitution established a presence of 
the Crown to empower each province, creating a distinct form of federalism with 																																																																																																																																																																				
Corporations Reform Act provided that mayors would be selected from within elected councils for 
a one-year period. This same arrangement was included in the Baldwin Act. 
39 Biggar, Municipal Manual of 1900, as quoted in Ian MacF. Rogers, The Law of Canadian 
Municipal Corporations, section 8.1. 
40 Municipal Corporations Act (Canada), 1849, section CVII reads, “The Warden of each County 
shall be the Head of the Municipal Council or Corporation of such County, the Mayor of each City 
and the Town shall be the head of the Town or Common Council or Corporation of such City or 
Town respectively, and the Townreeve of each Township and Village, the head of the 
Municipality or Corporation of such Township or Village respectively.” 
41 The Baldwin Act specifies slightly different electoral arrangements depending on the type of 
municipality.  
42 Municipal Corporations Act (Canada), 1849, section XXVII. 
43 Ibid, section LXXXIII.  
44 Ibid, section CIX.  
45 Ibid, section CXIII.  
46 Ibid, section CXI.  
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largely autonomous provinces. Scholars have described the Crown as Canada’s 
oldest, most pervasive and most important political institution, as the source of 
power in Canada’s political system and the organizing principle of Canadian 
government.47 Importantly, however, Canada’s Constitution did not reference a 
local level of government or establish any relationship between local entities and 
the Crown. Instead, it placed municipal institutions as the responsibility of their 
respective provinces. Section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 enumerates 
that each province “may exclusively make laws in relation to […] municipal 
institutions of the province”48 as well as “generally all matters of a merely local 
[…] nature in the province.”49 As such, while the Crown empowers the actions of 
the federal and provincial governments, municipalities are empowered through 
provincial legislation as corporations – quite literally the incorporation of their 
residents, through statute of their respective provincial governments. This is a 
profound and often overlooked point. In the words of one legal scholar, “[t]he 
distinguishing quality of a municipal corporation is its power of loca; the 
inhabitants, being incorporated, are authorized in their corporate capacity to 
legislate in respect of matters of local concern.”50  
Today Canada’s local governments operate differently from federal and 
provincial governments in many important respects: municipalities generally 																																																								
47 For an excellent text on the important role of the Crown in Canada, see: David E. Smith, The 
Invisible Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1995). 
48 Constitution Act, section 92(8).  
49 Ibid, 92(16).  
50 Ian MacF. Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations (Toronto: Thompson Reuters 
Canada Limited, 2009), section 1.29.  
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have no separate political legislative and executive branches; there is typically 
no ‘government’ in power or official opposition; there is no cabinet or the 
empowerment of individuals through some form of ministerial responsibility; they 
are not considered Westminster parliamentary systems, with no separation 
between a head of state and head of government; the institutions involved in 
governing are different, typically not involving political parties (and even where 
parties exist, local political parties are unlike federal and provincial parties in 
several respects); expectations for openness and transparency are considerably 
higher at the local level; and, importantly for this study, the process of selecting, 
electing and empowering leaders is different. Because of the differences 
between local and other levels of government, the role of the mayor in Canada is 
distinct from the role of first ministers in federal and provincial governments in 
many important respects. 
 Finally, in placing municipal institutions within the purview of the 
provinces, the Constitution established a framework where Canada would not 
have a system of municipal government, but rather systems of municipal 
government. The Constitution did not enumerate anything about “municipal 
institutions” or addressing “matters of a merely local nature” which may have 
facilitated some degree of consistency across Canada. Instead, municipal 
government has developed at least somewhat independently in each of 
Canada’s provinces, influenced by the historic evolution, political culture, and 
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other features unique to each province.51 The historic evolution of local 
government in Canada has produced the current context where the mayoralty is 
unique among Canadian political leadership roles, and where it can vary from 
province to province, and from city to city – making the Canadian mayoralty a 
particularly interesting object of study.  
 
Themes from Current Literature  
There is a vast body of media articles, books, blogs, websites, and other 
popular content about mayors in Canada. In Canada’s largest cities, there is 
near daily coverage of the mayor’s activities and political positions. National 
newspapers feature discussions about mayors,52 and public figures make regular 
commentary about Canadian mayors53 particularly in the wake of controversy.54 
A review of academic literature finds a much smaller volume of work. There is 
considerably less literature on mayors compared to works on other political 
leaders in Canada.55 Mayors feature as characters in many fields of study 
including economic development and urban planning, but surprisingly have not 																																																								
51 For an excellent review of the systems of municipal government in Canada’s provinces, see 
Andrew Sancton and Robert Young, eds, Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in 
Canada’s Provinces (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).  
52 For example, see special Globe and Mail feature: Globe Staff ,“Mayors get things done. Should 
they run the world?” TED Ideas Lab Special Feature in the Globe and Mail, March 15 2014.  
53 For example, see: Richard Florida, “What I Would Change About Mayors in Canada,” 
Huffington Post, June 24 2013.  
54 For example, see: Preston Manning, “How to make city mayors ‘responsible’,” The Globe and 
Mail, July 21 2014; David Mulroney: “Job one for Toronto’s next mayor: municipal diplomacy,” 
The Globe and Mail, July 20 2014; Stephen Quinn, “Sideshow Rob did Canada’s big-city mayors 
a favour,” The Globe and Mail, February 28 2014.  
55 David Siegel, Joseph Kushner, and Hanna Stanwick, “Canadian Mayors: A profile and 
determinants of electoral success,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 10 (June 2001), 539. 
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been a serious object of study in Canadian political science or local government 
fields. What little has been written about mayors is found in textbook chapters,56 
a small body of work on specific mayors,57 and a few autobiographical texts.58 
The most comprehensive description of the role of Canadian mayors is a chapter 
by Andrew Sancton in a 1994 book on political leadership in Canada.59 There are 
also a few studies on specific aspects of Canadian mayoralty, including the 
electoral determinants of success,60 the process of recruiting candidates,61 and 
																																																								
56 For example, see: Andrew Sancton, Local Government in Canada: An Urban Perspective (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), 221-242; and Richard C. Tindal and Susan Nobes Tindal, 
Local Government in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson, 2004), 262-264.  
57 See: F. H. Armstrong, “William Lyon Mackenzie, First Mayor of Toronto: A Story of a Critic in 
Power,” in The Canadian Historical Review (University of Toronto Press, Vol. XLVIII, No. 4, Dec 
1967); Jon Caulfield, The Tiny Perfect Mayor (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Publishers, 
1974); Timothy J. Coulton, Big Daddy: Frederick G. Gardiner and the Building of Metropolitan 
Toronto (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980); Robyn Doolittle, Crazy Town: The Rob 
Ford Story (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2014); Brian McKenna and Susan Purcell, Drapeau 
(Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1980); Allan Levine, ed., Your Worship: The Lives of Eight 
of Canada’s Most Unforgettable Mayors (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1989); Stan Persky, The 
House that Jack Built: Mayor Jack Volrich and Vancouver Politics (Vancouver: New Star Books, 
1980); Ivor Tossell, The Gift of Ford: How Toronto’s Unlikeliest Man Became Its Most Notorious 
Mayor (Toronto: Random House, 2012); and Tom Urbaniak, Her Worship: Hazel McCallion and 
the Development of Mississauga (Toronto: City of Toronto Press, 2009).  
58 See: Nathan Phillips, Mayor of All The People (Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 1967); John 
Sewell, Mackenzie: A Political Biography (Toronto: Lorimer, 2002); Victor R. Russell, Mayors of 
Toronto: Volume I 1834-1899 (Erin, Ontario: The Boston Mills Press, 1982).; and Hazel 
McCallion and Robert Brehl, Hurricane Hazel: The Life and Times of Hazel McCallion, Canada’s 
Favourite Mayor (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2014).  
59 Andrew Sancton, “Mayors as Political Leaders,” in Leaders and Leadership in Canada, edited 
by Maureen Mancuso, Richard G. Price and Ronald Wagenberg (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1994).  
60 David Siegel, Joseph Kushner, and Hanna Stanwick, “Canadian Mayors: A profile and 
determinants of electoral success,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 10 (June 2001), 539-
553. 
61 Anthony Long, and Brian Slemko, “The Recruitment of Local Decision-Makers in Five 
Canadian Cities,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 7 (September 1974), 550-559.  
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assessments of specific municipal elections.62 A recent book called Mayors 
Gone Bad by Philip Slayton profiled the antics of some of Canada’s most 
controversial mayors.63   
The fact that mayors have not been an object of serious study in Canada 
is symptomatic of a larger issue: namely, that municipal and local government 
has occupied, historically, only a small part of Canada’s political science 
agenda.64 It is only within the last few decades that scholars began to study local 
government in its own right, with early works including Crawford (1954),65 
Plunkett (1968),66 Rowat (1969),67 Higgins (1977)68 and the first edition of a 
textbook on local government by Tindal and Tindal in 1979.69 Even today, 
Canada has only a “handful of urban academics”70 and much less is known 
																																																								
62 For example, see: Joseph Kushner, David Siegel and Hannah Stanwick. “Ontario Municipal 
Elections: Voting Trends and Determinants of Electoral Success in a Canadian Province.” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 30 (1997), 539-553; and, Hannah Stanwick,“A Megamayor 
for All People? Voting Behavior and Electoral Success in the 1997 Toronto Municipal Election.” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 33 (September 2000), 549-568.  
63 Philip Slayton, Mayors Gone Bad (Toronto: Viking, 2015).  
64 Zack Taylor and Gabriel Eidelman, “Canadian Political Science and the City : A Limited 
Engagement,” Canadian Journal of Political Science (43:4, December 2010).  
65 Kenneth G. Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1954).  
66 T. J. Plunkett, Urban Canada and Its Government (Kingston: Institute of Local Government, 
Queens University, 1978).  
67 Donald C. Rowat, The Canadian Municipal System: Essays on the Improvement of Local 
Government (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969).  
68 Donald J. H. Higgins, Urban Canada: Its Politics and Government (Toronto: The MacMillan 
Company of Canada Limited, 1977). 
69 Richard C. Tindal and Susan Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-
Hill, 1979).  
70 Kennedy Stewart and Patrick J. Smith, “Immature Policy Analysis: Building Capacity in Eight 
Major Canadian Cities,” in Laurent Doubuzinskis, Michael Howlett and David Laycock, eds. 
Policy Analysis in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 266.  
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about decision-making and political behavior at the local level.71 In the 1980s, 
Sancton referred to the study of local politics as an “academic ghetto”72 and a 
2010 paper by Taylor and Eidelman argues “this is perhaps as true today as it 
was then.”73 The lack of attention given to local and urban politics within their 
field of political science is a serious deficit, particularly given increasing 
recognition of the economic and social importance of cities.74   
Not only has there been limited academic study of mayors – with need to 
develop a literature “almost literally from scratch”75 – what literature does exist 
acknowledges that the responsibilities of mayors in Canada are “vague”76 and 
																																																								
71 Robert Young, “Introduction: Multilevel Governance and Its Central Research Question in 
Canadian Cities,” in Young, Robert, and Martin Horak, eds. Sites of Governance: Multilevel 
Governance and Policy Making in Canada's Big Cities (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 2012), 3.  
72 Andrew Sancton, “Conclusion: Canadian City Politics in Comparative Perspective,” in Warren 
Magnusson and Anndrew Sancton, eds., City Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1983): 310. 
73 Zack Taylor and Gabriel Eidelman, “Canadian Political Science and the City: A Limited 
Engagement,” Canadian Journal of Political Science (43:4, December 2010): 976.  
74 This is recognized throughout the literature on cities, local government and urban politics. For 
example, see: Caroline Andrew et al, Urban Affairs: Back on the Policy Agenda (Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2002); Neil Bradford, “Why Cities Matter: Policy Research 
Perspectives for Canada,” Canadian Policy Research Network Discussion Paper, 2002; Alan 
Broadbent, Urban Nation: Why We Need to Give Power Back to the Cities to Make Canada 
Strong (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishing Ltd, 2008); Tom Courchene, “Global Futures for 
Canada’s Global Cities,” Policy Matters (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2007); 
Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002); John Lorinc, The 
New City: How the Crisis in Canada’s Urban Centres is Reshaping the Nation (Toronto: Penguin, 
2006); Mario Polese and Richard Stren, eds., Social Sustainability of Cities: Diversity and the 
Management of Change, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2000); Jeffery M. Sellers, 
Governing from Below: Urban Regions and the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); John Sewell, A New City Agenda (Toronto: Zephyr, 2004); and, Robert 
Young and Martin Horak. Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and Policy Making in 
Canada's Big Cities (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012).   
75 Tom Urbaniak, “Studying Mayoral Leadership in Canada and the United States,” 206. 
76 James Lightbody, City Politics, Canada (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 156. 
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“generally quite unclear.”77 Because the role is ambiguous and undefined, it is 
argued that the characteristics of the individual in the role become critical 
variables, perhaps more so than in well defined leadership roles: 
Because of the vagueness of their specified powers and duties, their 
relationships with other members of council can vary greatly even within a 
particular city with the occupant of the mayor’s chair changes. The extent 
to which a mayor is pre-eminent in council depends much on the 
personality of the particular incumbent. If the mayor has a forceful 
personality and has developed a network of close working relationships 
with other members of council, then the incumbent mayor may acquire 
informally a position of strong leadership in council and be able to 
exercise the powers of a strong chief executive.78 
 
This claim that Canadian mayors, because of the vagueness of their role, can 
“exercise the powers of a strong executive” 79 is an unpopular view. Rather, the 
overarching theme of the Canadian literature is to emphasize the weakness of 
mayors in Canada. The role of the mayor in Canada is described as “remarkably 
limited”80 with “no strong mayors in Canada.”81 Apart from the rights and powers 
held by mayors as members of council, their duties are described as being 
“primarily administrative in character.”82 Mayors in Canada are often described 
as having only ‘one vote on council,’ as do all other members, and no authority to 
act for the city or corporation other than through the authority of the council as a 
																																																								
77 Andrew Sancton, “Mayors as Political Leaders,” in Leaders and Leadership in Canada, edited 
by Maureen Mancuso, Richard G. Price and Ronald Wagenberg (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 175.  
78 Donald J. H. Higgins, Urban Canada: Its Politics and Government (Toronto: The MacMillan 
Company of Canada Limited, 1977), 96.  
79 Ibid, 96.  
80 Andrew Sancton, Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective, 228. 
81 Ibid, 228. 
82 Rogers, Ian MacF., The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, 153.2. 
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whole.83 In some cases, it has been argued that the mayor is actually in an 
underprivileged position within council:  
In most Canadian municipalities, mayors preside over meetings and have 
a special role in determining the agenda, but this gives them little in the 
way of special advantage. Presiding over council meetings often puts 
mayors at a disadvantage. In order to contribute to debates, mayors 
usually have to leave the chair and ask someone else to take over.84 
 
Other observers have argued that local institutional arrangements in Canada, 
and specifically the position of the mayor within council, can also limit a mayor’s 
power:  
His power in council is no greater than that of any other member, he can 
hardly be held to account for action or inaction on the part of his council. 
Because he does not and cannot act as the head of a party in the council, 
he has no weapon, comparable to party discipline, to compel support of 
the measures he proposed. He is also handicapped in giving leadership to 
his council because some of the other members may be potential 
competition for the mayoral chair and they may not be anxious to see his 
proposals succeed.85  
 
As a result of their limited power, a common argument is that Canadian mayors 
must focus on coalition building and ultimately will be driven to compromise 
positions in effort to advance an agenda: 
[T]he mayor’s vote is only one, equal in power to each of the other 
councillors. To accomplish anything like an innovative policy agenda, the 
mayor must be an astute political leader who devotes time to coalition-
building and personality politics. This individual must be prepared to 
sacrifice the optimal policy (as he or she sees it) to win broader 
acquiescence for more incremental actions. Otherwise, the mayor will 
have to be satisfied with occupying the moral high ground while not 
actually accomplishing anything.”86 																																																								
83 Ibid, 53.2. 
84 Andrew Sancton, Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective, Second Edition (Don 
Mills Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2015), 230. 
85 Kenneth Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, 56. 
86 James Lightbody, City Politics, Canada (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 156.  
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As this statement illustrates, the literature in Canada is not optimistic about the 
ability of Canadian mayors to lead their councils or drive agendas in their cities. 
Given that local political parties or other formal coalitions are absent in most 
cities in Canada (at least, on the surface), councils consist of individuals who 
often hold varied perspectives and are not necessarily organized around any 
shared ideology or agenda. The role of the mayor, as a head of a group of this 
nature, has been referenced as akin to “herding cats.”87  
 Where does the idea that Canadian mayors are “weak” come from? Given 
the limited literature on Canadian mayors, what has been written borrows heavily 
from the American literature and is necessarily comparative. The American 
“strong/weak” mayor typology is a core concept that has been adopted widely 
into the Canadian literature and local government lexicon,88 but often without 
critical discussion of its meaning or applicability to local government in Canada. 
Given the pervasive influence of these terms, and their centrality to this study, a 
review of their original context is warranted.  
 America has an established tradition of defining its forms of local 
government, dating back to the late nineteenth century.89 Today there are at 																																																								
87 Richard C. Tindal and Susan Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada (Scarborough, 
Ontario: Nelson, 2004), 102.  
88 Interestingly, the term ‘weak mayor’ was also used by participants in most of the interviews 
conducted with politicians, administrators and community leaders for this study.  
89 A 1925 book on American City Government suggests there was little interest in local 
government structures in Colonial America. “[Municipal] activities and the forms of their 
government did not greatly concern Colonial authorities […] Their powers and functions as then 
construed were strictly local and largely ‘private’” (Anderson, 283). By the mid nineteenth century, 
however, increasing complexity and cost of local government led to an interest in defining and 
evaluating forms of government. Some sources point to the establishment of the National 
Municipal League in 1895, created in part to establish a model city charter, as a departure point 
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least four common forms of local government in the United States: the mayor-
council system, the council-manager system, the commission system, and the 
town meeting system.90 There are variants of all four. Almost all local 
governments in the United States today use one of the first two – the mayor-
council form (34%) and the council-manager form (55%).91  
 The mayor-council model is a longstanding form of local government in 
America.92 In 1895, the National Municipal League was established, partly in 
effort to address mounting corruption in local government. The initial task of the 
League involved developing a “model city charter,” first published in 1899, to 
promote transparency and accountability in local government. The charter 
envisioned a separation of executive (mayor) and legislative (council) powers, in 
effort to introduce the “checks and balances” of the federal system into local 
government.93 The charter envisioned democratically elected mayors with 
responsibility for the administration of local government services, including 
appointing all department heads. Direct election, a separation of powers, and 
concentrated executive power were viewed as steps towards greater 
accountability to the public, protection from corruption, and independence from 																																																																																																																																																																				
for national-scale discussions about forms of government (Ridley and Notling 1934). A 1938 
article states, “In recent years a great deal of emphasis has been placed upon improvements in 
form of government. In numerous instances, reformers have insistent that a change from an 
existing form of city government […] would solve the city’s governmental problems. […] While a 
form of government of recognized merit may not be considered a panacea for the many ills 
which beset our municipalities, it is nevertheless important” (Phillips, 91). 
90 For a helpful overview each form, see: National League of Cities, “Forms of Local 
Government.” Available online: www.nlc.org/resource/cities-101-forms-of-local-government. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ridley and Notling 1934, 1; Phillips: 1938, 93.  
93 Ridley and Notling 1934, 1; Svara 1994, xxi. 
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business interests.94 The “model city charter” established the basic blueprint for 
the mayor-council form of government that remains in many cities today.  
 By the early twentieth century, the need for and complexity of municipal 
services was rapidly expanding. As the nation urbanized and innovations in 
technology – including electric lights, motor vehicles and machines – altered the 
functions of local government, a more “professional” approach to municipal 
administration was desired. 
Modern city government thus became a great business enterprise calling 
for administrative ability and leadership at a high order and a greater 
variety of skilled and technical workers than found in any private 
enterprise of similar size. […] The theory that democracy depended upon 
the diffusion of power among many officials elected for a short time 
became increasingly impracticable and gradually disappeared with the 
rapid growth and complexity of urban life in general and of municipal 
services in particular.95  
 
These conditions led to the emergence of the council-manager form of 
government. In 1905, a University of Chicago professor advocated for the hiring 
of a professional manager to oversee administration and establish the budget. 
This idea became popular with the United States Chamber of Commerce due to 
its “businesslike” model, where voters (viewed as akin to shareholders) select a 
council (akin to directors) who appoint a manager (akin to the chief executive) to 
oversee operations.96 In 1908, the Council of Staunton, Virginia appointed a 
“general manager” and delegated authority over day-to-day administration of 
municipal services to the manager. In 1914, eight general managers from cities 																																																								
94 Schragger 2006, 2547. 
95 Ridley and Notling 1934, 4. 
96 Rabin and Dodd 1985, 23. 
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across the United States met and formed what would later become the 
International City Managers’ Association (ICMA). In 1915, the National Municipal 
League modified its model city charter to reflect the design of what has now 
become known as council-manager form. By the 1930s, more than 440 
American cities had adopted this form.97 The council-manager form is now the 
predominant form of local government in the United States.98 This model is 
based on a principle of unity. Power is concentrated in a legislative body (council 
as a whole), which controls the executive (led by an appointed professional 
manager, not the mayor).99 There are no “checks and balances” in this form as 
the appointed manager serves at the pleasure of the council, and has no power 
to “check” the council.100 A comparison of the mayor-council and council-
manager forms of local government is presented in Table 1. 
There are variants within both (and other) forms of local government – 
including, notably, based on the role of the mayor. The terms “strong mayor” and 
“weak mayor” refer to variants of the mayor-council form, reflecting the extent to 
which executive authority is concentrated in the mayor. A mayor-council “strong 
mayor” has extensive executive authority including the ability to appoint and 
dismiss staff, prepare budgets, and direct the efforts of departments. A “weak 
mayor” is characterized by a fragmentation of power, a more limited ability to 
appoint or remove staff (as some are directly elected and/or appointed by other  
																																																								
97 Ridley and Notling 1934, 7. 
98 National League of Cities, “Forms of Local Government.” 
99 Svara and Watson 2010. 
100 Svara 1994 
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Table 1: Comparison of mayor-council and council-manager forms of 
government  
Mayor-Council Form101 Council-Manager Form 
Based on principle of separation of 
powers 
Based on unitary principle  
Often described as similar to 
American national and state 
government  
Often described as similar to 
parliamentary systems, and somewhat 
similar to corporate governance models  
Mayor is directly elected Mayor often chosen from among elected 
Council, or can be directly elected 
Mayor oversees administration – and 
can have “strong” or “weak” powers 
depending on authority to oversee 
administration, make policy, and set 
the budget 
Council oversees administration, makes 
policy and sets the budget  
Can appoint a professional manager 
who reports to the mayor 
Appointment of a professional manager 
who reports to council  
Second most common form; often 
found in very small or older, larger 
cities (eg. New York, Houston, Salt 
Lake City) 
Most common form; growing in 
popularity, particularly with populations 
over 10,000 (eg. Phoenix, San Antonio) 
 
officials), and a more limited role in preparing the budget. “Weak mayors” are 
those in mayor-council forms who lack integrated administrative control over the 
operation of city government.102 
Although many mayor-council cities have “strong mayors” and many 
council-manager cities have “weaker” mayors, the terms “weak mayor” and 
“council-manager” are not synonymous. Similarly, “strong mayor” and “mayor-
council” are not synonymous. This is a common misconception, acknowledged in 																																																								
101 Chart adapted from Svara 1994; Svara 2009; Watson and Svara 2010; and National League 
of Cities, “Forms of Local Government.” 
102 Svara 1990, 47 
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the American literature as well.103 Generally “strong” and “weak” refer to the 
extent of power held by mayors within mayor-council systems: 
The terms strong and weak should only be used to refer to variations in 
the mayor-council form, where mayors have formal powers over other 
participants in the governmental process but vary in the extent of these 
powers. The terms are often used inappropriately to distinguish between 
the mayor-council mayor and council-manager mayor, who does not have 
such formal powers. Their use is inappropriate because mayors cannot be 
measured on a single scale that extends from strong to weak.104  
 
In some cases, the “strong” and “weak” mayor variants of the mayor-council 
system are positioned as being different enough to be described as distinct 
forms of local government. Rabin and Dodd describe three variants of the mayor-
council system, including “weak mayor-council,” “strong-mayor council” and 
“strong mayor-council with CEO.”105 New York State legislation describes 
“council-manager,” “strong mayor-council,” and “weak mayor-council” as distinct 
options for New York local governments in their respective charters.106 Some 
authors identify variants of the council-manager form depending on the power of 
the mayor, including Hansell’s “council-manager with empowered mayor” 
variant.107 To add to the confusion, numerous hybrids between the forms and 
other variants have been established over time (or in the clever words of Phillips 
in 1938, “a certain amount of pioneering has been done”108). Observers note a 
																																																								
103 Svara 1994. 
104 Svara 1994, xxii  
105 Rabin and Dodd, 1985, 23.  
106  New York Department of State, “Local Government Handbook,” 6th  Edition, Published in 
2009. 
107 Hansell 1998; DeSantis and Renner 2002. 
108 Phillips, 1938.  
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“general convergence” of forms over the past several decades,109 with the 
distinction between them growing increasingly blurry.110 Some have argued that, 
in practice, differences between forms are more apparent than real,111 and 
established terminology may be falling out of fashion. In the words of one 
American city manager, “we don’t really say ‘weak mayor’ anymore. Mayors 
don’t like it. We say strong council.” 112 
 If one were to look for a similar discussion on the forms of Canadian local 
government and their evolution throughout history, the search would be met with 
great disappointment. While there is recognition throughout the literature that the 
form and function of local government varies across Canada – in terms of 
structure, size and scale, powers and authority, responsibilities, institutional 
features such as the presence or absence of political parties, and more – there is 
no established nomenclature to distinguish one “form” of Canadian local 
government from another. Instead, the Canadian local government literature 																																																								
109 DeSantis and Renner 2002, 95. 
110 Renner 1998; Boynton and DeSantis 1990; Frederickson and Johnson 2001). 
111 In the words of Lockard, “It is sometimes said that the difference between mayor-council and 
manager-council government is that the former retains the traditional American principle of 
separation of powers and that the latter system has legislative supremacy. The reasoning is that 
the mayor stands in somewhat the same theoretical position as a governor of the President, both 
of whom deal with a separate legislative body in a government where both branches have 
independent authority and neither is subordinate to the other. […] This distinction is more 
apparent than real. On one hand, specialization of governmental tasks has produced in the 
British government a sharp separation of actual power between the executive and the legislative 
elements of government, the classic interpretation of the British government notwithstanding. By 
the same token, it is nonsense to talk of American government at the national or state level as if 
the executive and legislative branches were islands apart. […] Exactly the same thing can be 
said of mayor-council relationships. True, they are apart in a sense […] but they must share 
power not only between themselves but with other governmental elements and with 
nongovernmental elements so they all bargain, deploy, and maneuver in the making of public 
policy. So too with managers and their councils” (1969, 142). 
112 Conversation with researcher at ICMA Conference, October 2015. 
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tends to borrow American terminology and concepts, despite their contested 
meanings, often with limited discussion about their applicability in a Canadian 
context. There are references throughout the literature – including in textbooks 
and articles – that Canada generally employs the “council-manager” form of 
government,113 and has a “weak mayor system.” A strict interpretation of these 
terms in context, however, would find such references inconsistent. The term 
“weak mayor” or “weak mayor system” refer to a variant of the mayor-council 
form of government, which is not present in Canada. Therefore, and as this 
author has argued elsewhere, 114 the term “weak mayor” is not ideally suited to 
describe the mayoralty in Canada. In addition to being technically inaccurate, the 
term loses its relative meaning in a Canadian context, as there are no “strong 
mayors” on the spectrum. Most importantly, it reflects a narrow definition of 
mayoral power by privileging the formal-legal dimensions of power. In the words 
of one Canadian observer, “while the legislation does not on its face appear to 
create a “strong mayor system,” it has generally been the case that a head is in a 
position to be as “strong”115 as he or she has the desire or ability to be.”116 As 
this study will illustrate, a closer examination of mayoral power in Canada 																																																								
113 Plunkett, 1968; Fenn and Siegel, 2007.   
114 Kate Graham, “Does Canada have a ‘weak mayor’ system?” Paper presented to the Canadian 
Political Science Association, Toronto Ontario, May 2017.  
115 As articulated here, the term “strong mayor” refers to a variant of the mayor-council system of 
government, which is not present in Canada. It is technically inaccurate, in most cases, to use the 
term “strong mayor” (or “weak mayor”) in a Canadian context. However, both terms were used by 
interview participants and are found throughout the Canadian local government literature. These 
terms are used throughout this dissertation in quotation marks (“_”) to remind the readers that 
these terms are coined expressions, rather than technically precise terms.  
116 George Rust-D’Eye, Handbook for Municipal Councillors (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada 
Limited, 2010), pg 23. 
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reveals a more complex and varied picture than what the universal application of 
the term “weak mayor” or “weak mayor system” in Canada would suggest.  
 
Theories of the Mayoralty  
 A number of studies over time have examined dimensions of the 
mayoralty117 and established models or theories by which to understand it. In 
1963, Duane Lockard advanced a model focused on mayoral leadership styles. 
He argued that mayors fell into one of the following categories: Stooge, the ‘front 
man’ of a political machine or power structure; Reformer, a leader who seeks 
office to end corruption or make government more ‘business like’; Program 
Politician, an activist seeking to implement particular policies; or, Evader, who 
avoids conflict after becoming frustrated with council or the bureaucracy.118 In 
1974, Kotter and Lawrence engaged a panel of 20 mayors who had held office 
for more than four years and developed the ‘Coalignment Model’ which argues 
that mayors able to align processes such as agenda setting and network building 
with the formal structures of government and nature of the city are most 
successful. Their model identified five leadership styles in mayors: Ceremonial,  																																																								
117 Alexander L. George, “Political Leadership in American Cities,” Daedalus v. 97 (Fall 1968); 
James V. Cunningham, Urban Leadership in the Sixties (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1970); John P. 
Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, Mayors in Action (New York: Wiley, 1974); Charles H. Levine,  
Racial Conflict and the American Mayor (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974); Douglas Yates, The 
Ungovernable City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); Paul R. Eberts, “How Mayors Get Things 
Done: Community Politics and Mayors’ Initiatives,” Research in Urban Policy v. 1 (1985), 39-70;  
Barbara Ferman, Governing the Ungovernable: Political Skill, Leadership and the Modern Mayor 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985); James H. Svara, Official Leadership in the City: 
Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation (New York: Oxford University press, 1990).  
118 Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 
413-427.  
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Table 2: Yates’ model of mayoral leadership 
  High Activism / Innovation 
Low Activism / 
Innovation 
Strong Political Power 
Base Entrepreneur Boss 
Weak Political Power Base Crusader Broker 
 
Caretaker, Personality / Individualist, Executive and Program Entrepreneur.119 In 
1984, Yates argued in The Ungovernable City that local governments are 
fundamentally incapable of producing coherent decisions and effective policies 
due to decentralization in local institutions, dependence on higher levels of 
government, and the nature of issues faced in modern cities. Yates was equally 
pessimistic about the capacity for mayors to act as effective local leaders, 
standing “at the centre of the city’s reactive, unstable policy making system […] 
faced with the unenviable task of making an increasingly ungovernable city 
governable.”120 His model, presented in Table 2, argues that mayors vary along 
two dimensions: (1) the amount of political and financial resources they possess, 
and (2) the degree of activism and innovation displayed in their work. These two 
dimensions produce a typology of four ‘styles’ of mayors: the Crusader, low in 
power and high in activism, who must govern through the force of symbolic 
politics and personality; the Entrepreneur, strong in power and high in activism, 
who advances large scale projects and consolidates political support; the Boss, 
																																																								
119 John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, Mayors in Action (New York: Wiley, 1974).  
120 Douglas Yates, The Ungovernable City (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 146.  
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strong in political power and low in activism, who assumes a passive attitude 
towards problem solving but can use political resources to maintain political 
control; and the Broker, weak in power and low in activism, who accepts the 
limitations of their power and aims to balance conflicts and interests.121  
In 1994, Andrew Sancton provided a Canadian perspective on Yates’ 
model. In a chapter on mayors in a book on political leaders in Canada, Sancton 
argued that because Canadian mayors lack executive power, most fall into 
Yates’ broker category: 
A much more common Canadian response to the absence of power is to 
act as a broker, working behind the scenes to mobilize support for 
incremental change. […] They understand the limitations of their office, 
but they also realize that they are uniquely placed to bring conflicting 
parties together. […] How skillfully he or she can do so – in the almost 
complete absence of any established procedures – will likely determine 
his or her success as a local political leader.122 
 
Sancton points to specific examples of Canadian mayors which could be 
classified as entrepreneurs, but generally argues that the boss and entrepreneur 
styles are not applicable to mayors in Canada.123 Sancton’s chapter instead 
describes the role of Canadian mayors as comprising multiple concurrent roles, 
including as leaders of communities, as leaders within government 
organizations, and as leaders of political parties.124   
 																																																								
121 Ibid, 147. 
122 Andrew Sancton, “Mayors as Political Leaders,” in Leaders and Leadership in Canada, edited 
by Maureen Mancuso, Richard G. Price and Ronald Wagenberg (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 185-186. 
123 Douglas Yates, The Ungovernable City, 185-186.  
124 Andrew Sancton, “Mayors as Political Leaders.” 
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 Another important contribution is the work of James Svara, an American 
political scientist with particular interest in the role of the mayor in cities with a 
council-manager form of government. Svara criticizes the American literature for 
focusing too heavily on the role of the mayor in mayor-council environments 
without an appreciation for how the role varies with structure. “When the 
preconditions of mayoral leadership are assumed to include formal authority over 
staff and financial resources, it is common to view the mayor in council-manager 
cities as an incomplete figurehead who fills only ceremonial functions.”125 He 
argues the “nonexecutive mayor” occupies a strategic location in his relationship 
with council, the city manager and public agencies. Figure 1,126 locating the  
 
Figure 1: Svara’s mayor in council-manager cities interactions model
 
 																																																								
125 Svara, The Facilitative Leader in City Hall, 5.  
126 James H. Svara, “Mayors in Council-Manager Cities: Recognizing the Leadership Potential,” 
National Civic Review vol. 75 (September/October 1986).  
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mayor within this network of actors, first appeared in a 1986 National Civic 
Review article. Svara identifies the common activities involved in each set of 
relationship: ceremonial activities and official representation in the relationship 
with organizations and public agencies; serving as presiding officer and leading 
discussions in the relationship with council; providing agenda setting guidance 
and serving in an “official head” capacity in the relationship with the city 
manager.127 Svara argues that the mayor is uniquely positioned to advance the 
coordination of the individuals and groups engaged in local government: 
By virtue of this favoured position, the mayor is able to tap into various 
communications networks among elected officials, governmental staff and 
community leaders. Although they can and do interact with each other 
independently, the mayor can transmit message better than anyone else 
in the government because of the breadth of his knowledge and range of 
contacts he or she is likely to have. In doing so, the mayor has a unique 
potential to expand the level of understanding and improve the 
coordination among participants in the government as a whole.128 
 
Svara challenges the notion that “nonexecutive” or council-manager mayors are 
powerless; he argues they play a different role that is equally central to effective 
administration of local government. He describes mayor-council mayors as the 
‘driving force’ of local governments, and council-manager mayors are the 
‘guiding force’ with capacity to improve the performance of the entire system: 
This office is important (if not crucial) to the city government’s operation, 
but what the mayor can do beyond filling ceremonial roles has been 
largely unrecognized. To be sure, the government may operate 
adequately with minimal leadership from the mayor, given the formal 
features of council-manager government and assuming a cooperative 
pattern of interaction among officials. […] An active and effective mayor, 
however, can elevate the performance of other officials and the 																																																								
127 Svara, Official Leadership in the City (1990), 96-97.  
128 Ibid, 97. 
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government system as a whole. The mayor’s roles are to foster 
communication and facilitate effective interaction among other officials 
and to provide a greater sense of purpose to city government. In this 
sense, the mayor is a guiding force in city government.129 
 
Svara charts the various tasks and responsibilities of “nonexecutive” mayors, 
and his later work includes substantive quantitative analysis drawing upon 
survey data on the degree to which mayors are viewed to provide each 
articulated duty. A later text provides detailed case studies illuminating how the 
“nonexecutive” mayor role varies in practice.130  
The common element across these models and theories is recognition 
that the role of the mayor is fundamentally relational – that is, it is defined 
through its association or connection to other actors engaged in local 
government. Yates’ model sorts mayors based on the strength of their political 
power base. Sancton defines mayors as brokers with recognition of their limited 
formal power, but unique positioning to bring conflicting parties together. Svara 
defines mayors based on their interactions with council, the administration, and 
community organizations and actors. This is consistent with the broader pluralist 
tradition and community power literature, where power resources are dispersed 
across actors. The mayoralty does not exist as an isolated institution of location 
government; rather, it is a position that is deeply embedded within the institutions 
of local government. The study of mayoral power in Canada requires a broader 
examination of mayors that considers their institutional and organizational 
environment, and relationships with other actors engaged in local government. 																																																								
129 Ibid, 82.  
130 Svara, The Facilitative Leader in City Hall (2009). 
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Conclusion 
The mayoralty is a global institution which has evolved over time from a 
ceremonial or symbolic role to one which is associated with power, whether real 
or perceived. In Canada, mayors are unique among political leaders as a result 
of the historic evolution of local government in Canada. Mayors are distinct from 
other leaders in many important respects, and because Canada has multiple 
systems of local government, the role can vary by city. The Canadian literature, 
albeit limited, emphasizes the weakness of Canadian mayors. The terms “weak 
mayor” and “weak mayor system” have had a pervasive influence over how 
Canadian mayors are understood, despite the contested nature of these terms. 
Technically, Canada does not have “weak mayors,” as the term refers to a 
variation of the mayor-council form of government. More importantly, this term 
reflects a narrow definition of mayoral power based on executive authority. Past 
examinations of mayoral leadership and power recognize the relational 
dimension of the role, and examine mayors within their broader institutional and 
organizational environment. This literature review offers foundational knowledge 
and insight to inform the study of mayoral power in Canada, but a number of 
important questions remain. What is “mayoral power” in a Canadian context, and 
how does it relate to other key concepts such as leadership, authority and 
influence? How can it be studied in Canada’s cities? The next chapter begins to 
explore these questions, outlining the methodological approach of this study.  
 
 
Chapter 3 | RESEARCH QUESTION, METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS 
 
It is said that the ideal way to approach social research begins with a 
problem, rather than a methodology.1 This study takes this advice. It confronts a 
very real problem: that the role of Canada’s urban mayors is unclear, and basic 
assumptions about mayoral power are contested and confused. This study 
applies multiple methods for an inductive exploration into mayoral power in a 
sample of Canadian cities. This chapter presents a summary of the 
methodological approach: first, a discussion of the research question and scope 
of study; second, an examination of key concepts such as “power,” “leadership,” 
“influence,” and “authority” with a discussion on how these terms are understood 
and explored for the purposes of this study; third, a summary of the research 
approach and case selection method; and, finally, an overview of the methods 
applied in the three substantive sections (Parts I, II and III) of the investigation.  
 
Research Question  
 This project investigates the power of Canadian mayors. The central 
research question of this study is: what factors shape the power in practice of 
mayors in Canada’s cities? The question clearly locates the context for the study: 
cities in Canada. However, even this can be a challenged concept. The term 
‘city’ can mean a type of municipality; a legal entity; a geography contained 
																																																								
1 Ian Shapiro, The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 212. 
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within a municipal boundary; or, an urbanized area spanning multiple municipal 
boundaries. Cities can be understood as political entities, defined by legally 
constituted geographic boundaries; or, as economic entities, where the 
geographic concentration of economic activity is often not contained within the 
legal boundaries of a municipality. The City of Toronto as a municipality includes 
a population of nearly three million people and its boundary is defined in 
provincial legislation. However, the name ‘Toronto’ is also a brand for a much 
larger metropolitan area, with upwards of six million residents and a greatly 
contested geographic boundary.2 Statistics Canada delineates urban areas in 
Canada in several different ways: census metropolitan areas, which includes the 
largest urban regions in Canada; census agglomeration, a smaller population 
category than a census metropolitan area which includes fewer people living in 
the area defined as the ‘urban core’; census subdivisions, which generally 
correspond to municipal boundaries; and, a recently renamed category called 
population centres.3 Adding to the complexity, each Canadian province has its 
own legislation establishing the structure of municipalities in that province. Some 
include ‘city’ as a legal category in their municipal legislation, often with a 
minimum population requirement – although not the same population 
requirement – while other provinces do not use ‘city’ at all.  
																																																								
2 The term ‘Greater Toronto Area’ (GTA) has recently been replaced by the term ‘Greater Toronto 
– Hamilton Area’ (GTHA) in some provincial documents and programs.  
3 The ‘population centre’ category, introduced in 2011, further differentiates between ‘small 
population centres’ which have a population between 1,000 to 29,999 residents; ‘medium 
population centres’ which have a population between 30,000 to 99,999 residents; and ‘large 
urban population centres’ which have a population of 100,000 and over.  
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 For the purposes of this study, the term ‘Canadian city’ refers to an urban 
municipality. The mayoralty is a defined role within municipal government, and 
mayors are directly elected by the residents living in the area defined by the legal 
geographic boundaries of a municipality. However, there are cases where 
mayors have formal roles in different geographic territories than those of their 
municipalities – for example, mayors who have leadership roles within regional 
governance structures – and these occurrences will be noted. Regardless, for 
the purpose of this study, the term ‘city’ refers to an urban municipality with an 
elected mayor.  
 The research question calls for an exploration of what factors shape the 
power in practice of mayors in Canada’s cities (urban municipalities). 
Importantly, this is a different question from what factors shape the power of 
Canadian mayors? The latter question would call for an investigation of the 
power of urban mayors as a collective. There is evidence to suggest that when 
mayors work together to influence extra-municipal policy changes or otherwise, 
they can be effective.4 However, the focus of this study is on examining the 
power of urban mayors within their respective cities. In some cases, as 																																																								
4 A recent and notable example of the collective power of mayors occurred during the 2015 
federal election. A group called the Big City Mayors Caucus (BCMC), a committee of the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities including the mayors of 22 specified cities with a collective 
population of 22 million Canadians, led an advocacy campaign called Vote For Cities. The 
campaign urged each federal party to commit to dedicated, predicable funding for transit, housing 
and economic development. FCM maintained a website which tracked party platforms and leader 
speeches reflecting commitments (or otherwise) related to the campaign’s priorities. A parallel 
Hometown Proud campaign ran in communities across Canada to build awareness. The Liberal 
Party of Canada’s platform reflected the strongest commitment to Vote for Cities priorities, and 
many BCMC mayors spoke to endorse their local candidates and leaders. The Liberal Party was 
elected with a sweeping majority, as the result of many factors, and a number of BCMC’s 
advocacy items are being implemented.  
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referenced in Part II, mayors often engage with actors outside of their 
municipalities – for example, federal and provincial political leaders or national 
organizations – and often do so in effort to accomplish something on behalf of 
their city. Their individual ability to exercise power beyond local government in 
their own community can be an important part of the role of the mayor, and 
therefore is in scope for this study.  
A number of related research questions were considered during the 
process of establishing and conducting this study. What is the role of the mayor, 
and why does it vary? Are mayors equipped to accomplish what Canadians 
expect of them? What resources do mayors need to do their jobs, and are they 
provided with them? What limits mayors from leading cities? Does Canada have 
“weak” mayors? Why are some mayors on the winning side of most council 
decisions, and other mayors are not? Which mayors in Canada are most 
powerful, and why? Do mayors need “strong mayor” powers to lead in Canada’s 
cities? Does limited authority constrain the ability of Canada’s urban mayors to 
lead? Each of these questions was considered, and many will be addressed to 
an extent in the study to follow. The research question, what factors shape the 
power in practice of mayors in Canada’s cities, was ultimately selected5 because 
																																																								
5 The research question as the project progressed. Initially, the study was established to 
investigate the role of mayors in Canada (“what is the role of the mayor in Canada’s cities, and 
how and why does it vary?). This was rejected after some time examining “the role” and finding 
limited variation in how the role was defined. The more important question seemed to be about 
understanding mayoral power, particularly how it is exercised and experienced in practice.  A 
question asking “how powerful” are urban mayors was engaged. Following the dissertation exam 
process, the question was further clarified and articulated as “what factors shape the power in 
practice of mayors in Canada’s cities?” 
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it drives at the most foundational debate surrounding the mayoralty in Canada: 
mayors in Canada are frequently described in universal terms as being “weak” 
with limited power, and yet the public believe their mayors are powerful.6 It may 
be that there is truth in both sentiments, but the way mayoral power is conceived 
and evaluated in each context is different. More importantly, the question 
engages an enduring debate about the factors shaping power – specifically, the 
relative importance of institutional variables compared to the agency of political 
actors. Given the largely undefined nature of the mayoralty in Canada, this 
question investigates the core of conflicting assumptions about the concept and 
variables shaping mayoral power itself.  
So what is ‘mayoral power,’ and how can it be studied?  
 
Key Concepts  
The term ‘power’ comes from the Latin potere, which simply means ‘to be 
able’. Over centuries, volumes have been written spanning academic disciplines 
with various conceptions and definitions: key distinctions between ‘power to’ and 
‘power over’; explorations of power as a property, a relation, a structure, or social 
order; distinctions between the core concepts of power, influence, control, and 
authority; studies where power is observed only when exercised, and where is it 
understood as a capacity which may or may not be exercised; examinations of 
the ‘faces’ of power’7 and ‘bases’ of power;8 ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power.’9 There 
																																																								
6 See Appendix B.  
7 Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Houndmills: MacMillan, 1974).  
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is no universal definition of power,10 and the meaning of the term can vary 
considerably by context.11 Dahl unceremoniously described the study of power 
as a “bottomless swamp.”12 The community power literature of the 1950s and 
1960s provides more focus by examining power within the urban realm, including 
key contributions in Hunter’s study of Atlanta,13 Dahl’s study of New Haven,14 
Bachrach and Baratz’s study of Baltimore,15 and Crenson’s comparative study of 
two communities in Indiana.16 The community power literature, consistent with 
the broader pluralist tradition, understands power to be unevenly distributed 
among many actors within a community; as “a relation among people”17 which 
can include individuals, groups, governments, nations and any other human-
based organization. Stone’s work in the 1970s and 1980s added to this literature. 
Stone built on the work on Bachrach and Baratz’s “two faces of power” 
																																																																																																																																																																				
8 John R. P. French Jr., and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” in D. Cartwright, ed. 
Studies in Social Power (Oxford: University of Michigan Press, 1959).   
9 Joseph Nye, The Power to Lead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
10 Haugaard (2002) offers an excellent reader on conceptions of power in political and social 
theory, and provides a helpful diagram locating the work of modern authors such as Dalh, 
Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes, Foucaut and Poulantzas within the traditions dating back to 
Aristotle, Machiavelli, Neitzche, Weber, and Marx.  
11 The ‘family resemblance’ concept, stemming from philosophers Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, is 
often referenced in surveys of literature on power to illustrate how the meaning of the word 
‘power’ can change so significantly depending on its the context that there may or may not be 
any single property which applies across all contexts.  
12 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science (Vol, 2, No. 3, July 1957), 201.  
13 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1953).  
14 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961).  
15 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970).  
16 Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision Making in the 
Cities (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).  
17 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science (Vol, 2, No. 3, July 1957), 203. 
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argument18 and developed a broader conceptualization of power as “the capacity 
to affect the context within which decisions are made.”19 Stone took a particular 
interest in “systemic power” biasing political actors and systems to favour certain 
interests over others:  
Policy is made and power is exercised within a structured set of 
relationships. These relationships are neither neutral nor easily changed. 
They confer advantages and disadvantages on various groups in the local 
community in the form of preferences and predispositions of leading local 
officials.20 
 
Stone’s later work further explored this notion of systemic power relations in his 
now classic study of Atlanta, where he identified patterns of decision making 
where major public policies that had little broad support but benefited key actors 
were consistently implemented. Stone’s concept of ‘urban regimes’ – the 
informal arrangements by which government organizations and private interests 
function together in carrying out local governance21 – has since become a 
dominant theory in the study of in urban politics. The extent to which urban 
																																																								
18 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970). 
19 Clarence Stone, Economic growth and neighbourhood discontent: System bias in the urban 
renewal program of Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 20.  
20 Ibid, 17.  
21 Clarence Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1989).  
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regime theory applies in Canada has been challenged,22 including through one 
study of Mayor Hazel McCallion in Mississauga.23  
 Given the numerous ways in which power can be conceived, it is not 
surprising that the ways power has been studied are also varied. Dahl’s study of 
New Haven24 from 1961 examined social characteristics and backgrounds of 
mayors over nearly 200 years. He concluded a broader argument that New 
Haven gradually changed from oligarchy to pluralism, with power becoming 
increasingly distributed among a greater number of actors over time. Dahl traces 
distinct periods: where mayors were almost exclusively drawn from patrician 
families, from 1784 to 1842; where mayors were “self-made men of business, the 
entrepreneurs” who governed from 1842 to 1900; and a third period where 
people from working class families or immigrant origins came into power, where 
“popularity was divorced from both wealth and social position by the influx of 
immigrants, and public office went to the ex-plebes, who lacked wealth and 
social position but had the advantage of numbers.”25 Dahl examined how power 
was exercised within a pluralist lens, finding a number of patterns of interaction 
																																																								
22 Timothy Cobban, “The political economy of urban development:  Downtown revitalization in 
London, Ontario, 1993-2002,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research (Vol. 12, No. 2, Winter 
2003), 231-49; Christopher Leo, “Are there urban regimes in Canada? Reply to Timothy 
Cobban,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research (Vol. 12, No. 2, Winter 2003), 344-8; Timothy 
Cobban, “A Reply to Christopher Leo,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research (Vol. 12, No. 2, 
Winter 2003), 349-53.  
23 Thomas J. Urbaniak, “Beyond Regime Theory: Mayoral Leadership, Suburban Development, 
and the Politics of Mississauga, Ontario,” PhD Thesis, University of Western Ontario (2005).   
24 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961). 
25 Dahl, Who Governs?, 11.  
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evident within his single case study of New Haven over time.26 For Dahl, power 
was about the ability to influence decisions and outcomes to desired ends. He 
considered the “power resources” held by mayors and others, such as wealth, 
skill, information, connections and social standing as important to exercise 
influence.  
 Twenty-five years later, Ferman’s Governing the Ungovernable City 
examines the time in office of two mayors, from Boston and San Francisco. She 
argues that, over time, mayors have become subject to greater demands for 
action, and yet have fewer political resources – citing fragmentation and 
decentralization of local government institutions, increased state and federal 
interest in local matters, and an anti-power bias in American political culture as 
the cause of this shift.27 Ferman investigates how mayors can acquire power, 
informed by 123 interviews over a two-year period. She argues that while the 
mayors used different strategies to acquire power, ultimately mayoral power was 
defined through interplay of institutional and personal interests:  
Power is necessary to govern, but developing that power often comes at a 
price. Many of these costs seem to result from the structure of urban 
institutions. Municipal reforms tend to weaken, and in many cases, 
remove, the institutional checks on power. This weakness, combined with 
the mayor’s need to acquire, often leads to power being developed for its 
own sake. The fine line between necessary power and self-aggrandizing 
power is lost and there are no institutional mechanisms to reinstate it.28  																																																								
26 Dahl examined several policy areas, and found several patterns of interaction: executive-
centered “grand coalition of coalitions,” coalitions of chieftans, and rival sovereignties engaging in 
conflict.  
27 Barbara Ferman, Governing the Ungovernable City: Political Skill, Leadership and the Modern 
Mayor (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985), 4-5.  
28 Barbara Ferman, Governing the Ungovernable City, x. 
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Unlike Dahl, where power is exercised through the process of governing and is 
defined by resources of individuals engaged in governing, for Ferman power is 
vested in institutions – including the mayoralty – and shaped by the interests of 
individuals.  
 A frequently referenced approach to understanding and studying power, 
from the field of sociology, is French and Raven’s Bases of Social Power 
(1959).29 For French and Raven, the phenomenon of power involves “a dyadic 
relation between two agents”30 which can be observed by examining individuals 
upon whom power is exerted. The exercise of power can translate into changes 
in the behaviors, opinions, attitudes, goals, needs, values and otherwise of 
another person. They identify five common and important “bases” of power: (1) 
reward power, the perception that one individual has the ability to offer rewards 
or benefits to the other; (2) coercive power, the perception that one individual 
can mediate punishments for the other; (3) legitimate power, a perception that 
one person has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior for another person; (4) 
referent power, based on a person’s interest in a closeness or association with 
another, and (5) expert power, based on the perception that one person has 
special knowledge or expertise.31 A later paper by Raven added a sixth category: 
informational power, the belief that one person has more information than the 
																																																								
29 John R. P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” in D. Cartwright (Ed.), 
Studies in Social Power (Oxford: University of Michigan, 1959).  
30 Ibid, 151.  
31 Ibid, 151-155.  
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other.32 French and Raven’s model has been applied in numerous settings, and 
is one of the most widely cited analysis of power.33  
In the 1980s, Joseph Nye coined the term “soft power” in a book on 
American foreign policy,34 referring to the ability to accomplish objectives by co-
opting, attracting or influencing others. This was contrasted to “hard power” as 
the use of payment or coercion to accomplish preferred outcomes. Nye defines 
power as “the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers”35 and 
understands it as a broad term which includes levers such as influence, 
authority, persuasion, coercion and more. 
 There are a number of terms related to power, often used as synonyms or 
to describe a specific form or source of power. This study intentionally uses the 
term “authority” when referring to legal powers of mayors, such as the 
examination in Part I. Authority is understood to be a specific form of power. 
Similarly, “influence” is often used to refer to mayors’ capacity to shape, 
persuade or condition other actors. These and other words were used by 
interviewees and in a variety of academic and other sources which inform this 
study, and are presented here in their original context whenever possible.  
 
																																																								
32 Bertram Raven, “Social Influence and Power,” in I.D/ Steiner and M. Fishbein (Eds.), Current 
Studies in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1965), 371-382.  
33 Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal 
Influence,” Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy (Volume 8, No. 1, 2008), 1-22.  
34 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (Basic Books: New 
York, 1990).  
35 Ibid.  
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 In summary, there is no single definition of mayoral power nor a universal 
approach by which to study it. Themes of the literature emphasize the relational 
aspect of power, a notion adopted in the approach of this study. Power is not 
understood to be a static property of an individual mayor; rather, it exists within 
the relations between mayors and other actors engaged in local government, 
and can shift over time. It can have many faces: the extent to which mayors are 
able to realize desired outcomes, or shape the preferences of others, or enable 
or limit the participation of others. Power can come from many sources, and 
where it is observed may depend on the lens of the observer. The term “power” 
is understood to be the larger umbrella which can include “influence,” “authority,” 
“control” and more; it can involve “hard” and “soft” forms of power; and, it can be 
expressed and observed in multiple ways. Mayoral power, specifically, is 
understood as the sum of these dimensions. The term “mayoral power” is used 
in this study to refer to a mayor’s capacity “to be able”; the extent to which they 
can realize desired outcomes. A central objective of this study is to examine the 
factors shaping mayoral power, to develop a more precise definition, and to 
advance a model for understanding mayoral power in practice. These are 
presented in the chapters to come.  
 Just as there is no established and shared definition of “mayoral power,” 
the concept of “mayoral leadership” is equally challenging. This is at least in part 
because leadership is a contested concept with numerous definitions and 
conceptions advanced over time. One study found more than 220 different 
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definitions of “leadership” advanced from the 1920s to 1990s,36 spanning many 
contexts including for business, institutional, political, community, religious, social 
and environmental purposes and audiences. Major works dating back to Plato, 
Machiavelli, Freud, Tolstoy, Weber and more have focused on key questions 
about the nature of leadership. Contemporary political scientists including Burns, 
Tucker, Neustadt, Barber, Nye and others have also taken up this challenge, 
defining various forms, types and models of leadership in various contexts. 
Leadership is generally understood as a social relationship involving three 
components: leaders, followers, and context.37 Nye defines a leader as those 
who “help a group create and achieve shared goals.”38 Burns, who is perhaps 
the most well known and often cited modern author on the topic, argues that 
there are two basic patterns of leadership: transactional leadership, based on a 
relationship of reciprocity between a leader and a follower; and transformational 
leadership, where a leader inspires others to follow not through exchange but 
through loyalty, admiration or support for the leader’s vision.39 He defines 
leadership in this way: “leadership over human beings is exercised when 
persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict 
with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to 
arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers.”40 Stone defines leadership 
as blending and using available resources to affect change or prevent a course 																																																								
36 As quoted in Joseph Nye, The Powers to Lead (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), x.  
37 Ibid, xi. 
38 Ibid, x. 
39 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).  
40 Ibid, 18.  
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of events.41 Sweeting states “leaders set goals, and persuade, cajole, or 
convince others to follow”42 and argues that mayoral leadership, specifically, is a 
product of four distinct components: the external environment, institutional 
arrangements, the local environment, and the personal characteristics of 
leaders.43 These definitions share an understanding of leadership as a social 
process involving a leader and followers, and a mobilization of resources. 
Mayoral leadership, then, is defined as the process by which mayors mobilize 
resources to incite others to follow them. 
 How does “mayoral power,” as a measure of the extent to which the 
mayor “is able” to accomplish desired objectives, relate to “mayoral leadership,” 
as the ability to mobilize resources and secure followers? There are multiple 
interpretations of the relationship between these concepts. Sweeting’s study of 
the mayoralty in London considers leadership – and specifically, a Svara-
modeled ‘facilitative leadership’ style – as an ingredient of mayoral power:  
In formal terms, the Mayor is weak. […] The Mayor is obliged by the 
legislative framework, and by the complexity of the tasks with which he is 
presented, to engage and secure the participation of others. Only then will 
the Mayor be able to extend his influence. The Mayor of London will have 
to act facilitatively and move towards a style of co-operative participation 
in order to wield power to act and to develop collaborative advantage. In 
doing so, the Mayor will need to rely on the informal resources of 
legitimacy, authority and profile.44 
 
																																																								
41 Clarence Stone, “Political Leadership in Urban Politics,” in D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. 
Wolman, eds,, Theories of Urban Politics (London: Sage, 1995): 18.  
42 David Sweeting, “Leadership in Urban Governance: The Mayor of London,” Local Government 
Studies (28:1, 2002): 5.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid, 18.  
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A study by Greasley and Stoker examined more than 375 mayors in England 
and concluded that a more facilitative style of leadership tends to accompany 
institutional empowerment of mayors.45 Sweeting’s interpretation that leadership 
is necessary “in order to wield power to act” and the findings of the Greasley and 
Stoker study affirm the linkage between power and leadership, consistent with 
the broader literature. Nye, for example, describes power as a necessary 
ingredient for leadership. “You cannot lead if you do not have power.”46 He 
clarifies that the existence of power, however, does not necessarily translate into 
leadership. “Leadership involves power, but not all power relationships are 
instances of leadership.”47 In sum, power and leadership are distinct concepts 
but are related to one another, and can be mutually re-enforcing. Mayoral power 
can enable mayoral leadership; and, effective mayoral leadership can be a 
source of mayoral power. Understanding the dynamics of this relationship in 
practice is a central pursuit of this study.  
 The basic research question driving this study examines the factors which 
shape the power in practice of mayors. The study is oriented around “power” 
because this is the dominant frame for how the mayoralty in Canada is 
understood, studied and conceptualized.  The “strong/weak” mayor taxonomy is 
rooted in specific assumptions about the natural of mayoral power which 
privileges the institutional dimensions of power – and, importantly, ignores other 
																																																								
45 S. Greasley and Gary Stoker, “Mayors and Urban Governance: Developing a Facilitative 
Leadership Style,” Public Administration Review 68:4 (2008).  
46 Nye, Powers to Lead, 27. 
47 Nye, Powers to Lead, x. 
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dimensions such as leadership as a potential a form of mayoral power. As a 
result, the foundational consideration about the nature of mayoral power in 
Canada – how it is understood and conceptualized, and the extent to which 
leadership is an important source of mayoral power – remains an open question.  
 
Research Approach  
 The research question inquires about the power of mayors in Canada’s 
cities, making it well suited to a comparative case study method. Case study 
research is common in political science, and an important contributor of 
knowledge in the social sciences more generally.48 The case study method 
generally refers to ‘small-N’ qualitative research involving intensive investigation 
into a single unit at a specific point in time. Case study research tends to be 
“exploratory in nature.”49 When the emphasis of a study includes comparisons 
between multiple cases, it is referred to as a cross-case study.50 There is a 
strong tradition in the local government literature of detailed single case studies, 
including seminal American studies by Hunter,51 Dahl,52 Pressman,53 Pressman 
																																																								
48 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 
12 (2006), 243.  
49 John Gerring, “The Case Study: What it is and What it Does,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Politics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 1137. 
50 Ibid, 1139. 
51 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1953).  
52 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961).  
53 Jeffrey Pressman, “Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership,” American Political Science Review 
Vol. 66, Issue 2 (June 1972).   
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and Wildavsky,54 and Stone.55 In Canada, Urbaniak conducted a study of 
mayoral leadership in one geographic area (now the City of Mississauga),56 and 
there are other texts that focus on a specific Canadian city or mayor. The cross-
case method has also been used in studies of mayoral leadership both in the 
United States57 and in Canada.58 Generally, single case studies can provide 
deep insight about a single heterogeneous unit, while cross-case studies provide 
broader insight across two or more homogenous units and can offer more 
externally valid or generalizable findings.59 Cross-case studies are also more 
appropriate where there is significant variation between cases. 60 For the 
purposes of this study, the ‘case’ is the mayoralty within a specific Canadian city, 
and it is a cross-case study because it investigates the mayoralty across ten 
																																																								
54 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Expectations in 
Washington are Dashed in Oakland; or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All 
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Canadian cities. Of course, there are tradeoffs with this decision including less 
opportunity for deep exploration into each case.  
 
Case Selection  
 Case selection is a critical decision in any research study, and particularly 
in a primarily qualitative cross-case study where there are practical constraints to 
the number of cases that can be studied. Many options were considered for this 
study: selecting the largest cities in Canada by population; selecting the largest 
cities within specific provinces; selecting all cities above a certain population 
threshold within a single province; and, random selection of cities above a 
certain population threshold. The selected approach examines the mayoralty in 
the largest city in each Canadian province, for a total of ten Canadian cities. 
Based on this case selection method, the ten cities included in this study are: 
1.  Vancouver, British Columbia  
2.  Calgary, Alberta  
3.  Saskatoon, Saskatchewan  
4.  Winnipeg, Manitoba  
5.  Toronto, Ontario  
6.  Montreal, Quebec  
7.  Saint John, New Brunswick  
8.  Halifax, Nova Scotia  
9.  Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island 
10.  St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador   
 
This approach was selected for three main reasons. First, in order to produce a 
Canada-wide study, it is critical to examine cities all provinces, particularly as the 
formal authorities of mayors are primarily assigned through provincial legislation 
		
58 
and because municipalities in Canada are creatures of the provinces in which 
they reside. Examining the mayoralty in only one or a few provinces would not 
provide a ‘Canadian perspective.’ Second, this method of case selection includes 
diversity in city size and scale. The cities included represent approximately 20% 
of the Canadian population, and include some of the largest cities in Canada with 
more than a million residents (Toronto, Montreal, Calgary), as well as smaller 
cities with fewer than one hundred thousand residents (Charlottetown and Saint 
John). The selection also includes five provincial capital cities and five non-
capital cities, and it includes both French- and English-speaking cities. Finally, 
this approach follows an established precedent for case selection in national 
studies of local government in Canada.61 The territories have also been 
excluded, consistent with this precedent. The authority of territorial governments 
differs from that of provincial governments, and thus their relationships with local 
governments also differ. This analysis is beyond the scope of this study, and so 
cities in the territories were intentionally excluded.  
 There are biases in any case selection method. In this case, where the 
selection includes only the largest city in each province, it could be anticipated 
that those cities would hold a special place within their respective provinces. The 
analysis in Part I explores this point further. Therefore, the mayoralty in these 
cities may not be reflective of the mayoralty within their provinces, and the 
sample may or may not be reflective more broadly of Canadian cities. However, 
																																																								
61 See Martin Horak and Robert Young, eds., Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and 
Policy Making in Canada’s Big Cities (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2012).   
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the selection does include a diversity of cities and provides enough cases to 
compare the role of the mayor in each province against a larger sample of 
Canadian mayors. The study seeks to examine the power of Canadian mayors in 
the context of other Canadian mayors.  
 
Methodology  
This study is presented as a progressive investigation of mayoral power in 
Canada, using a mixture of methods. Part I offers an institutional62 examination 
of mayoral power in ten cities. Institutionalism is a methodological umbrella 
including many variants: economic approaches such as rational choice, which 
emphasize the effects of institutions in conditioning human behaviours and 
decision-making; sociological institutionalism, which is most interested in the 
patterns of behavior, cultures and norms of institutions themselves; and, 
historical approaches which are interested in understanding and explaining ‘real-
world’ events.63 There are also many types of analysis within institutionalism 
including: descriptive, which charts the characteristics of institutions in formal-
legal terms; normative, which examines how well institutions meet specified 
objectives; and explanatory, which considers institutions as independent 																																																								
62 “Institution” here is understood broadly, as “[…] a relatively enduring collection of rules and 
organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively 
invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic 
preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances” (March and 
Olsen, 2006).  Institutionalism, and more generally the focus on institutions, is common within 
political science (Clemens and Cook, 1999) – or as one observer notes, until the 1950s, 
“institutionalism was political science” (Shepsle, 1995).  
63 Sven Steinmo, “Institutionalism,” International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral 
Sciences, 2nd Edition (2015), 182-183.  
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variables with predictable relationships to other variables.64 Other variants also 
exist. Thus, the institutional perspective has evolved from its historic focus on the 
formal-legal dimensions of government institutions to encompass social 
structures, behaviours, and norms. Although institutionalism is a long established 
methodological approach, some suggest it has experienced a “resurgence” in 
recent years.65 Much of the Canadian local government literature reflects an 
interest in institutions: studies of municipal structures and reform;66 examinations 
of the formal rules and established practices involved in local governance;67 
studies on municipal services,68 tax regimes,69 amalgamations and boundaries,70 
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and more. Some of the limited literature on Canadian mayors also reflects an 
institutional perspective.71  
Part I adopts this approach, understanding the mayoralty as a central 
institution within local government where interest is paid to its formal, defined 
and non-personal dimensions. Here mayoral power – “on paper” – is understood 
in limited terms as formal authority, established through legislation and shaped 
by local arrangements in each city. Chapter 4 compares the legal authority of 
mayors across cities, drawing from provincial legislation and municipal bylaws. 
Chapter 5 considers locally granted authority emanating from the varied 
governance and organizational arrangements in each of the ten cities, such as 
the presence of political parties, the ability of mayors to influence the governance 
bodies of extra-municipal organizations, and municipal budgets. Part I provides a 
clear, but limited, analysis of mayoral power in Canada. The authority of mayors 
varies across cities, in a variety of respects, but overall is limited.  
How powerful are Canada’s mayors in practice? Part II engages a 
different approach to examining mayoral power, relying on the perceptions of 
mayors and those who work most closely with them in each city. A narrative 
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inquiry method is engaged that privileges the perspectives of those with direct 
experience72 and seeks to find meaning through narratives to understand 
political or social realities.73 Narrative inquiry is an established method in political 
science,74 and has been used in other studies in the field including Siegel’s 
recent study of municipal chief administrative officers.75 The data was obtained 
through interviews in each of the cities in the study with people representing 
three specific perspectives: first, political, including mayors, past mayors, deputy 
mayors and councillors; second, executive, from senior administrators working in 
the municipal government including city managers and city clerks; and, third, 
community, from the people who closely follow the activities of mayors. Table 3 
provides a summary of the number of interviews conducted in each category, 
and separating out mayors and past mayors from the other political interviewees. 
A total of 68 interviews were conducted involving 70 people (two interviews 
included two people sharing their perspectives, at their request). The interviews 
were conducted during May, June and July of 2016. The majority of the 
interviews were conducted in person, during a research trip across Canada,  																																																								
72 D. Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly, Narrative Inquiry: Experience and Story in 
Qualitative Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004); Sonia M. Ospina and Jennifer Dodge, 
“It’s About Time: Catching Method Up to Meaning – the Usefulness of Narrative Inquiry in Public 
Administration Research,” Public Administration Review Vol. 65, No. 2 (March-April 2005).  
73 D. Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly, Narrative Inquiry: Experience and Story in 
Qualitative Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004); Sonia M. Ospina and Jennifer Dodge, 
“It’s About Time: Catching Method Up to Meaning – the Usefulness of Narrative Inquiry in Public 
Administration Research,” Public Administration Review Vol. 65, No. 2 (March-April 2005).  
74 Sonia M. Ospina and Jennifer Dodge, “It’s About Time: Catching Method Up to Meaning – the 
Usefulness of Narrative Inquiry in Public Administration Research,” Public Administration Review 
Vol. 65, No. 2 (March-April 2005).  
75 David Siegel, Leaders in the Shadows: The Leadership Qualities of Municipal Chief 
Administrative Officers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).  
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Table 3: Interviews Completed, By Perspective  
Perspective Number of Interviews Percentage  
Political: Mayors and Past Mayors 12 17.6% 
Political: Other Local Elected 
Officials  
25 36.8% 
Executive 14 20.1% 
Community  17 25.0% 
TOTAL  68 100% 
 
which included site visits to each city. This research trip also included 
opportunities for observation, with the researcher attending a council or 
committee meeting in almost every city76 in order to observe mayors ‘in action’ in 
each community. Interviews not able to be completed in person, for scheduling 
reasons or otherwise, were conducted over the phone. The services of a 
professional translator were engaged to support interviews where participants 
wished to complete the interview in French.  
Part II presents a summary of the interview data, identifying interview 
participants perceptions of mayoral power in each of the cities in the study. A key 
finding is that perceptions of power “in practice” do not align to power “on paper” 
– rendering the institutional variables of mayoral power as less important factors 																																																								
76 No formal data or analysis is drawn from these informal observation opportunities, as the type 
of observation varied by city. It was not possible to observe a council or committee meeting in 
person in each city due to scheduling, and due to the timing of a municipal election in one city 
(Saint John). The researcher attended a council or committee meeting in 7 of 10 cities in the 
sample. However, the researcher has observed council meetings in person or online in all 10 
cities, and has observed current mayors from all 10 cities in other forums. This is not a formal 
part of the research, but added helpful context for understanding the mayoralty in each city.  
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of how mayoral power is perceived in practice. The interviews present a more 
nuanced picture of mayoral power as involving a complex network of 
relationships with various other actors engaged in local government. Canadian 
mayors are uniquely positioned at the nexus of the network of actors engaged in 
local government and in their ability to draw on various power resources to 
shape, condition, enable or limit the engagement of these actors. Mayoral power 
in Canada does not necessarily stem from formal authority; rather, it emerges as 
a product of both institutional arrangements and leadership, with the latter as the 
more important variable. 
 The final approach is employed in Part III, where the argument in Part II is 
applied to an examination of the mayoralty in the City of Toronto. A span of three 
mayors over 15 years is examined, illustrating the dynamics of mayoral power in 
three real world circumstances, to offer insight into the nature of power and 
governance at the local level. Together these methods provide a multi-
perspective examination of mayoral power in Canada’s cities.  
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PART I: MAYORAL POWER “ON PAPER” 
 
 
“Whenever I describe my job and our system to people from  
other countries, they always ask: how do you get anything done?” 
 
                                                                                         - Canadian Mayor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 | PROVINCIALLY GRANTED AUTHORITY  
 
 
 Municipalities in Canada are established by, and with the authority of, 
their respective provinces – or, they are “creatures of the province” as is the 
common phrase. As noted in Chapter 2, this tradition dates back to the British 
North America Act and its successor, the Constitution Act, 1867, which in section 
92(8) enumerates that each province “may exclusively make laws in relation to 
[…] municipal institutions of the province”1 as well as “generally all matters of a 
merely local […] nature in the province.”2 Much has changed in the nearly 150 
years since this was written – at the time, fewer than 20% of Canada’s 
population lived in urban areas, which today is well over 80%3 – but the basic 
constitutional arrangement for local government in Canada remains the same. 
Today Canada’s cities do interact with the federal government in a variety of 
ways, but for legal purposes they remain the exclusive purview of their 
respective provincial governments.4  
																																																								
1 The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, ch. 3, s. 92(8).  
2 Ibid, s. 92(16).  
3 In 2011, Statistics Canada replaced the term “urban area” with “population centres” but the data 
still reflects a long standing shift towards urbanization. Population, urban and rural, by province 
and territory. Statistics Canada. Accessed September 3, 2016. Available online: 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo62a-eng.htm.  
4 Rogers (2009) provides a legal perspective on how the federal-local relationship is unclear and 
evolving. In his words, “The relationship of municipal institutions to the national government is far 
from clear. For instance, there has been no judicial determination of the extent to which 
Parliament can delegate functions to and impose duties on municipal bodies. However, the 
power of Parliament to impose financial obligations on local authorities was upheld as 
necessarily incidental to its power to deal with juvenile delinquents and railways. This also 
involves the question of whether municipalities called into existence by the provinces have any 
capacity to receive from Parliament jurisdiction in connection with federal matters.” 
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Each province has at least one statute establishing the general structure, 
roles and responsibilities of municipalities in that province, generally titled the 
‘Municipal Act’ or something similar. Some provinces have more than one 
primary municipal statute, specific to types of municipalities or geographic areas 
of the province. Regardless, it is this legislation that provides the primary source 
of authority for the existence and operation of municipalities within each 
province. There are also hundreds of other provincial statues and regulations 
that assign responsibilities to municipalities or individual municipal officer. For 
example, there are approximately 150 pieces of provincial legislation in Ontario 
alone impacting the operation of its municipalities.5 The result of municipalities 
being ‘creatures’ of their respective provinces is that Canada does not have one 
system of municipal government, but rather systems of municipal government, 
having developed at least somewhat independently based features unique to 
each province. There are important differences in the structure, powers, taxation 
regimes, and services of municipal governments in every province.6  
 Perennial concerns about the relative powerlessness and fiscal 
constraints of municipal governments have been expressed over time, 
particularly for Canada’s largest cities.7 Over the past decade, there has been a 
																																																								
5 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “Ontario Charter: A Proposed Bill of Rights for Local 
Government,” 1994, 4.  
6 For an excellent comparative survey of municipal government in each province in Canada, see: 
Andrew Sancton and Robert A. Young, eds., Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government 
in Canada’s Provinces (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
7 Broadbent (2008) provides a summary of the argument for greater power for urban local 
governments, including the ways in which this position has been advocated for in Canada over 
time.  
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general shift across most provinces to confer more power of self-government on 
municipalities, particularly in large cities:  
[M]unicipalities are now given wide discretion in the exercise of their 
powers, together with the appropriate tools to make their legislation work. 
This has enhanced the powers and responsibilities of municipal councils, 
with a concomitant increase in their importance and the legislative 
flexibility available to them in the enactment of their by-laws.8 
 
In addition to enumerating broad powers and responsibilities of municipalities, 
the primary municipal legislation in each province establishes basic governance 
structures. In all provinces, municipalities are governed by councils; and, 
councils are led by a mayor or equivalently titled head. Each province’s primary 
municipal legislation establishes the role, duties and authority of heads of council 
within that province. Just as the authority of municipal governments emanates 
from provincial legislation, so too does the authority of mayors in Canada.  
[T]he functions, rights and duties of the council head are all derived from 
statute although, in the absence of statutory regulations, common law 
rules may apply. The head receives his powers directly under statute and 
not as a representative of council and they are not suspended while the 
council is in session.9 
 
For this reason, an analysis of mayors’ formal authority as expressed through 
provincial legislation is an essential element in this study. This chapter compares 
the authority of mayors by examining the provincial legislation in all ten Canadian 
provinces, including both general municipal legislation and city-specific 
legislation where applicable.  
 																																																								
8 George Rust-D’Eye, Handbook for Municipal Councillors (Toronto: Thompson Reuters Canada 
Limited, 2010), 3 
9 Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, s. 153.2. 
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Defining the Mayoralty  
 Mayors in all provinces share a basic foundation in how their role is 
defined in legislation: in all Canadian provinces, the mayor is a member of 
council; the mayor holds all of the responsibilities of other members of council; 
and, the mayor is the head of council. Most provinces enumerate the duties of 
members of council, although using different language. Typically these include 
considering the well-being and interests of the municipality and/or community, 
representing the public, participating in council meetings, developing policies and 
programs of the municipality, ensuring the programs of the municipality are 
carried out, overseeing a senior administrator or the activities of administration, 
maintaining the financial integrity of the municipality, and performing other duties 
conferred upon them by provincial legislation or by their own council.10 Only one 
province, Prince Edward Island, does not enumerate duties of council members 
in its legislation, instead stating simply that council is the “governing body of the 
municipality.”11  
 Mayors hold the same obligations of other members of council, and some 
additional duties not shared with other members of council. In most provinces, 
municipal legislation provides that the mayor chairs, or has the option to chair,  
 
																																																								
10 Although a thorough analysis of the duties of municipal councillors is outside the scope of this 
study, there are some significant differences across provincial legislation. Lidstone (2004) and 
Sancton and Young, eds (2009) provide helpful reviews, and the ministry responsible for 
municipal governments in almost all provinces have guides detailing the duties of local elected 
officials in their respective province.  
11 [Prince Edward Island] Municipalities Act, RSPEI 1988, c. M-13, s 15(3).  
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Table 4: Language describing the role of the mayor in provincial legislation12 
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Mayor is the “chief 
executive officer”  X    X    X  
Mayor is the “chief 
elected official”  X         
Mayor is the “president 
of council” X          
Mayor is the “chief 
officer of the city”    X       
Mayor is “the official 
head of the city”           X 
None of the above (no 
title other than “mayor”)    X   X X X   
 
council meetings. Legislation also prescribes that mayors have a specific 
responsibility for signing bylaws, contracts and/or agreements; they have the 
ability to call special meetings; and, they have a specified role in emergency 
management. Beyond these basic shared duties, the way the role of the mayor is 
established in legislation varies by province – and it begins with distinctions in 
language. In some provinces, mayors are described as the ‘chief executive 
officer.’ Other provinces describe the role as the ‘chief elected official,’ ‘the chief 
																																																								
12 In provinces with multiple acts, this chart includes both city-specific and general legislation. 
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officer,’ ‘the official head,’ and in one case, “the president of council.”13 Some 
provinces provide no such titles, as outlined in Table 4. 
 Can anything be inferred from the variation in language? The answer is 
unclear. The analysis to follow identifies which provinces’ legislation affords the 
most formal authority to mayors, and there is no obvious relationship between 
the provision of more formal authority and the terminology used. One legal 
review of Ontario’s legislation supports this claim, suggesting that the use of a 
title such as ‘chief executive officer’ itself does not provide any additional power 
or authority to a mayor: 
The term “chief executive officer” does not, of itself, confer any powers or 
duties upon him; they must be sought in the express provisions of the Act. 
Whether the office of mayor is statutory or not, however, it is a public one 
to which common law principles are applicable in the absence of statutory 
provisions relating to his power and duties.14 
 
In this same review of Ontario’s legislation, it is noted that the head of council 
under the former Municipal Act, 1990 was responsible to “ensure laws were 
executed and obeyed” and to “oversee the conduct of all subordinate officers in 
the government.”15 This section was amended with the new Municipal Act in 
2001, with both of the previous clauses removed and the addition of the 
language of the head of council as the “chief executive officer” and a suite of 
more broadly phrased duties. The legal scholar states:  
The present Act is at the same time more general and more restrictive 
than the former and it will remain to see how it will be interpreted. 																																																								
13 Vancouver Charter, SBC 1953, c 55, s 207(1).  
14 Rogers, Ian MacF., The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations (Toronto: Thompson Reuters 
Canada Limited, 2009), section 53.1.  
15 Municipal Act, R.S.O 1990, c. M.45, section 70.  
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However, it is submitted the chief executive and leadership roles alone 
are broad enough to cover the duties of the former Act.”16 
 
The use of the term chief executive officer does not seem to imply any additional 
executive authority, and certainly does not empower a mayor with “strong mayor” 
executive authority in the American mayor-council form of government.  
  Another key difference across provinces is whether cities are afforded 
unique legislation, or ‘city charters.’ This group of cities includes the largest city 
in each Canadian province. Eight of these ten cities have unique legislation, five 
of which are called ‘charters,’ as detailed in Table 5. Just two provinces – 
Saskatoon and New Brunswick – have not established city-specific legislation for 
their largest cities. The most recent addition was Alberta following a recent 
review of the Municipal Government Act initiated by the provincial government in 
2012,17 which culminated in city charters for Calgary and Edmonton adopted in 
2017. While there is often political optimism about the benefits of such charters, 
there is also skepticism of charters as a “false panacea.”18 A paper by Smith and 
Spicer further argues that there has been little ‘give and take’ in existing city 
charters, meaning the provincial governments have extended few additional 
powers to cities and cities have not always fully utilized the powers granted, and  
 
																																																								
16 Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, section 53.2. 
17 Province of Alberta. Municipal Government Act Review. http://mgareview.alberta.ca/what-we-
heard 
18 See: “The False Panacea of City Charters” at the Urban Policy Program Symposium, 
University of Calgary, June 2015; Jason Markusoff, “City charter may be no cure-all, academics 
warn,” Calgary Herald (June 2, 2015); and, Andrew Sancton, “The False Panacea of City 
Charters?” (2016). 
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Table 5: Overview of general municipal and city-specific legislation  
 General Municipal Legislation City-Specific Legislation  
Vancouver, BC 
 
Community Charter Vancouver Charter 
Calgary, AB  
 
Municipal Government Act Calgary Charter 
Saskatoon, SK 
 
The Municipalities Act 
The Cities Act 
 
- 
Winnipeg, MB  
 
The Municipal Act The City of Winnipeg 
Charter 
Toronto, ON 
 
Municipal Act City of Toronto Act 
Montreal, QC  
 
Municipal Code  
Cities and Towns Act 
Loi de la Metropole 
Charter of Ville de Montreal  
Saint John, NB  
 
Municipalities Act - 
Halifax, NS  
 
Municipal Government Act Halifax Regional Municipal 
Charter 
Charlottetown, PE 
 
Municipalities Act  Charlottetown Area 
Municipalities Act 
St. John’s, NL 
 
Municipalities Act City of St. John’s Act 
 
that charters have increased the perception rather than the exercise of local 
autonomy.19  
In the eight provinces that have enacted city-specific legislation for their 
largest cities, they vary on whether the role of the mayor is treated differently in 
the general and city-specific legislation. In four provinces – Ontario, Nova Scotia, 
Prince Edward Island and Alberta – the legal provisions for the role of the mayor 																																																								
19 Alison Smith and Zachary Spicer, “Who Gives? Who Takes? Evaluating City Charters in 
Canada,” Presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Conference, University of 
Calgary, June 2016.  
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in the city-specific legislation is close to or identical to the provisions in the 
general municipal legislation. In the four other provinces – British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Quebec and Newfoundland – the city-specific legislation provides that 
mayor with more authority than what is prescribed for other mayors in the 
province.   
  
Legislative Authority 
Provincial legislation varies across Canada in the authority and 
responsibilities provided to mayors. A summary is provided in Table 6, which 
identifies the enumerated legal authority of mayors, by province. This table 
reflects each city’s chief governing legislation (that is, in provinces with city-
specific legislation, it is that legislation which is reflected in the table; in provinces 
with only general legislation, that legislation is reflected in the table). A number of 
interesting observations can be made from this comparison of the role of the 
mayor as expressed through provincial legislation. First, the three most common 
duties of mayors across provinces are presiding over meetings, calling meetings, 
and signing official documents. This is uniform across provinces, with one 
exception in Montreal with respect to presiding over meetings, as Montreal’s 
charter includes provisions instead for the appointment of a speaker.20 
 
 																																																								
20 It should be noted that other cities have also appointed council speakers, but the legislation in 
all provinces other than Quebec provides the mayor with the option to preside over meetings if so 
desired.  
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Table 6: Mayoral authority in provincial legislation, by city  
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Mayor presides over 
meetings (or has option to) X X X X X  X X X X 
Mayor calls special meetings 
at own discretion X X X X X X X X X X 
Mayor signs bylaws, 
contracts, cheques, etc. X X X X X X X X X X 
Mayor makes specified 
appointments  X X X X X X   X  
Mayor appoints deputies, 
committees and/or chairs  X   X X X   X  
Mayor “provides leadership” 
(or equivalent) X    X  X    
Mayor “provides direction” (or 
equivalent) X     X X    
Mayor “communicates 
information” (or equivalent) X    X X X X  X 
Mayor “makes 
recommendations”  X    X X    X 
Mayor “reflects the will of 
council”  X          
Mayor “prosecute and 
punishes all negligence”          X 
Mayor oversees employees’ 
conduct  X   X  X    X 
Mayor suspends employees 
or officers X   X  X    X 
Mayor suspends Council 
decisions for limited period    X  X     
* Denotes cities with city-specific legislation 
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Interestingly, these basic duties are similar to those identified in the Baldwin Act 
of 1849, which provided that mayors were responsible to preside over meetings, 
summon special meetings, and administer oaths.21 Today, these historic 
responsibilities remain the only mayoral duties consistently enumerated in 
provincial legislation.  
Second, there are important differences across provinces in whether 
mayors are empowered with specific authority with respect to their council 
colleagues. Four provinces provide mayors with legislated ability to make 
appointments. The extreme example of this is found in the Winnipeg Charter 
which states, “the mayor must appoint (a) a deputy mayor; (b) an acting deputy 
mayor; (c) the chairpersons for the standing committees; […] and (d) members of 
the executive policy committee.”22 This could be viewed as an important lever for 
securing and rewarding political support for the mayor from other council 
members; however, in no province is this power comparable to the cabinet 
appointment powers of first ministers in parliamentary systems. Councillors 
serving as standing committee chairs do not hold comparable authority with 
respect to specific municipal services or departments, as would a cabinet 
minister. Some provinces enumerate more vague duties regarding council such 
as ‘providing leadership’ or ‘communicating information,’ and mayors in some 
provinces have expressed temporary veto authority. The extent to which these 
powers are used in practice is unknown, but their very provision in some 
																																																								
21 Municipal Corporations Act (Canada), 1849. 
22 The City of Winnipeg Charter, SM 2002, c 39, s 51(1).  
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legislation but not in others reflects that there are differences in how the role of 
the mayor within council is understood across provinces.  
 Finally, and perhaps most curiously, some provincial governments have 
extended unusual legislative power to the mayors of their largest city. In some 
cities, provincial legislation identifies that mayors have a role in overseeing 
employee conduct, an ability to suspend municipal officers, and in one case an 
identified responsibility for ‘prosecuting and punishing negligence.’ Interestingly, 
during the interviews that inform Part II of this study, current and past mayors in 
cities with these unusual legislated duties often expressed surprise when asked 
about them, and indicated they either were not aware of them23 or that they were 
not particularly important in practice. Regardless, the fact remains that some 
provinces empower mayors with duties and authority not granted to other 
members of council and not typical for urban mayors in Canada. 
 
Summary: The Role of the Mayor in Provincial Legislation  
 This chapter began by positioning municipal governments as being within 
the purview of their respective provinces. Canada’s provinces have established 
legislation to govern municipal affairs and establish the authority of mayors and 
councils. The legislation varies in the language it uses – ‘chief executive officer,’ 
‘chief elected officer,’ ‘official head’ – but generally recognizes the mayoralty as 
holding a central leadership role the structures of local governance. All Canadian  																																																								
23 When one mayor who has the authority to suspend staff was asked about whether this power 
had ever been used, the person responded in surprise with, “I have that power? Hmm. The staff 
never told me about that.”  
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Table 7: Comparison of mayoral authority in provincial legislation 
Low Medium High 
Legislation enumerates 
only procedural 
distinctions between role 
of mayor and role of 
council member 
Legislation enumerates 
procedural and functional 
distinctions between role 
of mayor and role of 
council member 
Legislation enumerates 
procedural and functional 
distinctions between role 
of mayor and role of 
council member; and, 
empowers mayor with 
some specific authority 
outside council 
 
Calgary 
Saskatoon 
Charlottetown 
Toronto 
Saint John 
Halifax 
Vancouver 
Winnipeg 
Montreal 
St. John’s 
 
 
mayors have specific procedural duties with respect to council. In most 
provinces, mayors are also prescribed specific duties not held by other members 
of council, although the nature and extent of these duties varies. In a few cases, 
provincial legislation empowers mayors with individual responsibility that extends 
beyond the realm of their authority within council, such as unilateral authority to 
suspend employees.  
 Table 7 places the cities in the study on a simple low-medium-high scale 
based on the extent to which provincial legislation empowers the role of the 
mayor – that is, a relative picture of the degree of mayoral authority afforded to 
the mayor from provincial legislation. Three cities – Calgary, Saskatoon, and 
Charlottetown – rank low, as the legislation articulates the role of the mayor as 
being primarily procedural in nature. Three cities are placed in the middle – 
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Toronto, Saint John and Halifax – as the legislation recognizes some non-
procedural roles for the mayor such as ‘providing leadership’ or ‘communicating 
information’ to council, which distinguish the role of the mayor from the role of 
other members of council. Four cities rank high – Vancouver, Winnipeg, Montreal 
and St. John’s – as the role of the mayor is distinguished from the role of other 
members of council, and the mayor is empowered with authority extending 
beyond the realm of council. 
How powerful are urban mayors in Canada? An examination of provincial 
legislation alone suggests that mayors in Canada have limited legal authority. In 
general, the role appears to be primarily procedural in nature and limited in 
scope to working within council. However, there are many exceptions and no two 
provinces where the role of the mayor is defined in exactly the same way. 
Importantly, the four cities in the ‘high’ category in Table 7 are from the same 
four provinces which have (1) extended city-specific legislation to their largest 
city, and (2) where the enumerated authority of the mayor in those cities differs 
from the enumerated authority of the mayor in the general municipal legislation. 
Therefore, there appears to be a relationship between mayoral empowerment 
through provincial legislation and the willingness of a provincial government to 
establish city-specific legislation. In other words, where provincial governments 
in Canada have extended separate legislation to their largest cities, and 
recognized a unique role for those cities’ mayors, they have also tended to 
empower the mayors. Just as the nature of local-provincial relations vary across 
the country, so too does the authority of the mayor.  
Chapter 5 | LOCALLY GRANTED AUTHORITY   
 
No two cities in Canada are identical.  Local institutional arrangements 
vary, reflecting the unique evolution, provincial and local political interests, 
political culture, and particular circumstances over time in each city. Municipal 
amalgamations and annexations, for example, have occurred in many parts of 
Canada and can have a lasting influence on local governance arrangements. 1 In 
cities such as Montreal, understanding the structures of municipal government 
requires an understanding of the city’s history of amalgamation (and, in this 
unusual case, de-amalgamation).2 Similarly, reform movements towards 
centralization or decentralization, privatization or public ownership of local 
assets, and shifts in desired governance models all shape the political structures 
and norms of their respective cities. Even the small number of cities included in 
this study reflects great diversity in local institutional arrangements.  
This chapter explores the authority of the mayor through an examination 
of the locally granted arrangements in each city. It examines procedure bylaws 
and other documents, and the various resources granted to mayors across cities. 
Variation abounds, with each city choosing to empower – and in some cases, 
																																																								
1 For more on this topic, see: Andrew Sancton, Governing Canada’s City-Regions: Adapting 
Form to Function (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994); and, Andrew 
Sancton, Merger Mania: The Assault on Local Government (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2000).  
2 In 2002, the Province of Quebec amalgamated 27 municipalities on the Island of Montreal into 
one unified city. This decision was met with great residence, and after a series of referendums, 
the Province authorized an unprecedented de-merger which split the city back into smaller 
municipalities. Montreal City Council includes the mayors, and sometimes councillors, from each 
of these municipalities. There are now 19 mayors within the City of Montreal.  
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disempower – through a unique combination of arrangements. The chapter 
begins by presenting available data, primarily from municipal websites and 
policies, in a comparative format. It concludes with a discussion of mayoral 
power “on paper” based on the findings of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
 
Institutional Arrangements 
Every municipality in Canada is governed by a council, but the 
composition of this council varies by community. Table 8 presents an overview of 
the composition of council in the cities in this study. The number of council 
members ranges widely from 11 to 65, and with no obvious relationship to 
population size or other variables. The number of constituents per councillor also 
varies widely from just over 3,400 to nearly 80,000. Understanding why local 
government in each city is structured the way it is would require an extensive 
investigation into the history, culture and circumstances of each community – all 
of which have surely influenced the local institutional arrangements unique to 
each city.   
In most municipalities in Canada, including those examined in this study, 
the operation of council and the duties of members of council are outlined in a 
procedure bylaw or similar policy document. In some but not all cases, the role of 
the mayor is described. In the City of Toronto’s Municipal Code, for example, the 
mayor is identified as the ‘chief executive officer’ of the city, responsible for  
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Table 8: Council composition, by city   
 Size of Council 
(including Mayor) 
At Large  
vs. Wards  
Avg. Constituents 
Per Councillor3  
Vancouver, BC 
 
11 All councillors 
elected at large 
60,350 
Calgary, AB  
 
15 All councillors 
elected in wards  
78,348 
Saskatoon, SK 
 
11 All councillors 
elected in wards 
22,219 
Winnipeg, MB  
 
16 All councillors 
elected in wards 
44,241 
Toronto, ON 
 
45 All councillors 
elected in wards 
59,469 
Montreal, QC  
 
65 All councillors 
elected in wards  
25,774 
Saint John, NB  
 
11 All councillors 
elected in wards 
7,006 
Halifax, NS  
 
17 All councillors 
elected in wards 
39,010 
Charlottetown, PE 
 
11 All councillors 
elected in wards 
3,456 
St. John’s, NL 
 
11 5 ward councillors  
+ 5 at large 
positions 
10,717 
 
presiding over meetings, providing leadership to council, and representing the 
city at official functions.4 Toronto is an unusual case where a leadership role of 
the mayor is recognized in local bylaw or policy. The Toronto Municipal Code 
also grants the mayor a range of other special powers, including the ability to  
 																																																								
3 Note: in Vancouver and St. John’s, some or all councillors are elected at large, and represent all 
constituents. 
4 City of Toronto Municipal Code, Chapter 27: Council Procedures. Available online at: 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/bylaws/lawmcode.htm 
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Table 9: Mayoral appointment powers  
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Mayor can make 
additional appointments X   X X X   X  
Mayoral appointments 
include salary increase  X   X  X   X  
Mayor-appointed 
executive committee     X X X     
 
appoint deputy mayors and committee chairs, and to flag items from council 
agendas as being key matters for the mayor.5 Procedure bylaws must be 
consistent with the municipal legislation relevant to each city, but often provide 
more detail about the role of the mayor in practice such as their specific 
responsibilities during council or committee meetings. Often this includes 
procedural requirements such as for individuals to address comments during 
meetings through the mayor as chair, and giving the mayor authority to 
determine who can speak when during meetings and rule on points of privilege. 
Many cities’ bylaws identify the mayor as an ex officio member of all council 
committees. In some cases, as illustrated in Table 9, mayors are also granted 
appointment powers for specific positions or committees, or an executive body. 
In some cases, these appointment powers also involve salary increases for 																																																								
5 Ibid. 
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appointees. This may be a useful lever for securing political support from 
appointees. In an extreme case, the Mayor of Winnipeg not only makes 
appointments but also issues ‘mandate letters’ to appointees, akin to common 
practice in parliamentary systems for cabinet ministers.6 These practices 
empower the mayor because they shape how the mayor and interacts with their 
council in one of the most visible aspects of their role, with levers to secure and 
mobilize political support.  
 Locally established practices and procedures can also have the effect of 
disempowering mayors. In some cities, such as Charlottetown, mayors only vote 
in the case of a tie as the deciding vote. In some cases, procedure bylaws limit 
the participation of the mayor during council deliberations. In the City of 
Saskatoon and City of Calgary, for example, the mayor must vacate the chair in 
order to participate in debate or make a motion.  Policies other than procedure 
bylaws can also establish higher restrictions or expectations on the mayor than 
what are held for other members of council.7 Regardless, the role of the mayor is 
defined and empowered (or disempowered) though local bylaws and policies.  
 
Status and Resources  
Although the Canadian local government literature generally emphasizes 
the weakness of the mayor’s role, there is recognition that the mayor holds a 																																																								
6 “Executive Policy Committee & Other Mayoral Appointees Receive Mandate Letters,” City of 
Winnipeg Media Release, November 4, 2016. Available online: 
http://www.winnipeg.ca/cao/media/news/nr_2016/nr_20161104.stm#5 
7 For example, the City of Calgary’s Gifts and Benefits Policy includes requirements for 
disclosures which apply only to the mayor and not to other members of council.  
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Table 10: Status of mayoral role vs councillor role   
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Mayor is considered a 
full-time position X X X X X X  X  X 
Mayor is only full-time 
position on council   X     X  X 
Mayor is only position 
elected at large   X X X X X  X X  
 
privileged role within council. Some have argued that the mayor is in a position of 
greater authority by virtue of popularity with the electorate,8 and as the mayor is 
generally the only elected official elected to represent the whole community.9 In 
one author’s words, “being elected by all citizens presumably provides a moral 
suasion for the mayor’s platform among the council, and the mayor can, as a 
result, speak for the entire community on issues of consequence.” 10 However,  
as illustrated in Table 10, this is not always the case. In this selection of cities, 
only three mayors are the only full-time member of their respective council. In 
two cases, Saint John and Charlottetown, the mayor is not considered a full-time 
role. In five cities – Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal – all  																																																								
8 Alan Levine (ed.), Your Worship: The Lives of Eight of Canada’s Most Unforgettable Mayors 
(Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1989), 2.  
9 Kenneth Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1954), 90. 
10 James Lightbody, City Politics, Canada (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 156.  
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Table 11: Resources provided to the mayor   
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Mayor is paid 2x or 
more than councillor 
salary 
X  X X  X X X X X 
Mayor has more than 
2x individual councillor 
staff  
X X X X X X X X X X 
Mayor has more than 
2x individual councillor 
budget  
X X X X X X X X X X 
 
members of council are full-time. In three cities –Vancouver, Saint John and St. 
John’s – all residents of the municipality also elect other members of council.  
 Another important variable is with respect to resources. Mayors generally 
are provided with greater resources than are their colleagues on council. In all 
cases, the mayor has more staff and a larger budget than any other member of 
council. In the City of Toronto, for example, the mayor’s office has 17 staff 
members including dedicated resources for communications, media and various 
policy files. Council members, in contrast, each typically have two to four staff 
members. In the smaller cities, councillors typically share staff resources while 
dedicated staff resources support the mayor. Salary is an also an important 
consideration. In all but one case (Charlottetown), mayors make six-figure 
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salaries, with the highest salary of just under $220,000 per annum. The average 
salary for the mayors in this study is $149,010. This is equivalent to an average 
cost of 66 cents per resident, with the cost per resident generally decreasing as 
city size increases. Residents of Toronto pay approximately 7 cents each 
towards their mayor’s salary, while residents of Charlottetown pay $1.90. Council 
establishes the compensation for the mayor (and council) in most but not all 
cases. Saskatoon, for example, sets the mayor’s salary at 85% of the salary of a 
provincial cabinet minister. The average salary for councillors in the cities in the 
sample is $67,795. This ranges from $32,700 in Charlottetown to $115,400 in 
Calgary. On average, mayors are paid 2.3 times the salary of their respective 
council colleagues.  
 Another organizational variable is the presence of local political parties. In 
two cities, Vancouver and Montreal, parties play a critical role in organizing 
political decision-making. Local political parties are different from federal and 
provincial parties in several respects, including that the mayor tends to play a 
more central role in the party. The governing party in Montreal, as the extreme 
example, has at times been named after the mayor. Local political parties in 
Montreal tend to be organized to support a mayoral campaign and disband after 
that mayor’s tenure ends. Where the mayor is a member and prominent leader 
within the governing political party, the mayor may be able to exercise greater 
control over the council agenda and decision-making process. 
 
 
		
88 
Table 12: Parties and confidential meetings   
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X   X  X     
 
The mayor of Winnipeg has similar capabilities through their ability to 
appoint the executive committee, which includes close to half of council and 
makes many key decisions, sometimes without requiring council support. During 
the interviews in these three cities for Part II of this study, it was clear that all 
three mayors meet with their party caucuses or executive committees in closed 
session on a regular basis. In the words of one interviewee in Winnipeg, 
“everyone knows. It’s the worst kept secret at City Hall.”11 The current governing 
party in Vancouver, Vision Vancouver, has been scrutinized in the media for 
holding closed caucus meetings which, given their majority on council, could be 
considered illegal council meetings.12 Regardless, this is an important variable 
because it can provide a forum for the mayor to exercise greater control over  
																																																								
11 Confidential interview, Administrator, City of Winnipeg.  
12 Jeff Lee, “Councillors who meet privately likely breaking the rules, says lawyer,” Vancouver 
Sun (September 22, 2015). Available online: 
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Table 13: Mayoral power within council 
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Mayor has political party 
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meetings 
X   X  X     
 
council decision-making by removing deliberations about key decisions from the 
public eye and media reach, and providing opportunity for what is commonly 
referred to as ‘horse trading’ on policy matters behind the scenes.13 All of these 
variables influence the power of the mayor. 
 
Summary: Locally Granted Mayoral Authority  
 This chapter began by articulating that no two municipalities in Canada 
are identical, as local institutional arrangements are unique to each city. These 																																																																																																																																																																				
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Councillors+meet+privately+likely+breaking+rules+says+law
yer/11385689/story.html 
13 This phrases was used in interviews in all three cities.  
		
90 
arrangements can empower the mayor. Table 13 presents a summary of the 
variables considered in this chapter: the ability for mayors to make appointments; 
the status of the mayoralty relative to other members of council; the resources 
provided to the mayor; and, the presence of political parties or an executive 
committee which can meet confidentially akin to a cabinet at the federal or 
provincial level.  
Table 14 presents a broad categorization of cities based on the degree to 
which mayors are empowered through local institutional arrangements, using a 
similar low-medium-high scale as presented in the summary section of Chapter 
5.14 In all cities, local arrangements provide mayors with more authority and 
more resources than are provided to councillors. However, cities vary in the 
degree to which mayors are empowered with resources to assist in exercising 
leadership, organizing political support, and streamlining decision-making. In 
cities ranked ‘low,’ specifically Calgary and Saint John, mayors are not provided 
with any additional appointment powers. They also do not hold unique status as 
the only full-time council member, and do not have any means by which to 
organize or make decisions outside of the public arena. In cities positioned in the 
‘medium’ level on the scale, the mayor has some levers such as appointment 
powers or through having a unique status as the sole full time, at large elected 
official with the unique ability to represent an entire community. 
																																																								
14 Note: as in Chapter 5, this table is presented for illustration purposes only, to communicate the 
variation across cities in a simple format. The assessment of low, medium or high is relative (that 
is, based on a comparison of where each city sits relative to the other cities) rather than against 
an objective, fixed standard. 
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Table 14: Mayoral authority through institutional arrangements 
Low Medium High 
Mayor is granted only 
modestly more resources 
than are other members 
of council, and no 
additional levers which 
may assist in organizing 
political support or 
decision making. 
Mayor is granted more 
resources than are other 
members of council, and 
some additional levers 
which may assist in 
organizing political 
support or decision 
making.  
Mayor is granted more 
resources than are other 
members of council, and 
significant levers to 
assist in organizing 
political support or 
decision making.   
 
Calgary 
Saint John 
 
Saskatoon 
Toronto 
Halifax 
Charlottetown 
St. John’s 
 
Vancouver 
Winnipeg 
Montreal  
 
On the high end of the scale, mayors have institutional levers they can use to 
organize support and decision-making. The mayor of Winnipeg has unilateral 
authority to appoint an executive policy committee, which has been known, 
historically, to meet in closed session and through which all other committee 
decisions flow. The mayor issues mandate letters to those appointed to key 
positions as a clear expression of authority. In Montreal and Vancouver, the 
mayor is a member of a governing political party, a significant vehicle for 
organizing council decision-making or for a mayor to execute their agenda.  
This review of the local institutional arrangements finds variation including 
municipal structure, council composition, and nature of local political organization 
– and this variation can translate into greater power for the mayor. Interestingly, 
the low-medium-high distribution of cities bears resemblance to the low-medium- 
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Table 15: Summary of institutional variables 
 Low Medium High 
Authority from 
Provincial Legislation  
Calgary 
Saskatoon 
Charlottetown 
Toronto 
Saint John 
Halifax 
Vancouver 
Winnipeg 
Montreal 
St. John’s 
 
Authority from Local 
Institutional 
Arrangements  
Calgary 
Saint John 
 
Saskatoon 
Toronto 
Halifax 
Charlottetown 
St. John’s 
 
Vancouver 
Winnipeg 
Montreal  
 
high scale of mayoral authority from provincial legislation. Montreal, Vancover 
and Winnipeg emerge in the ‘high’ category, Toronto and Halifax in the ‘medium’ 
category, and Calgary in the ‘low’ category, in both examinations. It may be that 
the mayoralty, as an institution, reflects much of its environment. The political 
culture and norms within each province, the structures and dynamics of local 
government unique to each city, and the particular features of a community are 
all echoed in the mayoralty. The ways in which mayors are empowered through 
provincial legislation, for example, is illustrative of the nature of local-provincial 
relations. British Columbia, for example, is considered to have a more 
collaborative approach to municipal government described by some as one of 
‘leniency’15 and ‘gentle imposition’16 and has extended some of the most 
																																																								
15 Kenneth Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1954), 47.  
16 Paul Tennant and David Zirnhelt, “Metropolitan Government in Vancouver: The Politics of 
Gentle Imposition,” Canadian Public Administration, vol. 16 (Spring 1973): 124-38.  
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empowering legislation to the mayor of its largest city. As another example, the 
traditionally more conservative political culture in Alberta may be what is 
reflected in the low level of mayoral empowerment in that province. The rapid 
growth of Toronto and expanding expectations for local services has led to 
perennial discussions within the city about empowering Toronto’s mayors.17  
 This institutional examination of the mayoralty finds some variation in how 
both provincially and locally granted authority and arrangements empower 
mayors – but importantly, mayoral power as presented here is quite limited. 
Canada does not have any mayors with American “strong mayor” styled 
executive power. Canada does not have mayors who have much unilateral 
authority separate and apart from their council. However, the examples also 
show that mayors in Canada are not universally “weak” even when mayoral 
power is understood in solely institutional terms. Variables such as the presence 
of political parties or council-granted authority to make appointments are levers 
that empower the mayor.  
A second important finding from this review is that provincial and 
municipal governments in Canada define mayoral power in vague terms. There 
were no examples found where the role of the mayor – and the power of the 
mayor – was clearly and comprehensively articulated. What limited articulation of 
mayoral power exists tends to focus on the procedural aspects of the role. By 
reviewing a newspaper in any Canadian city, it will quickly become apparent that 
mayors in Canada are engaged in many activities not listed in provincial 																																																								
17 See Chapter 9.  
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legislation or municipal bylaw. Mayors regularly engage with a wide array of 
actors and play various roles within these groups. Mayor are involved in a 
broader scope of activities, and play a role with a wider network of actors, than 
what this institutional review would suggest.  
 Third, there are institutional variables in Canada which are associated 
with increased mayoral power: first, the presence of city-specific provincial 
legislation; second, the use of different language to describe the role of the 
mayor in the city-specific legislation, compared to the general municipal 
legislation for the province; and, third, the presence of local political parties. But 
do these institutional variations matter? Do they translate into mayors actually 
being “more powerful” in practice? Part II takes up this question, exploring the 
mayoralty through an organizational lens and expressed through narratives 
shared by mayors and those who work most closely with them. This approach 
presents a rather different image of mayoral power in Canada’s cities.  
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PART II: MAYORAL POWER “IN PRACTICE” 
 
 
“Everyone assumes the mayor is the boss, but what level of control  
or power or leadership capacity does the mayor actually have?  
 
Well, that’s up for discussion.” 
 
                    - City Councillor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 | PERCEPTIONS OF POWER  
 
On September 2, 2015, a three-year-old boy drowned as his family 
attempted to flee to Europe from Syria by boat. A shocking photograph of the 
boy’s lifeless body washed up on a beach went viral within hours. The image 
prompted an outcry from leaders around the world, including several of Canada’s 
big city mayors who expressed a desire to address the continuing Syrian refugee 
crisis. On September 3, 2015, the mayor of Canada’s largest city issued a press 
release urging the federal government to “act quickly.”1 On September 4, 2015, 
the Big City Mayors Caucus – a group of mayors from Canada’s largest cities – 
issued a formal press release, indicating that “Canadian cities are ready to 
address this crisis”2 with a call on governments to work together to take action. 
Press conferences were held in many cities across Canada, and mayors spoke 
out individually and collectively to attract attention to the issue and apply 
pressure. Fundraising efforts to privately sponsored refugee families occurred 
across the country. Mayors spoke publically about the number of Syrian refugees 
their cities would be prepared to accept, and called on the federal government to 
increase the number of families being admitted to Canada. These events 
happened to fall just weeks before a federal election, and attracted considerable 
attention from the media and political parties alike. All of the major parties 
																																																								
1 Media Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Toronto. September 3, 2015.  
2 Federation of Canadian Municipalities, “Cities mobilize for action on Syrian refugee crisis,” 
September 4, 2015. Available online: http://www.fcm.ca/home/media/news-and-
commentary/2015/cities-mobilize-for-action-on-syrian-refugee-crisis.htm 
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articulated plans to increase the number of Syrian refugees welcomed to 
Canada. Following the election, the newly elected government unveiled a plan to 
welcome more than 25,000 Syrian refugees to Canada. 
This is a curious story. Immigration and international relations are 
decidedly federal matters in Canada. Making decisions about the number of 
refugees to be accepted into Canada is not within the jurisdiction of any city 
council in the country, and yet mayors were an active part of the response. 
Mayors also contributed to the high profile the issue received during the election. 
In the words of one Canadian mayor: 
Last year, when the Syrian crisis hit the front pages, it wasn’t the federal 
government that was leading it. It was mayors. We were saying, ‘we need 
to do something about this.’ Cities are where life happens – and it’s not 
just because we’re the ‘closest level of government’ and all that. It’s 
because you can’t really talk about big issues – environment, health, 
immigration – without talking about cities.3 
 
There is no municipal legislation in Canada that would suggest that holding a 
press conference on an immigration issue is a part of the role of the mayor – or 
that mayors hold any power or influence in this policy space – yet mayors across 
the country were actively engaged on the issue. In every Canadian city, every 
day, mayors engage in activities not prescribed in legislation or bylaw. The story 
about the Syrian refugee crisis is but one example of the sometimes curious 
activities of mayors, and the undefined scope of mayoral power in Canada. Thus 
begins an exploration into the ambiguous and largely uncharted area that is 
mayoral power, in practice, in Canada’s cities.  																																																								
3 Confidential Interview #8.  
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Studying Mayoral Power in Practice 
 The perspectives and observations of mayors and those who work most 
closely with mayors are essential ingredients for understanding mayoral power in 
practice. For the purposes of this study, a narrative inquiry approach is engaged, 
privileging the perspectives of those with direct experience.4 During the summer 
of 2016, the researcher travelled to the ten cities in this study to observe mayors 
in practice, and to conduct interviews with people representing three specific 
perspectives in each city:  political, including mayors, past mayors, deputy 
mayors and councillors; executive, from senior administrators working in the 
municipal government including city managers and city clerks; and, community, 
from media or others who closely follow the activities of mayors. A total of 68 
interviews were conducted involving 70 people (two interviews included two 
people together, at their request).5 Interviews were conducted in person, or over 
the phone where required for scheduling or other reasons. A translator was 
offered to interviewees where participation in French was preferred. The 
researcher also observed a council or committee meeting (and, where possible, 
both) in each city.  
Selecting participants for interviews was more challenging in some cases 
than others. Securing interviews with individuals representing a political 
perspective was relatively straightforward. Invitations were sent to the current 																																																								
4 D. Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly, Narrative Inquiry: Experience and Story in 
Qualitative Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004); Sonia M. Ospina and Jennifer Dodge, 
“It’s About Time: Catching Method Up to Meaning – the Usefulness of Narrative Inquiry in Public 
Administration Research,” Public Administration Review Vol. 65, No. 2 (March-April 2005).  
5 See chart in Appendix B. 
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mayor, deputy mayor (where applicable), most recent living past mayor, and 
current councillors in each city included in the sample. In cities with larger city 
councils, invitations were sent to a shorter list of councillors selected by random 
draw. Interviews with individuals representing an executive perspective were 
more challenging. An invitation was sent to the city manager (or equivalent) and 
city clerk (or equivalent) in each city. In a few cases, referrals were made to 
other senior staff members or former city managers (or equivalent). In one city 
with a forthcoming election, it was not possible to obtain any executive interviews 
as all invited participants declined. The most challenging group to select for 
interviews was individuals representing a community perspective. Originally, 
invitations were sent to local reporters in each city who cover city hall affairs. In 
small communities with only one or two local newspapers, this was 
straightforward. In larger communities, it was more difficult. The method of 
selection involved searching for recent media stories including the word “mayor” 
and “city of ___” and identifying authors with the highest volume of recent 
stories. This method resulted in many referrals. Most individuals contacted 
through this means responded by recommending a more suitable individual in 
their community who was more attuned or had a longer history of observing local 
politics. In several cases, the referrals included non-media community leaders 
who have frequent contact with mayors or local government. In some cities, 
securing interviews was relatively simple with a high participation rate from those 
contacted. In other cases, it was more difficult. The researcher followed up with 
individuals who did not respond to the requests a maximum of one time in 
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additional to the original request, per research ethics guidelines. Interviews 
reflecting the community perspective were secured in all but one city. The 
interviewees proved a wealth of insight, history and stories about mayors in each 
city.6  
 The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format. A list of 
general questions was provided to all interviewees in advance,7 asking 
interviewees to describe the mayor’s role, and share observations from their 
experience. Many of the questions prompted story telling, long answers, and 
returns to earlier questions. The researcher was careful to speak as little as 
possible, and instead listen for the ways in which interviewees described their 
perceptions of the role and power of the mayor. Prodding and follow up 
questions were incorporated during the discussion as needed. Interviewees were 
assured confidentiality, and processes required by research ethics were 
followed.  
 At the beginning of each interview, the researcher provided a verbal 
overview of the study, including the scope and purposes. It was also expressed 
that the study is not focused on individual mayors, nor does it seek to assess or 
evaluate any specific mayor or group of mayors. Interviewees were asked to 
focus on the role, not any particular person in the role. Some interviewees were 
																																																								
6 This point cannot be overstated. The interviews offered far richer and deeper insights about 
mayors, local government and cities in each community than anticipated. The experience of 
travelling to each city in the sample, meeting with people with personal experience and insight 
into the role of the mayor in their city was a once in a lifetime experience for the researcher. The 
journey is chronicled through a series of blog posts available online at www.mayorsproject.ca.   
7 See Appendix C. 
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more compliant with this direction than others. In most cases, interviewees were 
quick to share stories and reference specific mayors. Interviewees would often 
compare specific mayors from their own city as a way to express a point. For 
many interviewees, it was difficult or impossible to speak about the mayoralty 
without references to individuals.8 The following chapters aim to communicate 
perspectives on mayoral power as shared by interviewees, using their own 
words as often as possible. 
 
Summary of Interview Findings  
 The most basic – and unsurprising – observation emerging from the 
interviews is that the role of the mayor in Canada is unclear. This is consistent 
with the literature, as presented in Chapter 2. When asked, “Do you think the role 
of the mayor is well understood?” more than 80% of respondents indicated that 
they do not feel the role is understood. Interestingly, as articulated in Table 16, 
mayors and other elected officials were most likely to indicate that the role of the 
mayor is unclear. Community members were the least likely to indicate that the 
role is unclear, although the majority of this group still felt the role is unclear. A 
common response was to indicate that the public believes mayors have more 
power than they actually do, based on the perspective of the interviewee. In the 
words of two interviewees: 
																																																								
8 This important point will be revisited in Chapter 8. The inability to examine the role of the mayor 
absent the person in the role ultimately had a shaping influence on the approach taking in this 
study.  
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A lot of people still believe the mayor has executive authority. If the mayor 
says something is going to happen, or believes a certain initiative should 
happen, they think it’s going to happen. I really don’t think the public 
understands how it all actually works.”9 
  
People think mayors have a lot more power than they do, but he’s just 
another vote – but he’s got to answer for all of it, like he’s in control.10 
 
Many mayors and past mayors shared stories to illustrate the lack of 
understanding about their role: receiving calls about services provided by other 
levels of government; being requested to make decisions outside their authority, 
such as about an individual’s immigration status or matters related to health or 
education; being contacted to help with personal or family matters. Other elected 
officials also reported similar experiences where constituents not only did not 
understand their roles, but also more generally, did not understand the roles of 
each level of government: 
There isn’t much understanding about the three orders of government. 
Almost every day, I get an email telling me that we should focus on 
building a new hospital, but that’s a provincial thing. We’re trying to build a 
recreation centre right now, and people tell us we should be spending that 
money on a hospital.11 
 
Some respondents felt there were benefits to the ambiguity in the role. “I don’t 
think people realize what the mayor actually does or can do. And it’s just 
because we don’t talk about it. That leaves a lot of leeway. I think someone could 
walk into the office, and really take control, if they wanted to.”12 
																																																								
9 Confidential Interview #5.  
10 Confidential Interview #8.  
11 Confidential Interview #14.  
12 Confidential Interview #1.  
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Table 16: Responses to “Do you think the role of the mayor is well understood?” 
 Yes No 
Political: Mayors and Past Mayors 8% (1/12) 92% (11/12) 
Political: Other Local Elected 
Officials  
12% (3/25) 88% (2/25) 
Executive  14% (2/14) 86% (12/14) 
Community  41% (7/17) 59% (10/17) 
Total 19.1% (13/68) 80.9% (55/68) 
 
 
Defining the Mayoralty  
If the role of the mayor is considered generally unclear and ambiguous, 
how do mayors and those who work most closely with them define it? 
Interviewees were asked to describe the role of the mayor in their own words. 
There was remarkable consistency across cities and perspectives in how the role 
is defined. Overwhelmingly, the role of the mayor is described as a position of 
leadership. The word ‘lead’ (or ‘leader’ or ‘leadership’) was used by nearly 9 of 
every 10 interviewees. As described in Table 17, municipal administrators 
(executive perspective) were the most likely to use this term, followed by 
politicians and community members. Interviewees in all cities used the term with 
similar frequency. Overall, there was strong consensus across cities and across 
perspectives that the role of the mayor is fundamentally characterized as a 
position of leadership. 
 
		
104 
Table 17: Use of words ‘lead,’ ‘leader’ and ‘leadership,’ by perspective 
 Political  
(n=37) 
 
Executive 
(n=14) 
Community 
(n=17) 
Total 
(n=68) 
Percentage of 
interviewees using word 
‘lead,’ ‘leader’ or 
‘leadership’ to describe 
role of the mayor 
 
89% 93% 82% 88% 
 
Table 18 captures common responses to this question in more detail. The six 
most frequent responses are listed in the table. The interviews are again sorted 
by perspective, and reflect the percentage of interviews from each perspective 
mentioning the response listed. The variation across perspectives is striking. The 
most common response overall described the role of the mayor as providing 
leadership to council. Interestingly, almost all city managers and administrators 
(executive perspective), when describing the mayor’s role, spoke about the 
mayor as primarily a leader of council, while fewer than one third of community 
members (community perspective) identified this as a part of the role. Just over 
half of mayors and other elected officials (political perspective) identified leading 
council as part of their description of the role of the mayor. The second most 
common response to this question was to indicate that the mayor represents the 
city or speaks on behalf of the city – but with variation based on perspective. 
70% of community interviewees included their response, compared to only 35%  
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Table 18: Common responses to “How would you describe the role of the 
mayor?” 
 
 Political  
(n=37) 
 
Executive 
(n=14) 
Community 
(n=17) 
Total 
(n=68) 
Provide leadership to 
council  
 
57% 85% 29% 56% 
Provide leadership to 
administration 
 
22% 29% 18% 22% 
Provide leadership to 
community   
 
13% 7% 53% 22% 
Represent the city / speak 
for the city  
 
35% 42% 70% 45% 
Drive a vision / set a 
direction  
 
32% 21% 41% 32% 
Sell the city / economic 
development  
 
16% 0% 23% 14% 
 
of political interviewees. The central observation here is that while interviewees 
agree that the mayoralty is fundamentally a leadership role, the type of 
leadership that is valued and expected varies depending on the perspective of 
the interviewee.  For politicians, the mayoralty primarily involves providing 
leadership to council, representing the city, and driving a vision or direction. For 
administrators, the role involves providing leadership to council, representing the 
city, and providing leadership to administration. For community members, the 
role involves representing the city, providing leadership to the community, and 
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driving a vision or direction. Providing leadership to council is the top response 
for the other two perspectives, but was not included in the top three for 
community members. Interestingly, nearly a quarter of the community 
perspective interviewees identified the role of the mayor as involving selling the 
city and/or economic development – but this was not mentioned by any 
administrators. Other less frequent responses to the question included serving 
as a diplomat, engaging in intergovernmental relations, negotiating with unions, 
and building the brand of a political party. 
 Interestingly, while almost all interviewees describe the role of the mayor 
using the word “leader,” few used the word “power.” Fewer than 1 in 5 
interviewees mentioned power at all when describing the role of the mayor in 
their own words. Administrators were most likely to use the word power, as 
illustrated in Table 19, but in only slightly higher frequency than were politicians 
and community members. In some cases, the reference to “power” was in the 
context of suggesting that mayors have limited power (“Mayors have very little 
actual power, beyond the power of persuasion.”13). In other cases, the 
interviewee was suggesting the opposite (“I’ve discovered that the mayor has a 
significant amount of power. Even though Council may have debated something, 
or voted on something, the mayor can still go to the public and say something 
else.“14).  Regardless, the notion of “power” was far less frequently cited than  
 
 																																																								
13 Confidential Interview #16.  
14 Confidential Interview #24.  
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Table 19: Frequency of word “power,” by perspective 
 
 Political  
(n=37) 
 
Executive 
(n=14) 
Community 
(n=17) 
Total 
(n=68) 
Percentage of 
interviewees who used 
the word ‘power’ to 
describe role of the 
mayor 
 
19% 21% 18% 19% 
 
was “leadership” across all cities as a way to describe the role of the mayor. This 
may be an important contrast between the political cultures in Canada and the 
United States, where less emphasis is placed on the “power” of the mayor in a 
Canadian context. 
 Where the interviewee did not offer a perspective on mayoral power, the 
researcher followed up with more specific questions to assess the interviewees’ 
sense of how powerful mayors are in their community. Respondents were asked, 
“how powerful do you think the role of the mayor is?” The responses were wide 
ranging:  
It’s a pretty powerful position. The mayor controls the microphones. If he 
doesn’t want to hear from you, he just won’t turn your microphone on. 
That happened to me [as a councillor]. I went to the clerk, and they said, 
“Well, it’s his meeting.” Staff won’t buck him.15 
 
Well, the role of the mayor is unfortunately not as substantial as you might 
think. He has, in most cases, very little political power. He’s just one of 
																																																								
15 Confidential Interview #25.  
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many councillors, presiding over a budget that is wholly inadequate. He 
ends up doing things that are relatively trivial in nature.16 
 
Anything I’ve really wanted to accomplish [as mayor], it’s been 
accomplished, much to the chagrin of the councillors. If we really want to 
get it done, we’re going to get it done.17 
 
Because responses were so varied, the researcher coded each interviewee’s 
comments based on their perception of mayoral power using a simple 1-3 
scale.18 Interviewees who emphasized the powerlessness or weakness of the 
mayor during their interview were given a score of 1 (such as the second quote 
above, describing the mayor as having “very little political power” 19). 
Interviewees who acknowledged mayoral power, but also spoke about 
constraints or limits on mayoral power were given a score of 2 (“Mayors have 
power, yes, but it depends on what they do with their council.”20). The majority of 
respondents (58%) were scored as a 2. Interviewees who emphasized the power 
of the mayor were scored a 3 (for example, “he [the mayor] is the boss. It isn’t 
any more complicated than that”21). Averages of these scores, by city and by 
perspective, are presented in Table 20. Overall, interviewees across 
perspectives presented fairly even assessments of mayoral power. Community  																																																								
16 Confidential Interview #46.  
17 Confidential Interview #54.  
18 Note: this scoring is for illustration and comparative purposes only. Interviewees likely have 
varied perceptions about what power is, how it would be evaluated, and may have different 
reference points (eg. comparing the power of a mayor to that of a councillor, vs comparing the 
power of a mayor to that of a prime minister). Therefore, this should not be understood as an 
objective assessment but rather as an illustrative tool to demonstrate the variation in responses 
from interviewees.  
19 Confidential Interview #46.  
20 Confidential Interview #20.  
21 Confidential Interview #33.  
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Table 20: Perceptions of mayoral power, by city and perspective 
 Political  
 
Executive 
 
Community 
 
Overall  
Vancouver, BC 
 
2.2 2.0 3.0 2.4 
Calgary, AB  
 
1.5 2.0 -- 1.8 
Saskatoon, SK 
 
2.3 -- 3.0 2.5 
 
Winnipeg, MB  
 
1.6 2.5 3.0 2.1 
Toronto, ON 
 
2.2 1.5 2.0 2.0 
 
Montreal, QC  
 
2.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 
 
Saint John, NB  
 
2.0 2.0 2.5 2.1 
 
Halifax, NS  
 
1.8 2.0 1.0 1.7 
Charlottetown, PE 
 
2.0 
 
3.0 3.0 
 
2.3 
 
St. John’s, NL 
 
2.0 1.0 2.0 1.9 
 
Average Overall  2.1 
 
2.1 2.3 
 
2.1 
 
members tended to view mayors to be more powerful than did political or 
executive interviewees, although not notably so. The variation across cities 
presents a more interesting picture. Cities where interviews scored the lowest – 
or, where the perceived powerlessness of the mayor was most often emphasized 
– included Halifax, Calgary and St. John’s. All other cities were scored to an 
average of 2.0 or higher. The highest scores were given in Montreal, Saskatoon 
and Vancouver. Importantly, this picture is not consistent with the relative 
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assessment of mayoral power “on paper” as presented in Chapter 5. Saskatoon, 
for example, fell in the low and medium categories relative to other cities in the 
sample in terms of how the role of the mayor is empowered through legislation 
and bylaw, but the perceptions of mayoral power were among the highest based 
on interviews for this study. Winnipeg consistently scored in the high category 
“on paper” but “in practice” is exactly average. Interviewees in Halifax had 
relatively low perceptions of mayoral power, and yet was Halifax is average in 
terms of empowerment of the mayor in provincial legislation and municipal 
bylaw. Chart 1 presents a summary of mayoral power “on paper” (from Table  
 
Chart 1: Mayoral power “on paper” and “in practice”22 
 
																																																								
22 Note: this is for illustration purposes only, as no standard scale was used for all the data 
summarized in this diagram. There is no objective “unit” of power; instead, this provides a relative 
picture of mayoral power in each city in the context of the other cities in the sample. 
0 
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15 in Chapter 5, where cities ranked low are marked as a 1, low-medium as a 
1.5, medium as a 2, medium-high as a 2.5, and high as a 3), and “in practice” 
(from Table 20, where the scores from 1.0 to 3.0 charted), again for illustration 
purposes only.  
 The important finding here is that increased mayoral power “on paper” 
does not translate into perceptions of greater power “in practice.” In other words, 
institutional variables, such as legislation and local arrangements, are less 
important factors in terms of how mayoral power is perceived in practice. The 
only variable that appears linked to both higher “on paper” and “in practice” 
perceptions of power are the presence of local political parties, in Vancouver and 
Montreal. Otherwise, there is no obvious relationship between these relative 
comparisons. Variation in legal authority appears to have no obvious relationship 
to perceptions of power. Mayors and those who work most closely with mayors 
rarely referenced municipal legislation or any formal power of the mayor when 
participating in the interviews. This was a surprising observation to the 
researcher, particularly the frequency with which the researcher seemed to know 
more about the legal authority and institutional powers of the mayor than 
interviewees – sometimes including mayors themselves. The argument that 
institutional variables do not translate into higher perceptions of power is further 
bolstered when considering survey data on public perception.  
 In October 2015, Ipsos Public Affairs conducted a survey of 12,000 
Canadians. To support this research project, one question was included in this  
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Chart 2: Perceptions of Mayoral Power, by Province  
 
survey regarding attitudes about mayoral power.23 The survey found that 
Canadians, generally, believe that their mayors have the power to make things 
happen in their communities. However, perceptions of power across provinces 
do not mirror variations in legal authority or institutional power. As presented in 
Appendix B, respondents in Prince Edward Island, Alberta and Saskatchewan 
had the highest perception of mayoral power – provinces where the mayors in 
their largest cities have some of the least formal authority. Respondents in New 																																																								
23 See Appendix B for more details on this survey question and the findings.  
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Newfoundland and Labrador had the lowest perception of mayoral power, 
despite the mayor of their largest city having among the highest level of legal 
authority in this sample. 
Perhaps most interesting finding from the survey was the responses in 
Canada’s largest cities. Urban residents had higher perceptions of mayoral 
power than rural residents, particularly in Canada’s largest cities. Calgary had 
the highest perception of mayoral power of any of the city-specific24 results, with 
79% of Calgarians believing their mayor has power to make things happen, 
compared to 72.1% of people across Canada. Calgary is the only city in this 
sample rated in the ‘low’ category for both legal authority and local institutional 
arrangements. This further demonstrates the finding expressed in Chart 1, that 
institutional variables – other than the presence of political parties – appear less 
important factors shaping how mayoral power is perceived in practice.  
 
Mayoral Leadership  
 As noted above, interviewees rarely described the role of the mayor in 
terms of power. The much more common way to describe the mayoralty, and 
speak about mayors and their ability to accomplish things, was for respondents 
to speak about mayoral leadership. The interviews revealed that the role of the 																																																								
24 There are limitations to this data, given that it was a part of a larger study. The researcher had 
limited access to the data other than summarized results from Ipsos. This posed a number of 
issues. For example, the city-specific data as presented here and in Appendix B reflects 
respondents in a Census Metropolitan Area, as it was not possible to obtain the data based on 
the geographic boundaries of the municipality. The data was not able to be disaggregated for 
every city in the study. As a result, the decision was made to use this survey data to support a 
few general arguments rather than feature as a central part of the research project.  
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mayor is fundamentally viewed to be a leadership position; and, that mayors 
have more than one leadership role. Interviewees spoke of mayors working 
across the groups engaged in local government, including politicians, staff, 
unions, business leaders, media, officials from other governments, and the 
public. Svara’s model,25 which identifies the mayor at the nexus of three groups – 
council, administration, and the community – was adapted as a way to sort 
interviewees’ discussions about mayoral leadership with various groups. Svara’s 
model closely mirrors the ways in which interviewees described the role of the 
mayor.  Interviewees described mayors in three specific leadership roles: first, a 
political role, working with council and other elected officials; second, an  
 
Table 21: Roles mentioned in response to question, “How would you describe 
the role of the mayor?,” by perspective 
 
 Political  
(n=37) 
 
Executive 
(n=14) 
Community 
(n=17) 
Total 
(n=68) 
Political role – working 
with council and other 
elected officials 
 
92% 100% 78% 87% 
Executive role – 
working with the city 
manager and/or 
administration 
 
48% 71% 35% 51% 
Community role – 
working with the 
broader public 
 
70% 57% 82% 70% 
																																																								
25 As presented in Chapter 2, and pictured in Figure 1.  
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executive role, working with the city manager and/or administration; and, third, a 
community role, working with citizens, groups, businesses and other 
organizations. The extent to which these roles were emphasized often depended 
on the perspective of the interviewee. As presented in Table 21, most 
interviewees recognized all three roles in some way when describing the role of 
the mayor in their own words. The most recognized role of the mayor is a 
political role (identified by 87% of interviewees), followed by a community role 
(identified by 70% of interviewees), and an executive role (identified by 51% of 
interviewees). Interestingly, the interviewees reflected a bias toward recognizing 
that the mayor plays a role in whatever group the interviewee represented.  
When asked to identify the single most important part of the mayor’s role, 
respondents were most likely to point to some aspect of the mayor’s community 
or political role. The mayor’s role as an executive leader – working with 
administrators or on the delivery of municipal services – was referenced least 
often. When asked to identify the single most challenging aspect of the mayor’s  
 
Table 22: Summary of other interview responses, by role   
 
 Political Role Executive Role  Community 
Role  
What is the most important 
part of the mayor’s role? 
 
44%  
(30 / 68) 
10% 
(7 / 68) 
46% 
(31 / 68) 
What is the most challenging 
part of the mayor’s role?  
35% 
(24 / 68) 
23% 
(16 / 68) 
25% 
(17 / 68) 
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role, respondents were most likely to point to the mayor’s role as a political 
leader.26 A summary of this data is presented in Table 22.  
What can be learned about mayoral power from this summary of interview 
data? First, consistent with the literature, the role of the mayor in Canada is 
unclear. Mayors themselves experience this most acutely, but those who work 
closely with them also perceive ambiguity in the role. Second, the role of the 
mayor in Canada is fundamentally viewed to be a leadership position. Although 
the Canadian and American literature tends to focus on the “power” of the 
mayor, this term rarely emerged during the interviews. Instead, mayors and 
those who work with them were more likely to define the role as one involving 
“leadership” and related terms. “Mayoral leadership” was referenced as the 
defining feature of the role, and an important contributing factor to percpetions of 
“mayoral power.” The relationship between these concepts will be returned to in 
Chapter 8. Finally, the role of the mayor is understood to be multi-dimensional. 
This, too, is consistent with themes emerging from the literature. Sancton27 
described mayors as having multiple concurrent roles. Svara’s work28 positions 
the mayor at the nexus of a network of individuals and groups engaged in local 
governance. Similarly, interviewees across perspectives and cities recognize 
																																																								
26 11 of the 68 respondents’ response to this question, regarding the most challenging aspect of 
the mayor’s role, did not fit into one of the three categories. These 11 respondents all indicated 
that the most challenging aspect of the mayor’s role has to do with work-life balance, time 
pressures or strain on family life. This response was not coded as falling into a political, 
executive, or community role because it is a product of all three roles. For this reason, the data in 
Table 25 for this question does not add up to 100%.  
27 Sancton, “Mayors as Political Leaders” (1994). 
28 Svara, Official Leadership in the City (1990). 
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mayors as having more than one distinct leadership role, each involving a 
different suite of actors and different power resources.  
If leadership is a critical component of understanding the role of mayors in 
practice, what exactly does it entail? To gain an understanding of the mayoralty 
in Canada, careful attention was paid to the perceptions expressed by 
interviewees when describing the role of the mayor – and in their own words. 
Interviewees were not led to discuss any of these three roles specifically. They 
were not asked to describe what mayoral political leadership looks like, or what 
community or executive leadership entails. Instead, interviewees were asked 
open-ended questions about the role of the mayor, with interest in narratives and 
expressions to inform a more nuanced understanding of the mayoralty in 
Canada. Chapter 7 presents an image of the leadership of a Canadian mayor, as 
described by mayors and those who work most closely with them.  
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Chapter 7 | POLITICAL, EXECUTIVE AND COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP 
 
 What does the role of the mayor entail? How do mayors work with council, 
with staff, or with the community? What resources empower mayors when 
working with these groups? What happens when mayors lead, and when they do 
not? This chapter presents insights on these questions, informed by interviews 
with people who have served as or with urban mayors in ten Canadian cities.1 As 
identified in Table 21, interviewees with political, executive and community 
perspectives each recognized multiple leadership roles for Canadian mayors. 
Mayors are expected to serve concurrently as: first, political leaders, as the head 
of council and sometimes a local political party; second, executive leaders, 
recognized as the 'CEO' of the municipality in many provinces and having some 
degree of formal leadership in the administration of municipal government; and, 
third, community leaders, elected on behalf of an entire community to represent 
its interests on a local, provincial, national and sometimes international stage. 
But what do these roles look like, and what is expected of mayors in each 
capacity?  
 To answer this question, the researcher used a theming method2 to 
examine the interview data. The interviews were examined with interest in 
																																																								
1 Informed by the narrative inquiry approach, this chapter privileges the experiences of 
interviewees, and shares perspectives using direct quotes as much as possible.  
2 Identifying themes is a central challenge of qualitative data analysis, with many approaches: 
word repetitions, identifying indigenous categories, examining words in context, analyzing 
transitions or connectors, and more. This study takes a theming approach, grouping similar ideas 
together and labeling those ideas with terms used by interviewees.  
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expressed expectations of the mayor – in other words, concrete actions or 
responsibilities that interviewee expected the mayor to undertake in their 
capacity as mayor. The researcher sorted this list of expectations into the three 
roles – political, executive and community – and then further grouped similar 
ideas together. For example, interviews expressing expectations like “getting 
council to act positively together”3 or “playing that facilitator for us, making us feel 
like we’re working towards a common cause”4 were grouped together as “council 
cohesion.” Using this method, the majority of comments were captured and 
condensed into a shorter list of defined categories.5 Table 23 presents a list of 
these categories, sorted into the three leadership roles of mayors.6 As political 
leaders, mayors are expected to articulate a vision for their community, build 
cohesion among council, chair meetings, champion decisions, and build 
relationships with officials from other levels of government. As executive leaders, 
mayors are expected to work with their city manager, have oversight over service 
delivery and taxation, serve as chief spokesperson for municipal activities, and 
motivate public servants. As community leaders, mayors are expected to build 
civic pride, keep “the pulse” and stay closely attuned to the community, mobilize 
groups, give hope in times of crisis, and personally project a positive image of  
 																																																								
3 Confidential Interview #2. 
4 Confidential Interview #11.  
5 Very few outliers were excluded after using this method. These included: “telling little lies to sell 
the city,” “hiring senior staff,” “knowing the municipal legislation,” and “giving advice to 
businesses.”  
6 Importantly, these responses were taken from the entire content of the 68 interviews, rather 
than just the responses to a single question, as was the data presented in Chapter 6.  
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Table 23: Expectations of mayors, by leadership role 
Leadership Role Expectations of Mayors  
Political  1. Articulate a shared vision 
2. Build council cohesion  
3. Chair meetings effectively 
4. Champion council decisions  
5. Maintain strong intergovernmental relationships  
Executive  1. Maintain positive relationship with city manager 
2. Align service delivery with community needs 
3. Steward tax dollars responsibly 
4. Communicate municipal activities   
5. Motivate the public service  
Community   1. Build civic pride 
2. Keep the pulse of the community 
3. Mobilize and engage diverse groups 
4. Give hope in times of crisis  
5. Project a positive image of the city  
 
the city. Importantly, these roles are not mutually exclusive. Mayors may be 
engaged in an initiative that requires working with council and community actors 
collectively. Strong leadership in one role may generate positive externalities by 
strengthening the mayor’s leadership in another aspect of their role. The defining 
lines between the political, executive and community leadership aspects of the 
mayoralty can be blurry – but there are still distinct expectations held of the 
mayor within each role. 
 Table 24 presents the frequency with which each of these common 
expectations was expressed, in total and by interviewee perspective. Overall, the  
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Table 24: Expectations of mayors, and frequency expressed  
  Political  
(n=37) 
 
Executi
ve 
(n=14) 
Commu
nity 
(n=17) 
Total 
(n=68) 
P
ol
iti
ca
l R
ol
e 
 
Articulate a shared vision 
 
64.9% 57.1% 58.8% 61.8% 
Build council cohesion 
 
51.4% 71.4% 52.9% 55.9% 
Chair meetings effectively  
 
29.7% 50.0% 29.4% 33.8% 
Champion council decisions 
 
27.0% 14.3% 11.8% 20.6% 
Maintain strong intergovernmental 
relationships  
13.5% 7.1% 0% 8.8% 
E
xe
cu
tiv
e 
R
ol
e 
 
Maintain positive relationship with 
city manager  
43.2% 64.3% 23.5% 42.6% 
Align service delivery with 
community needs 
24.3% 21.4% 17.6% 22.1% 
Steward tax dollars responsibly  
 
29.7% 14.3% 11.8% 22.1% 
Communicate municipal activities  
 
16.2% 7.1% 5.9% 11.8% 
Motivate the public service  
 
0% 28.6% 5.9% 7.4% 
C
om
m
un
ity
 R
ol
e 
Build civic pride 
 
54.1% 64.3% 58.8% 57.4% 
Keep the pulse of the community  
 
56.8% 64.3% 47.1% 55.9% 
Mobilize and engage diverse groups  
 
32.4% 42.9% 47.1% 38.2% 
Give hope in times of crisis 
 
13.5% 14.3% 11.8% 13.2% 
Project a positive image of the city  
 
16.2% 7.1% 5.9% 11.8% 
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most frequently expressed expectation of mayors was to articulate a vision for 
their community (identified by 61.8% of interviewees), contribute to civic pride in 
the community (57.4%), build council cohesion (55.9%), and to stay closely 
attuned to the needs and interests of their community (55.9%). However, the 
expectations held of mayors vary depending on the perspective of the 
interviewee. For example, municipal administrators were more likely than 
politicians or community members to expect mayors to build council cohesion, as 
the single strongest response (71.4% of administrators). The mayor’s role in 
motivating the public service was identified by more than a quarter of executive 
interviewees (28.6%) but was not identified by a single elected official. 
Community members were most likely to expect mayors to be well attuned to the 
public interest (identified by 64.3% of community interviewees, compared to 
56.8% and 47.1% of political and executive interviewees respectively). But what 
did interviewees express specifically, and what is meant by these expectations? 
The chapter is organized into three discussions on the distinct and concurrent 
roles of mayors in Canada – as political leaders, as executive leaders, and as 
community leaders – in the words of mayors and those who work most closely 
with them.  
 
Role #1: Mayor as Political Leader 
It was clear the former mayor had told this tale before. It had the character 
of a war story: a personal experience of hardship and adventure, where those 
who live to tell the tale relish in sharing it. The former mayor set the stage: a city  
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experiencing rapid growth, with mounting transit and transportation demands and 
a need for quick action. He had campaigned on a specific proposal for a new 
rapid transit system, and shortly after being elected, the mayor set to work on 
bringing the proposal to life. Much legwork had already been done, including the 
needed studies and assessments. What was missing was political support from 
council. The past mayor described his approach this way. “I would go to [the 
councillors’] offices, one by one, and say, ‘Can you share a few minutes with 
me? I’m bringing forward a motion. I want to run past you what I’m going to say. I 
need your feedback.’”7 The former mayor indicated that he would have this 
conversation several weeks in advance of tabling any significant motion on the 
project. “I’d say, ‘I’m giving you a copy of my speech, and a copy of my motion. 
I’ll leave it with you. Please think about it. I’m going to ask you to support this 
motion, and this investment for our city.’”8 The former mayor emphasized the 
importance of this step. Asking for feedback in advance would reveal which 
councillors would be supporters and detractors when the motion came to council. 
This enabled the mayor to be strategic about the timing of when to bring items 
forward, and come prepared to address outstanding concerns. As with all good 
war stories, the tale concludes in victory: a series of affirmative council decisions, 
and the successful construction of one of the city’s largest infrastructure 
investments in its history. “We did it in 36 months. It’s never been done again. It 
																																																								
7 Confidential Interview #58. 
8 Ibid. 
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happened because I did the legwork with council.”9 The former mayor described 
this approach as a strategy that he would use on any major policy file, and one 
that had never failed him during his time in office. “It’s enormously time 
consuming […] but if you don’t respect your colleagues, they won’t respect you. 
If you respect them enough to share what you are doing, why you are doing it, 
and ask for their help, most people will join you.”10 
Canadian mayors are political leaders. They are elected alongside a 
council, and as the head of that council, mayors are expected to provide 
leadership to the council in some way. The means by which mayors serve in this 
political leadership role can vary depending on many factors, including 
personality, local political culture, and the institutional arrangements specific to 
their municipality. The former mayor’s story about securing political support for a 
rapid transit project reflects both the priority he placed on political relationships, 
and the political norms of his community. A similar approach was described 
during the interviews in several cities; however, in cities in Ontario this approach 
could be considered an illegal serial meeting.11 Mayors provide political 
leadership to their elected council colleagues; and, they are expected to be the 																																																								
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ontario’s Municipal Act, 2001 provides that all meetings of municipal council and committees 
must be open to the public, except in specific circumstances. There has been much discussion, 
and confusion, over what constitutes a “meeting” and whether informal gatherings of, or 
conversations among, a quorum of councillors from any committee constitutes a “meeting.” In 
2008, the Ontario Ombudsman established the Open Meeting Law Enforcement Team (OMLET) 
to educate municipalities, and investigate complaints. Numerous investigations have taken place 
in municipalities across Ontario, finding violations of the open meeting requirements of the 
Municipal Act, 2001 in several cases. For a helpful overview of Ontario’s context, see Sancton, 
“What is a Meeting? Municipal Councils and the Ontario Ombudsman” (Working Paper, 2014).   
		
125 
primary contact with political leaders from other governments. The political 
leadership role is challenging, complex and viewed to be one of the most 
important dimensions of any mayor’s job.  
 
What does mayoral political leadership look like? 
 The political leadership role of Canadian mayors is at the same time one 
of the most visible and one of the most hidden parts of the mayor’s job. The most 
visible part occurs during council meetings. In most Canadian cities, the mayor 
chairs council meetings.12 They call the meeting to order. They recognize 
visitors. They announce agenda items, and moderate the debate on those items. 
In some cities, they speak to the item at hand; in other cases, they do not speak 
but instead focus on facilitating the discussion. In some cities, the mayor votes; 
in other cases, the mayor votes only in the case of a tie. If a member of council is 
out of order, the mayor is expected to address the member and remedy their 
behavior. The mayor concludes the meeting, and is often called upon to speak to 
the press following the meeting about key decisions made. This visible 
dimension of the role extends beyond procedure; mayors can set the tone of 
debate through the way they run a meeting and interact with their political 
colleagues. Council meetings are among the most accessible forums in which 
the public can observe the political leadership of the mayor.  
																																																								
12 In some Canadian cities, including Toronto and Montreal, the mayor or council select a 
speaker to chair council meetings.  
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 However, a significant part of the mayor’s political leadership role occurs 
outside of council chambers through the relationships the mayor builds with their 
council colleagues. In cities where mayors have appointment powers, a positive 
relationship with the mayor can have a direct political and sometimes financial 
benefit to members of council, and result in leadership opportunities such as 
chairing committees or acting as a lead on key policy files.13 Even in cases 
where mayors do not have appointment powers, council members often go to the 
mayor for advice, for support on key decisions, to amplify a specific issue or 
concern, and with requests specific to their own ward. Similarly, the mayor may 
seek out advice and support, and make requests of their council colleagues.  
 The relationship between a mayor and their council, collectively and 
individually, is complex and often filled with tension. Some of the sources of 
tension are obvious: when members of council have personal ambitions to 
become mayor, when councillors aim to position themselves in opposition to the 
mayor and/or council, and, the positioning that occurs around key votes or 
leading up to election time. There are also less obvious sources of tension, 
including a persistent dynamic of interdependence. Individually, for a councillor 
to achieve something they want, it often helps to have the mayor on side; 
																																																								
13 This is based on perceptions shared in cities where mayors have appointment powers; 
however, not everyone agreed that appointment powers always translate into political support. In 
the words of one past mayor, “It’s been said that Winnipeg has a ‘strong mayor system’ [laughs] 
– but I don’t know any mayor of Winnipeg who has actually experienced that. Yes we have an 
Executive Policy Committee [appointed by the mayor], and the mayor picks the chairs. The 
media calls EPC the cabinet, but of course it isn’t. I can assure you, I selected people and 
sometimes they supported me and sometimes they didn’t. And you can’t just replace them if they 
don’t. It’s not that easy.” (Confidential Interview #53) 
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similarly, the mayor may need to maintain or build support from the councillor to 
achieve their own goals. Collectively, a council is typically more effective when 
the mayor is an effective political leader; and, the mayor tends to be more 
effective when they have the support of their council. There can also be a ‘push 
and pull dynamic’ where council members try to align themselves more closely or 
less closely with the mayor, depending on the mayor’s perceived popularity at 
any particular point in time. The nature of the mayor’s relationships with other 
councillors can influence the cohesion of council and the decision making 
process. In the words of one media observer: 
The mayor can really set the tone, lead the agenda, and be the coalition 
builder. Council has to believe in their authority and the legitimacy of their 
authority. You could translate this into cynical, casual terms: if council 
believes that voters like the mayor, they will vote with the mayor. If they 
believe voters have turned against the mayor, they will too. They are all 
about saving their own skin.14 
 
When interviewees were asked about the most important part of the mayor’s job, 
‘working with council’ (or a variant such as ‘dealing with council’ or ‘bringing 
leadership to council’) was the second most common response, per Table 22.  
When asked about the most challenging part of the mayor’s role, ‘working with 
council’ in the political role was the most common response.15 Across all cities, 
there was recognition of the complexity of this role, and interviewees often 
																																																								
14 Confidential Interview #45.  
15 Interestingly, interviewees from all three perspectives (political, executive and community) 
frequently shared this response. The language varied depending on the context. In cities with 
political parties, interviewees said things like ‘trying to stop the bickering between parties during 
council meetings.’ In cities without political parties, common responses included things like ‘trying 
to build consensus at council’ and ‘keeping council together.’ 
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described this challenge with humour, as “herding the cats of city council”16 or, in 
a city with 10 councillors, as akin to “having 10 kids.”17 Despite recognition of 
how difficult this aspect of the mayor’s role can be, there was also broad 
consensus across interviewee perspectives and across cities that the 
relationship between the mayor and council is critically important to the overall 
effectiveness of local government: the difference between a mayor who has 
positive relationships with their council and a mayor who has negative 
relationships with their council can be the difference between having a functional 
and a dysfunctional council. In the words of one interviewee, a seasoned local 
politician, “if you have a mayor who can’t get along with their colleagues, you 
won’t have an effective council. And that’s that.”18  
 When interviewees described the political leadership role of mayors, five 
chief expectations emerged, and many interviewees expressed several from this 
list. As political leaders, mayors are expected to:  
 1. Articulate a shared vision 
2. Build council cohesion  
3. Chair meetings effectively 
4. Champion council decisions  
5. Maintain strong intergovernmental relationships  
Interviewees expressed expectations for mayors to play a leadership role in each 
of these areas; and, that when mayors are able to provide leadership in these 																																																								
16 Confidential Interview #58.  
17 Confidential Interview #18.  
18 Confidential Interview #36.  
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areas, it can translate into a cohesive council, productive decision making 
processes, and more effective local governance. The following section provides 
an overview of each responsibility, expressed through the words of interviewees.   
 
1. Articulate a shared vision 
 In many cities, the mayor is the only local politician elected on a citywide 
basis; and in all cities, a mayoral election can be a vehicle for a community to 
express a shared vision of their city. Mayoral candidates frequently project 
competing policy positions on key issues facing a community, and they 
themselves can personally represent competing images of a community. The 
election of a mayor is a significant act of collective expression in Canada’s cities 
– and this point is not lost on Canada’s mayors. In the words of one longstanding 
and highly respected former mayor, 
A mayor represents the collective psyche of a city at a particular moment 
in time. Sometimes it’s during an election. Sometimes it’s a longer period. 
That’s a really significant obligation, to be the owner of that spirit and the 
representation of collective will. If you’re lucky, that moment lasts. If you’re 
not, it can pass quickly. It’s different than being the ‘face of the city’; you’re 
the embodiment of hopes, of dreams, and sometimes anger. You need to 
honour that spirit in all of your actions. 19  
 
In describing the role of the mayor, several interviewees expressed similar 
sentiments about mayors as an expression of a collective vision from a 
community, and having a responsibility for that vision. In the words of two city 
councillors from two cities: 
																																																								
19 Confidential Interview #35.  
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The mayor is the convener of the vision of the city, to look to the horizon 
and understand where the city is going. It’s about helping citizens and 
administrators see beyond the immediate. At their best, mayors’ jobs are 
to see the big picture.20 
 
A mayor can really set and drive a vision, something that can be achieved 
on behalf of the people. That’s what I think the mayor’s role is: it’s to be 
the keeper of the vision and be the one who champions it. Oh, and a lot of 
other things too.21 
 
In the words of one senior administrator, this expression of a community vision is 
a key distinction between the mayoral campaigns and other councillor 
campaigns. Mayoral candidates are expected to convey ‘broader visions and 
grander ideas’ about their community, and as such, mayors take on a different 
role from councillors on council after the election: 
Mayoral candidates campaign in a very different way. It’s obvious the 
kinds of councillors who want to become mayor, and the ones who want 
to be councillors. Some just want to represent their wards. Mayoral 
candidates are expected to have broader visions and grander ideas. 
Councillors can’t do that. They talk about the kinds of things they support 
or will vote for, but they are not the front line on big ideas.22 
 
The community can express a collective voice through their selection of a 
mayoral candidate; but the council plays a critical role in articulating this vision, 
and mayors are expected to play a leadership role with council in doing so.  
There is some confusion between a campaign platform and a strategic 
vision. They are not the same. […] The strategic vision for the city is set 
by council, but it’s up to the mayor to lead the development of it.23 
 																																																								
20 Confidential Interview #54.  
21 Confidential Interview #1.  
22 Confidential interview #47.  
23 Confidential Interview #58.  
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Most Canadian cities have a strategic plan or similar document,24 which sets out 
a vision, prioritizes areas of focus, and identifies specific strategies or goals to be 
achieved during the council term. It is common for this document to be 
developed by new councils, often early in their term, as a way to define their 
shared agenda. Some interviewees provided examples where mayors have 
played a leadership role in this process, facilitating discussions and conversing 
with members of council to build support around shared priorities. In cities with 
political parties, this process may occur outside of council and instead be a 
discussion within the political party.25  
 Mayors who play an active leadership role with their council in articulating 
a shared vision for their city can benefit from having a council that is aligned 
around a common direction; and, it can be helpful to build broader council 
support for key elements of the mayor’s campaign. Articulating a shared vision 
can be a powerful tool for mayors to advance their interests. In the words of one 
former mayor,   
In order to satisfy the people’s aspirations and dreams, as expressed 
through your election, you have to use all of your skill and power to 
																																																								
24 All but two cities included in this study have a document called a “Strategic Plan” for their 
municipality. Other documents such as Community Plans, Community Strategies, Corporate 
Plan, Plan for the Future, etc. also exist in cities included in this study.  
25 Interviewees from the City of Vancouver indicated that the current majority party’s campaign 
platform serves as the guiding strategic document for council. Interviewees aligned with the 
majority party spoke favourably about this arrangement, citing how it provides alignment across 
organizations including the school boards and parks board because representatives on many 
organizations have contributed and support a common vision. Interviewees who are not aligned 
with the majority party spoke unfavourably about the arrangement, expressing a sense of 
exclusion.  
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ensure that the policies and programs that you believe are right for the city 
actually get implemented.26 
 
Mayors are often evaluated on the basis of whether they are able to advance the 
vision of their city expressed during their campaign with their council, and a 
mayor who takes a stand can be praised for doing so. In the words of one 
councillor,  
Some people have criticized our mayor for coming out so strongly in the 
promise to end homelessness. They say it hasn’t happened, and that we 
have more homeless people now than ever before. But I think that’s 
exactly the kind of thing the mayor should do. I praise him for taking a 
stand. Naming the issue. Calling out to people, getting them on board, 
and articulating a goal.27 
 
Mayors, by virtue of the uniqueness of their election, represent and are expected 
to advance some vision of their city for the future. The act of working with their 
council to more fully articulate this vision, and coalesce the group around a 
shared vision is a critical aspect of the mayor’s role as a political leader.  
 
2. Build council cohesion  
 After articulating a vision, the second most commonly expressed 
expectation of mayors in their political leadership role was about establishing 
positive dynamics and relationships with council. For interviewees from an 
executive perspective, this was the most frequently expressed expectation. 
Across cities, building council cohesion was identified as one of the most 
important and challenging roles that mayors play – but one that is vital to 																																																								
26 Confidential Interview #35.  
27 Confidential Interview #63.  
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everything from the passing of individual policy decisions to the overall brand of 
the city. Building cohesion among council includes the visible dimensions of the 
political role – namely, working together at meetings and in public forums – and 
the less visible aspects of the role, including the way councillors speak to the 
media and members of the public about the work of council. The mayor is widely 
viewed to play a critical role here, and it starts with the quality of relationships.  
A mayor needs to take the councillors he’s been given – he hasn’t 
selected them, he’s been given them – and he needs to curate them into a 
cohesive unit so they can actually get something done. A mayor who 
understands the strength of council will focus on building relationships 
with them.28 
 
One mayor described the importance of having personal relationships with his 
councillors, including providing insight into their individual interests and 
philosophies, which can help mayors build consensus from the group: 
I know all of our councillors. I know how they think. I know their attitudes. 
So you gravitate towards the group that has the same philosophy as you 
do […] and you know how many you have on side. Then it’s a matter of 
rational discussion with the others to move them towards consensus.29 
 
One local reporter and blogger, after closely following city hall affairs for many 
years, indicated that he had witnessed how relationships and the personal 
orientation of councillors can influence policy outcomes:  
It’s all about getting councillors on board, and that starts with good 
personal relationships. If you go and find out why votes were delayed or 
failed, often it’s about personality and it’s really petty. It’s personal feuds 
that are costing us votes. One councillor told me she didn’t like the tone of 
																																																								
28 Confidential Interview #24.  
29 Confidential Interview #7.  
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a presentation, and voted against it. She made a policy decision, just 
based on that.30 
 
The way in which policy decisions are brought forward to council also emerged 
as an important ingredient toward building a cohesive council. The story from the 
former mayor about building support for a rapid transit project is an extreme 
case. A more common story came from councillors who felt surprised, 
uninformed, or caught off guard when big items came forward without their 
knowledge or input. One councillor described a situation where a challenging 
budget was submitted to council, including both significant tax increases and 
service cuts. The councillor received negative public feedback almost 
immediately on the budget’s public release, and expressed disappointment about 
not getting a ‘heads up’ in advance. The councillor laid blame with the mayor for 
“blindsiding” council when the budget came forward. 
There was a lack of preparation for council members, so we were 
blindsided. I decided to vote for [the budget], but I didn’t really have 
enough information or understanding of the issue. I didn’t hear from the 
mayor, not even once. I went to Finance committee, and the mayor wasn’t 
even there.31 
 
Norms around how the mayor communicates with council in advance of key 
reports and decisions seem to vary considerably. In some cases, mayors take an 
active role in agenda setting with senior administration and play a role in 
communicating the council agenda to members; in other cases, mayors take a 
less active role. In some provinces, legislation restricts informal discussions 
																																																								
30 Confidential Interview #56.  
31 Confidential Interview #4.  
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between members of council outside of formally constituted meetings.32 A 
common theme in the interviews with councillors was that communication from 
the mayor – particularly proactive communication before items advance through 
the formal council or committee process – enables members of council to feel 
more engaged, connected and included.  
 Several councillors also identified a desire for more deliberate team 
building work with council, and looked to the mayor to lead this work. The 
challenges and disincentives for doing so were also recognized: 
The mayor is the chair. He could say, ‘okay guys, today we’re going to do 
a team building exercise.’ But, we don’t. Fortune 500 companies do team 
building exercises – giving space to hash out ideas and move away from 
the politics of it – but we don’t do any of that. […] I can’t imagine how 
much further we’d be, and how much more effective we’d be, if people 
actually came together to hash out ideas. But that’s not a public role. 
That’s something people won’t see, and generally politicians don’t do 
things that people can’t see. The public needs to see what we’re working. 
If we went out there and said, we had a great team building session, 																																																								
32 This is a complex and unclear area of municipal legislation in Canada. In all provinces, the 
relevant municipal legislation requires council and committee meetings to be open to the public, 
save for specific matters which can be discussed in closed session. Ontario has traditionally been 
the extreme case in terms of its requirements for open meetings. The definition of what 
constitutes a ‘meeting’ remains unclear but has been subject to much debate and a few important 
court decisions. A draft bill defined a ‘meeting’ as including any gathering of councillors 
constituting a quorum of council or a committee, which could mean even in an informal or social 
setting. One particular Ontario Ombudsman informally adopted this definition, including applying 
it in investigations in a number of Ontario municipalities. As such, the general practice in Ontario 
is to avoid informal discussions involving members of council that constitute a quorum of any 
committee. This interpretation was subject to considerable challenge. In 2017, the Ontario 
Government adopted new legislation which defined a ‘meeting’ as involving a quorum of 
members and where matters are materially advanced. In British Columbia, a 2012 
Ombudsperson report adopted a similar definition of a meeting. In 2015, members of 
Vancouver’s majority party were criticized for meeting in closed session as a party caucus. The 
party includes seven of Vancouver’s 11 members of council, so caucus meetings included a 
quorum of council. The rules around open meetings and informal discussions between council 
members were only raised during the interviews for this project in two cities, Toronto and 
Vancouver.  
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people would just roll their eyes and say, ‘oh that’s so lame’. So yeah, we 
don’t do it.33  
 
In lieu of informal and formal opportunities for council members to “team build,” 
the dynamics of council often depend on the multiplicity of relationships between 
the mayor and individual members of council, and their relationships among one 
another. Most of the mayors and past mayors, during their interviews, identified 
this aspect of political leadership as one of the most challenging part of their job, 
but also essential to the success of council. In the words of one mayor:  
The most challenging part of my role is getting council to act together 
positively on issues. It comes back to the fact that I have no overall 
authority. That doesn’t mean everyone has to agree on everything, but it 
does mean that I have to try to get them to not attack each other. If you 
can’t do that, it can make for an awful few years.34 
 
 
3. Chair Meetings Effectively  
 One of the most obvious political leadership roles of a mayor takes place 
during council meetings, where in most cities, the mayor serves as the chair and 
presides over the meeting. The mayor is the focal point of council meetings, on 
both a symbolic and functional level. One council member phrased it this way: 
“The mace gets walked in. We all stand up. He walks in wearing a chain, that 
mayoral bling! [laughs] I really think we defer to him, to a degree because, well 
… because he’s the mayor.”35 The role of the mayor during council meetings 
also varies across cities. In some cities, the mayor plays primarily a procedural 																																																								
33 Confidential Interview #1.  
34 Confidential Interview #7.  
35 Confidential Interview #1.  
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role during the meetings; in other cities, the mayor plays a procedural role but 
also speaks on substantive matters; in other cities, a speaker is selected to 
preside over meetings and enable the mayor to more freely participate in debate. 
The manner in which the mayor engages during council meetings does not go 
unnoticed by other politicians, administrators or observers. Even in cities where 
the mayor does not chair the meeting, the role of the mayor during meetings can 
have an influence on the participation of other members of council. A local 
politics reporter in Montreal (a city where a speaker presides over meetings, and 
with a large council) commented on the dominance of the mayor during 
meetings: 
Our councillors have been marginalized. We elected them and they don’t 
have a lot of importance. It’s sad. I like the Toronto system where there 
are no party lines, so when the mayor wants to pass something, he has to 
make sure it pleases everyone. In Montreal, the parties, the alliances – 
the mayor get what he wants when he wants it. They always vote with him 
according to party lines. Councillors are pretty much invisible. Even some 
of the 65, when they raise from their seat, we [the media] say, ‘who’s 
that?’ It’s pretty sad. We don’t even know who they are.36  
 
In cities where the mayor does preside over meetings, the mayor tends to speak 
less frequently than other members of council. One councillor argued that this 
adds strength to the mayor’s voice, because when it is used less frequently, it 
carries more weight when used. The councillor reflected on advice he had given 
to his mayor: 
I said to him, ‘your voice carries weight. Use it appropriately. The more 
you use it, the more you erode its power. Save it for when you want to win 
that vote. If you’re already winning the vote, don’t speak.’ But the mayor, 
he talks all the time. He speaks on everything. He’s eroded the power of 																																																								
36 Confidential Interview #33.  
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his voice to the point where his comments carry no more weight than 
mine. He’s no longer the first among equals; he’s just an equal.37 
 
Council members in other communities expressed similar sentiments. “A good 
mayor is a mayor that doesn’t talk about every subject. He allows councillors 
have dialogue. If you don’t have a good chair, then you don’t have a good 
meeting.”38 
 Individuals involved in local government, including elected officials and 
administrators, as well as the media expect the mayor to set and enforce both 
the procedural and social norms of political decision making in cities. In every 
city, individuals had perspectives on the degree to which their mayors are 
effective in this role. Where the mayor was perceived to not be an effective or 
inclusive chair, or to dominate during council meetings, councillors and 
administrators expressed frustration with decision-making processes in their city. 
Where the mayor was perceived to be an effective and inclusive chair, 
individuals expressed appreciation for the efficiency of decision-making or would 
common on the ‘professionalism’ of council meetings. In the two cities in this 
sample with political parties – Vancouver and Montreal – the dynamic during 
council meetings is quite different. Interviews with members of council in the non-
majority party in both cities revealed similar sense of exclusion from council; and, 
interestingly, individuals expressed an expectation of the mayor to bridge 
partisan lines during council meetings. In the words of one councillor, “[the party] 
is not council. Council is 10 councillors and the mayor. There is bickering, and 																																																								
37 Confidential Interview #58. 
38 Confidential Interview #23.  
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extreme partisanship at times. The role of the mayor should be to stop that, and 
play a leadership role in diminishing the partisanship at council.”39 The mayor’s 
skill level in chairing meetings, and setting the tone for council meetings as a 
whole, is an important aspect of their political leadership role.  
 
4. Champion Council Decisions  
 Canadian mayors tend to be the most well known member of council, and 
the person who the media turns to first for comment on council decisions, actions 
and activities. The mayor’s voice is widely viewed to carry greater weight with the 
public than is that of other members of council, by virtue of their position. In one 
council member’s words, “it’s a huge difference when a councillor says 
something and when the mayor says something. People think the mayor is in 
charge. […] He represents the whole city.”40  Many interviewees expressed an 
expectation that the mayor serve as a positive spokesperson for all of council. 
This expectation is not without challenge. The spokesperson role is easier when 
the decisions and actions are positive, and more difficult when the situation 
involves conflict or something, which is not popular with the public. In the words 
of one mayor, “when there is good news, all of the councillors are willing to take 
credit for it. Success has many fathers, but failure has none. When there is 
failure, it’s harder to find someone to speak, so the public looks to the mayor.”41 
																																																								
39 Confidential Interview #62. 
40 Confidential Interview #1.  
41 Confidential Interview #55.  
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Several councillors recognized the challenges inherent in the mayor’s role 
as spokesperson for council, and the political disadvantage this role can create 
for the mayor. “It works well for me as a councillor, but the mayor wears a lot of 
the decisions, whether he voted from them or not. Council will make a decision, 
and if citizens don’t like it, they blame the mayor.”42 Mayors also acknowledged 
the difficulty of this role. In the words of a former mayor:  
In today’s world, there’s never any praise. As a society we’ve become 
very negative about our elected officials. The mayor receives a lot of 
criticism, and it’s hard to not stand up and say, ‘I didn’t even vote for this’ 
or ‘it wasn’t my decision’ because you are expected to support the 
decisions of council.43  
 
Examples were shared of mayors who have spoken out publically against their 
council colleagues following decisions. Interviewees viewed this as a calculated 
move that may have personal political benefits for the mayor, but weakens the 
overall image and cohesion of the group. One councillor, after telling a story 
about a mayor publically criticizing their council’s decision on a planning matter, 
cited this as a source of power because of the weight of the mayor’s voice in the 
public. “I’ve discovered that the mayor has a significant amount of power. Even 
though Council may have debated something, or voted on something, the mayor 
can still go to the public and say something else. “44 
Several interviewees expressed frustration about other members of 
council speaking out against their council colleagues following meetings or after 
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difficult decisions. Even in cases where the mayor is the designated 
spokesperson for council, it is not uncommon for other member of council to 
publicly criticize their colleagues and shared decisions. One mayor, who had 
also served as an elected official at the federal level, expressed it this way:   
There is a ‘caucus mentality’ at the other levels of government, where 
even if you don’t agree, at least you appreciate that there is value to 
having a united front. But [in local government], not only do we allow 
everyone to speak their mind, we encourage it.”45 
 
Another mayor commented on expectations to ensure council presents itself as a 
cohesive and united group: 
When councillors break out on their own, people will say to me, ‘why don’t 
you control this?’ I say, ‘I can speak to them but they are independent 
representatives. They can act and say what they wish. I can’t control what 
they say.’ Their reaction is, ‘but you’re the mayor!’46 
 
Whether this expectation is reasonable or not, mayors are expected to be 
champions and spokespeople for their councils. During the interviews, this was 
consistently identified in relation to the mayor’s role in strengthening the 
cohesion of council. This challenging expectation may mean that mayors need to 
be cautious in their own public remarks regarding contentious matters where 
their colleagues are divided. One former city manager expressed this 
observation: 
The mayor is the spokesperson for council. If a mayor is doing a good job 
being a chair, he will be a better spokesperson for council. If they have 
opined too much before an issue is decided, they risk becoming a less 
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effective spokesperson because they could be aligned to the wrong side. 
Smart mayors won’t speak until they know how the wind is blowing.47 
 
 
 
 
5.  Maintain strong intergovernmental relationships  
 The fifth expectation related to the political leadership role of mayors in 
Canada was to build strong working relationship with officials from other levels of 
government. Interestingly, this expectation was raised by political and executive 
interviewees, but not by any community perspective interviewees. For 
interviewees who did identify government relations as a key part of the mayor’s 
political leadership role, it was often spoken of in relation to the tangible 
outcomes from these relationships for the community. One councillor described 
with great pride a number of recent investments from the federal and provincial 
government into their municipality, and cited their mayor’s previous political 
experience as a leading reason for this success.  
He knows how to work with other levels of government. He’s friends with 
ministers. He’s friends with Justin Trudeau. That’s the benefit of having 
someone from the big leagues come back to municipal government. 
Someone on their way up wouldn’t have those kind of national 
connections.48 
 
The intergovernmental role also includes the work of mayors through municipal 
associations. There was a high level of awareness in each city of the role 
interviewees’ respective mayors play in associations, particularly on the 																																																								
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Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) Big City Mayors Caucus (BCMC). 
Nine of the ten cities in this study are engaged in BCMC, and interestingly, 
interviewees in all nine cities made reference to the role their mayor played at 
this table. In some cities, interviewees spoke to strained relationships between 
their city and their provincial governments. In the words of one executive in 
Montreal, with a particularly prominent mayor, “it’s because of him as a person, 
and his position. They [the provincial government] feel like they are in his 
shadow. And they don’t want to give too much power to the City of Montreal.”49 
Frustration with municipal-provincial affairs was not an uncommon theme during 
the interviews. Misalignment between provincial priorities and local priorities can 
highlight underlying fiscal and power imbalances.   
When you have a federal or provincial government that needs to hang on 
to a seat, or win a seat, they will just dump money in. Let’s call it what it is. 
All of a sudden, we’re building that bridge or community centre. They are 
trying to make an ‘investment’ but it’s really in the seat. They can look 
down the city’s list, and suddenly their priority becomes our priority. It’s 
hard for us to say no to money. It’s a really frustrating experience.50 
 
Canadian mayors, individually and collectively, engage in intergovernmental 
activities on a regular basis, particularly in the largest cities – and mayors report 
having unique access to provincial and federal officials, particularly in large and 
capital cities. In the words of a politician from Charlottetown, “oh yes, we [the 
premier and the mayor] see each other a fair bit. He’s just down the street! 
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[laughs] Access has never been an issue.”51 Interviewees expressed a clear 
expectation of mayors to play a leadership role in discussions and negotiations 
with other levels of government, and placed value on mayors’ personal 
relationships with key leaders.  
 
 
Summary: Mayoral Political Leadership  
Canadian mayors are expected to be political leaders. This role is 
complex, but viewed as one of the most important aspects of the mayor’s role, 
and the most challenging part of the role. As described, none of these tasks are 
without challenge. The relationships between mayors and their councils, as well 
as with officials from other governments, are often filled with tension. They are 
also described as involving a high degree of interdependence.  
What makes a mayor an effective political leader? There appears to be no 
single answer to this question. During the interview process, competing 
perspectives were shared about how a mayor is able to be a strong political 
leader. Some interviewees argued that political leadership depends on “standing 
and reputation.”52 Another argued political leadership requires a mayor to be “a 
great peacemaker, and really good at dealing with people.”53 Even in speaking to 
mayors and past mayors, their perspectives on what effective political leadership 
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looks like varied across cities. One past mayor described his approach to 
political leadership:  
You can’t lose a vote. If you start losing votes, you lose your power. You 
have to make council think you are all powerful, and make sure the civil 
service knows too. […] You have to create the illusion that you’re all 
powerful and you always get your way. There are a bunch of things that 
are tied to that. Once you start getting your way, council members will 
start coming to you asking for favours. You have to be very careful in 
judging whether those favours are aligned to your agenda. And, you have 
to bully people. They have to be a bit afraid of you. They need to be afraid 
that if you’re not on board, nothing will get done. [… It is also] smart and 
strategic use of the bully pulpit, which is an incredibly powerful thing. You 
have to use that wisely. You can’t fritter it away. […] You can lose your 
bully pulpit very easily – through personal behavior, or weighing in on 
issues that you don’t need to. If you do silly things too often, it undermines 
your ability to be taken seriously.54 
 
Interestingly, other interviewees described this particular mayor as being highly 
collaborative and an effective leader of council. But, the approach described 
differs considerably from that of other mayors interviewed for this study. The 
mayor who built rapid success for a transit project summarized his approach this 
way. “Creative tension is healthy. Show respect, and maintain your humility. 
You’ll get the votes every time.”55  
 When mayors are strong political leaders, councillors feel more engaged, 
the council is more functional and effective, the public see a more positive image 
of their city projected, and cities may receive more benefits or have more 
influence with other levels of government. Overall, effective mayoral political 
leadership contributes to effective local governance. In the words of one 																																																								
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seasoned former city manager, who had worked with several mayors over the 
course of a career in local government:  
The chaos that you get when you have a mayor that can’t get votes 
together, it’s bad – and it’s harmful to a community. Things don’t move 
forward. It creates fighting and conflict. Every group of people needs a 
leader. If the mayor can’t be the leader, there’s constant positioning 
among the council to become the leader. […] I’ve seen councils where the 
mayor is unable to master the role of leader. Very seldom do things move 
quickly. Councils learn quickly how they can obstruct things. When it’s 
council leading, instead of the mayor leading, it’s not a good place to be 
as an administrator. You don’t move forward fast, because you’re always 
waiting for the dust to settle.”56 
 
Others echoed this sentiment. When mayors are not effective political leaders, 
other members of council begin taking on roles such as coalition building, liaising 
with other government officials, or other duties generally expected of the mayor. 
Chaos can also emerge, with fractures and conflict among councillors. When the 
mayor is unable or unwilling to provide political leadership, or focuses energies 
into other leadership roles, other elected officials will position themselves to take 
on this leadership role – sometimes creating conflict when there are multiple 
individuals seeking to emerge as leaders. This tends to shift the dynamic of 
council in a significant way, and can impact relations between council and staff, 
and the reputation of council and the community.  As such, the nature of the 
mayor’s political leadership – and the mayor’s political relationships – can have a 
profound influence on the dynamics of governance at the local level in Canada’s 
cities.    
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Role #2: Mayor as Executive Leader 
The public servant was seated at a handsome boardroom table in his 
office, featuring an expansive view of the city through large glass windows. For 
someone who manages an organization with a multi-billion budget and a staff 
team exceeding 25,000 people, his office was remarkably organized. He began 
to describe the role of the mayor in his own words. “The most important part [of 
the mayor’s role] is to tell the public service where he wants to go with the city. 
He tells the vision for the city. Public servants then do the work to arrive at this 
goal.”57 The administrator shared a few examples. “He has a lot of decisions to 
make: so many programs, recreation subsidies, grants for nonprofit 
organizations. He’s the driver – we go there, or we go here – but he has to know 
where he wants to go. The most difficult thing for a municipality is if the mayor 
doesn’t know where to go.” The administrator was a seasoned executive with 
decades of experience within the provincial government, and described his 
appointment just two years earlier. The municipality had come through a period 
of chaos, so when the newly elected mayor contacted the public servant about 
taking on the most senior administrative role in the organization, he knew he was 
in for a challenge. Within months on the job, he had created three new plans for 
the city – a planning document, an infrastructure plan, and a budget – working 
closely with the mayor and executive committee, and ultimately receiving support 
from council. When asked about nature of the working relationship with the 
mayor, the public servant was very direct. “The mayor is the boss. […] If the 																																																								
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mayor wasn’t satisfied with me, he would have to propose my removal to council 
– but in reality, if the mayor wasn’t satisfied with me, I would just quit. It’s like that 
here.” 
 In every Canadian city, the mayor is in some sense an executive within 
their respective municipality. As illustrated in Chapter 4, in many provinces the 
mayor is officially titled the ‘chief executive officer’ (or similar title) of the 
municipality. In all provinces, the mayor’s signature is required to authorize 
official documents and enter into contracts. Mayor’s signatures appear on 
cheques issued by municipalities, and they have individual responsibilities with 
respect to certain public services such as emergency management. In many 
cities, the mayor is involved in activities of the municipality such as economic 
development and tourism in a way that other members of council are not. The 
level of legal authority held by the mayor varies across cities and provinces, and 
mayors in some large cities have ‘executive’ type powers such as the ability to 
suspend senior staff. The story shared here is an extreme case in the Canadian 
context. Most city managers would not refer to the mayor as their ‘boss’ or 
describe the role of the mayor as including making decisions about grants or 
recreation subsidies. The point is that all Canadian mayors are expected to be 
executive leaders to some extent, and this ranges widely from signing bylaws all 
the way up to being described as “the driver” and “the boss” of the public service.  
 The executive role of Canadian mayors is subject to great confusion. 
While the American “strong mayor” model of concentrated executive power 
independent of council does not exist in Canada, Canadian mayors do have 
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executive-type duties – that is, responsibilities related to the administration of 
government services. When interviewees were asked about the most important 
part of the mayor’s role, the executive role was the least frequently referenced 
leadership role of mayors. However, it was recognized more frequently by 
interviewees when asked about what the most challenging aspect of the mayor’s 
role is, with approximately a quarter of interviewees mentioning this role at least 
a few times during the discussion, per Table 22. There was broad recognition 
that the mayor plays a special role in everything from setting priorities with the 
city manager, down to day-to-day issues faced by citizens with city services. In 
the words of one interviewee, “sure, theoretically, the mayor can’t direct city staff 
to do something. But if his office asks for something, as a courtesy, he will get a 
briefing on what staff know, what their thoughts are. Anyone who complains 
about this doesn’t understand the system.”58  
 
What does mayoral executive leadership look like? 
 The executive role of the mayor is the most ambiguous and varied aspect 
of the job. It is rarely articulated in writing, and often is defined informally over 
time through periodic testing as circumstances arise. Often this informal testing 
of boundaries begins shortly after the election, when a new mayor will sit down 
with their most senior administrator and share their campaign platform with an 
expectation that it will drive the work of the organization during the term ahead. 
Interviews with current and former city managers indicated that this was a 																																																								
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common occurrence, particularly when the individual comes to office without 
experience in local government.  One former city manager provided this account:  
After every election, my senior team would do a good analysis of the 
platform of the mayor elect. I remember, after one mayor was elected, he 
gave me a copy of his platform, and told me what he expected on the 
environment, and other issues. We went through his platform with he and 
his political staff, and made it very clear what would still require approval 
from council and what was already underway. That’s where you get your 
priorities and strategy for the next four years. What becomes tricky is 
when there is something the mayor wants to do, and council won’t 
approve it.59 
 
Another senior municipal administrator shared a similar sentiment. “I welcomed 
the last three mayors to their jobs. Each of them, regardless of their political 
backgrounds, and especially if their staff came in from outside – they were all 
surprised to learn that they don’t have executive power.”60 This is a more 
common narrative; although, it must be recognized that there is variation across 
cities in Canada in the norms related to the executive leadership of mayors. In 
the case of the story at the beginning of this chapter, these early discussions 
between the mayor and the senior administrator following an election were likely 
rather different.  
In general terms, on what exactly do people expect mayors to provide 
leadership in this executive role? During the interviews, five main expectations 
emerged: 
1. Maintain positive relationship with city manager 
2. Align service delivery with community needs 																																																								
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60 Confidential interview #41.  
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3. Steward tax dollars responsibly 
3. Communicate municipal activities   
5. Motivate the public service 
Interviewees expressed expectation for the mayor to play a leadership role in 
each of these areas and communicated that when a mayor is able to provide 
leadership in all of these areas, it may translate into a more productive municipal 
organization, improved service delivery, or greater citizen satisfaction with local 
government.  
 
1. Maintain positive relationship with city manager 
 The most commonly expressed expectation of mayors as executive 
leaders, particularly by administrators, was to build a strong working relationship 
with the most senior administrative official – the city manager, sometimes known 
as the chief administrative officer (CAO). This relationship was widely viewed to 
be critical to the mayor’s ability to ‘get things done’:  
The mayor can’t get anything done at City Hall without the cooperation of 
city staff – so it’s important to have good relationships, especially with the 
CAO. The CAO’s job is to make sure staff are implementing council’s 
directions, and they don’t always do that willingly.61 
 
The terms of relations between the mayor and city manager vary by city, and 
with changes in the individuals involved. In some cities, the mayor and city 
manager meet on a regular basis for advice, sharing information, and to make 
decisions about emerging issues. In some cases, mayors rely on city managers 
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for advice; in other cases, the direction of the advice is reversed. When council’s 
direction is unclear or ambiguous, city managers referenced conversations with 
mayors to ‘translate’ or clarify council direction. Some city managers claimed that 
they rarely met with the mayor, and instead tended to have positive relationships 
with committee chairs or, in smaller cities, all members of council. One city 
manager described how sensitive his role was to a change in mayor:  
The city manager job, it changes completely when the mayor changes. 
You have to reinvent yourself. Whatever worked before, probably won’t 
work now. Especially if you’re a survivor from the previous mayor, you’re 
already on shaky ground. There is too much room for comparison, and 
they always feel like they are being evaluated. So you have to reinvent 
yourself.”62 
 
Although the mayor may not be viewed as ‘the boss’ in most cases, this 
relationship remains an important one for the most senior of municipal 
administrators.  
 In several cities, examples were given of what can happen when there is 
misalignment between the mayor and the city manager. A councillor from a city 
where the contract of their city manager was recently discontinued described the 
importance of the relationship in this way:  
We had a city manager who had a complete disregard for all associations, 
stakeholder groups, and council itself. That made it very difficult for us to 
not only work together, but also to work on behalf of our community. [As a 
councillor] it’s a part time role, and the city manager plays a big role in 
running the organization. So much happens without council even knowing 
about it. If it’s done in the wrong tone, or with the wrong vision, the whole 
system just doesn’t work. But if you have a city manager who works well 
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with council, and partners with the mayor – wow. Things will really start 
happening.63 
 
The relationship between the mayor and city manager requires effort, trust and 
respect on the part of both individuals involved. One seasoned city manager 
made this remark about his peers in other cities. “I see a lack of respect for 
mayors, mayor’s offices and councils among other administrators. It’s 
concerning. I truly respect them. They were elected. We would all act similarly in 
their situation.”64 However, the real or perceived power imbalance in the 
relationship also needs to be recognized. In the words of one council member, 
“you need to find yourself a strong city manager who is not going to be afraid to 
stand up to the mayor, especially if you have a mayor who is prone to doing his 
own thing.”65 In extreme cases, where the mayor has strong support from 
council, the nature of this relationship may be very different. One former city 
manager recalled working for a mayor who was perceived to have control over 
council. “Working for a mayor who never loses a vote is a cakewalk. We 
[administration] didn’t have to be prepared to debate policy issues. We just wrote 
marketing documents.”66 Regardless of the dynamics, the relationship between 
the mayor and the city manager – and the ability of the mayor to provide 
leadership through this relationship – is an important expectation of mayors in 
their executive leadership role.  
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2. Align service delivery with community needs 
 One in five interviewees expressed an expectation that mayors play a role 
in ensuring that the services of a municipality are aligned to the needs and 
expectations of the community. This is a confusing, and perhaps unreasonable, 
expectation, as many people could view this to be the responsibility of all of 
council or of administration – or perhaps both. An expectation that the mayor can 
ensure that municipal services match community needs is one of the most 
ambiguous and confusing areas of the role. In some cases, this expectation was 
expressed at a system level, inclusive of all city services: 
The role of the mayor is to understand what the community’s needs are, 
and balance them against [the municipality’s] ability to deliver on those 
needs. The mayor needs an understanding of both, and the difference 
between them. We need clean drinking water; we want a soccer pitch. It is 
incumbent on the mayor to make sure everyone understands the 
difference.67 
 
In other cases, mayors are expected to address day-to-day operational service 
related issues. By virtue of their position, mayors receive numerous constituent 
requests for help regarding issues with city services. Some constituents may 
start by communicating a problem to their ward councillor, and then escalate the 
concern by contacting the mayor’s office.  
The community thinks that the mayor has a hell of a lot more authority 
than he does. They’ll say, ‘Mr. Mayor, get rid of panhandlers.’ ‘Mr. Mayor, 
do something about crime.’ They believe he can just give direction and it 
will happen, but there is no law that gives him this power.68 
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In some cases, these concerns have little to do with municipal government at all. 
One mayor remarked, “Do you know how many times I get calls from people 
saying, ‘I didn’t get my welfare cheque?’ The average citizen does not 
understand it at all.”69 
 When mayors receive complaints regarding city services, it can create 
confusion and place mayors and their staff in a challenging position. On one 
hand, they are not in a position to direct city staff to address the issue; on the 
other hand, the citizen expects the mayor to address their issue. In some cases, 
the public service may also be confused about the role of the mayor in this 
regard. One administrator argued that this confusion can lead to mayors having 
greater power over municipal operations than may be expected. 
Within the public service, there are also different understandings of the 
role of the mayor. I meet a lot of people who say, ‘the mayor asked for this 
and so of course we’re going to do it.’ There are members of the public 
service who have literally no understanding of the constructs of the law 
whatsoever, and they will do it because it’s coming from ‘the president’.”70 
 
Some interviewees cited examples where they felt mayors had abused their 
position of power by making demands of staff or intimidating staff.  
The expectation that mayors play a leadership role in aligning service 
delivery with community needs – both from a system-level perspective, and at a 
day-to-day level – creates challenges for mayors. It is also a challenge for 
municipal administrators. “It puts the public service in an awkward position. It’s 
hard to say to someone [the mayor], no I’m not doing it, go to council and get the 																																																								
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votes.”71 There are clear differences in practices across cities, and it seems that 
it is an area of leadership that is gradually tested and defined over time. The 
confusion may reflect a deeper issue: a general misunderstanding of the role of 
the mayor, and the executive part of the role in particular. Interestingly, two 
interviewees had similar comments about the influence of American television in 
this regard: 
There is a growing ‘presidentialization’ of the mayor, or of Canadian 
politics generally. This is a function of the fact that most of our civics 
education comes through watching American television. 72 
 
My perception is that people see the television version of the strong 
mayor from the United States – you know, the New York or Chicago 
mayors, who can dish out contracts and get potholes filled. It just doesn’t 
work that way here.73 
 
Regardless of the cause of confusion or the dynamics of this role in each city, it 
was regularly cited as a source of tension. “The public believes the mayor runs 
the city. This creates a lot of problems. You end up with mayors who try to run 
the operations, and that can be very dangerous. Mixing political interests with 
what roads get paved – well, that just doesn’t work.”74  
 
3. Steward tax dollars responsibly  
 A closely related expectation of mayors in their executive leadership 
capacity is about acting as a steward of tax dollars, and of taxpayer interests 
more generally. Again, this is an area where all of council has a role – but 																																																								
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interviewees expressed a particular expectation of mayors to play a leadership 
position. One elected official described the expectation aptly:  
The job is hard. You have massive public expectations, and very limited 
resources. I could line up people who have very good causes, and the line 
would go from my desk here all the way to my house 20km away. There is 
a tsunami of needs out there that are not being met, but the taxpayer is 
only willing to pay so much. The pot is only so big. The challenge for 
mayors is to allocate these scarce resources among so many competing 
needs. […]  
 
Most people are not engaged. Sure, there’s 1% who are in the political 
class – the activists, the attentive public, sometimes the highly educated – 
but most people don’t even know who their councillor is. In my ward, 
people just want their taxes kept low. That’s it. If you asked them, ‘what’s 
the role of the mayor?’ they would just say, ‘to keep my taxes low.’”75 
 
Citizens and community leaders alike may expect the mayor, typically as the only 
local official elected with a citywide mandate, to play a particularly strong 
leadership role in ensuring the responsible stewardship of tax dollars. Many 
mayoral candidates across cities campaign on platforms oriented towards costs 
savings or keeping taxes low. In these cases, where a community expresses a 
preference in a cost-reduction agenda through the election of the mayor, the 
mayor is likely to be expected to play an even stronger leadership role in this 
area.  
 
4. Communicate municipal activities     
 In most communities, the mayor is a chief spokesperson not only for the 
decisions of council but also for the day-to-day operational activities of the 																																																								
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municipal corporation. This is particularly true during extreme weather events 
and crises. Interviewees from community, executive and political perspectives 
alike articulated an expectation that mayors, in their executive leadership role, 
would play a key role in communicating municipal activities to the public. 
The mayor is the spokesperson for the city. He’s the go-to person for 
media who will comment on anything of citywide significance. Residents 
turn to the mayor for leadership on emerging issues, the big things, the 
crises. He’s the person who articulates the city’s voice on those 
occasions.76  
 
The mayor’s ability to command media and public attention can be helpful for 
communicating an important message, and for shaping the tone of the 
communications. One elected official commented on the particular skill of a 
former mayor in her city in this regard:  
[The mayor] brought a really positive perspective to the city. He came with 
a lexicon of superlatives that he used all the time. If we budgeted $6 
million for snow removal, and then we spent $9 million – well, he could still 
find a way to celebrate a really expensive snowstorm.77  
 
This expectation of mayors is not without challenge. In particular, the time 
sensitivity of crises and major events means that the spokesperson role can 
require the mayor’s availability at any time. The expectation of mayors to be fully 
aware of the details relating to emerging issues and events can also pose a 
challenge. One former mayor stated the difficulty in this way: 
The problem is that these events unfold quickly, and unexpectedly, and as 
mayor you are required to respond immediately. You could wake up one 
day and not even know something was an issue, and by lunch you have 																																																								
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to have an intelligent conversation about how the issue will be resolved. 
The media is so fast, and now with social media – people want the 
impossible.78 
A senior administrator shared a similar concern:    
The 24/7 media age we’re living in, the news cycle that seems to be about 
15 minutes – it’s challenging to meet the needs of a society that wants 
instant answers. Our system hasn’t evolved as quickly as society has. […] 
People want answers in the age of social media. Information gets out 
there very quickly, and a challenge for the mayor is to help them 
understand that there are still processes that have to be undertaken. But, 
sometimes those processes are outdated.79 
 
The demands of this aspect of the mayor’s leadership role can be highly time 
consuming for the mayor, the mayor’s staff, and for administration. One 
interviewee felt this was a key difference between the role of the mayor and the 
role of leaders in other levels of government, and felt the expectations of mayors 
are underestimated in some cases:  
There are just so many files, and we don’t have a proper cabinet in the 
way a prime minister or premier has a cabinet. So you have to be 
constantly up to speed on all of the issues. That’s why city councillors look 
like such buffoons, because they speak on every single issue and they 
have so few staff to bring them up to speed on them. So when they are 
talking about issues, they just talk off the cuff, so they look stupid. The 
mayor does have some people, but the number of files and issues and 
priorities – it’s a lot. It’s a full-time job, even in cities where it’s a part time 
job. It’s really [a] full-time job.80 
 
The resources required for mayors to effectively serve in this leadership role may 
vary based on city size, and based on the norms and expectations in each city 
regarding the types of activities and events for which the mayor is expected to 																																																								
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serve in a spokesperson role. Although no examples were found where this role 
is clearly articulated, it was identified in all cities.  
 
5. Motivate the public service  
 In Canada’s cities, municipal government is a large enterprise. 
Municipalities provide numerous services to their respective residents, and are 
often among the largest employers in their communities. The relationship 
between the mayor and the public service can be unclear, as there is no direct 
reporting relationship between most municipal staff and an individual member of 
council, yet the mayor is a highly visible leader of their organization. More than a 
quarter of administrators interviewed shared an expectation of mayors to build 
positive, supportive relationships with the public service as a whole. Interestingly, 
this expectation was not identified by any elected officials interviewed. In the 
words of one senior administrator interviewed,  
Maintaining a good relationship with the public service matters. There’s no 
substitute for that. You can have a mayor who breathes fire, and it will get 
short term results. But if you want the public service all moving in the 
same direction, it doesn’t work. The public service shouldn’t need to be 
persuaded, because we serve at the will of council, but it really does start 
with that relationship.81 
 
There can be tension between a mayor and the public service for a variety of 
reasons. The relationship may be strained after a difficult contract negotiation or 
collective agreement decision, where anger among staff members is targeted 
towards the mayor. Similarly, given that staff salaries tend to be among the most 																																																								
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expensive budget line items for municipalities, there may be political incentives 
for mayors to publicly attack the public service in the media or community. This 
can also damage relationships. In the words of one city manager, “staff want 
mayors to support them, not criticize their work or question their value. Some 
mayors gain traction on the basis of criticizing administration, and it’s hurtful to 
the organization.”82 
 Interviewees frequently identified relations with municipal staff as a 
challenging aspect of the role of the mayor, across cities. One of the most 
commonly cited reasons for this challenge was how entrenched staff may be in 
their work, or their policy recommendations. In the words of a community 
observer:  
Staff can be challenging for politicians, because they feel they have to 
push – and sometimes staff feel that council isn’t listening. But staff’s role 
is to study issues and make recommendations, then step back, and let 
Council make the decision. They can’t take the decisions personally, but 
some of them do. Some staff feel offended if council doesn’t take their 
view. But, staff are there to give their best advice, and council is there to 
make decisions.”83 
 
What role can the mayor play towards addressing tension between council and 
administration? Interviewees identified demonstrating and communicating 
respect for the public service as an important leadership role. Some argued there 
is a connection between the mayor’s orientation towards the public service and 
the performance of the employees.  
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If morale is high among city staff, that means the mayor is doing a good 
job. He needs to strike a balance of listening to professional staff, and 
listening to councillors, and really hearing the public. Finding that balance 
is tough. He’s the conduit between staff and elected officials. If he can 
create synergy in these groups working together, rather than it feeling like 
Us vs. Them, that would be real success.”84 
 
In the words of one former city administrator, now in a community leadership 
role, but reflecting on an experience as a staff member. “As a municipal worker, 
yes we work for them [council] – but we’re also voters. They never really 
understood that we were people too. We are the community. We’re the ones who 
are paying attention. We talk to other people about what is going on.”85 Although 
the relationship between the mayor and the public service can be unclear, and 
appears to be most valued by administrators, it is an important element in the 
executive leadership role of the mayor.  
 
Summary: Mayoral Executive Leadership  
 Mayors are expected to provide executive leadership in Canada’s cities. 
This role is less visible to the public than the political and community leadership 
roles, but it is important to those engaged directly in municipal government. The 
nature of the mayor’s relationship with the city manager, their ability to help align 
service delivery with community expectations, their role in stewarding taxpayer 
interests, their capacity to communicate the activities of the municipality, and 
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their role with respect to the public service may each play a role in supporting the 
overall effectiveness of a municipal corporation.  
 What makes a mayor an effective executive leader? Maintaining 
relationships with, and showing respect for, administration is clearly a key 
ingredient. Mayors who build positive relationships and champion their 
administration can boost morale and pride in the public service, enhance 
productivity, and build the public’s confidence in their public service. One former 
mayor stated it this way: “Administration is professional, and they are there for 
the long term. If you respect them, and provide them with clarity, anything can be 
done. It’s when there isn’t clarity, and there isn’t a mission or focus, people start 
to muddle.”86 Conversely, mayors who do not maintain positive and productive 
working relationships with their city managers risk divergence between the 
political agenda and the activities of administration. The tension between council 
and staff generally can stem from a technical knowledge imbalance, and can be 
perceived as problematic for the mayor and council. In the words of one 
councillor: 
Most municipal politicians don’t have a firm grasp on our legislation, and 
the restrictions in places on them. Their ability to make decisions is highly 
restricted and prescriptive. Councillors don’t understand the system. 
That’s why staff are so powerful, because we have to rely on them so 
much.87 
 
When the mayor is disengaged from executive leadership, the city manager may 
become more powerful and be in a position to make decisions which would be 																																																								
86 Confidential Interview #60.  
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made by, or in consultation with, the mayor in other cities. Where mayors do not 
provide leadership regarding aligning service delivery expectations or taxpayer 
interests, there may be misalignment with citizen interests. A mayor who attacks 
staff or the municipality in a public way, or who does not communicate the 
activities of the municipality, can diminish the public’s perception of their local 
government. In short, the role of the mayor as an executive leader can be a 
shaping and important ingredient in effective municipal administration. This role 
is one of the least recognized, and most confused, dimensions of the mayoralty, 
but remains an important part of the role of the mayor in Canada.    
 
Role #3: Mayor as Community Leader 
“In a small city, everyone knows the mayor. Maybe in Toronto the mayor 
is a celebrity, but here, he’s your next-door neighbour. He is someone you can 
call at home. You have his cell number. You see him at the grocery store. You 
can stop him while he’s cutting the grass and ask a question.”88 The pride in the 
local reporter’s voice was obvious as he described his own personal connections 
to his city’s mayor: his father had served on committees with the mayor; they had 
become personal friends; sometimes they would go out ‘just to shoot the breeze.’ 
He described the mayor as someone who everyone knew, and who knew 
everyone. “A few years ago, I was offered to be a legislative reporter [on 
provincial affairs]. I turned it down flat. It’s sort of a promotion around here, but I 
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turned it down. I enjoy covering city council because of the access.” 89 He 
referred again to his close relationship with the mayor, and with other members 
of council. “It’s so grassroots, and you can talk about the tiniest little issue and it 
really resonates.  It could be paving a street, building a building – anything can 
become a huge story. It’s never dull covering city council, and there’s always 
drama. Nothing beats the city hall beat.”90 
 Canadian mayors have a unique relationship with their communities. 
Unlike leaders at other levels of government, they are directly elected by citizens. 
In most cases, they are elected as an individual – not as a member of a party – 
representing a set of ideas or proposals, or a particular philosophy. To become a 
leader in a provincial or federal government, there are many steps a politician 
must take in sequence – being selected by a riding association, becoming 
elected in a riding, campaigning in a leadership race, and so on – before taking 
on the leadership role. To become mayor, an individual need only file nomination 
papers and campaign to gather support of the electorate. As a result, mayors are 
uniquely positioned as community leaders – and have unique relationships with 
their city, relative to politicians at other levels. In the words of one former mayor 
who now serves in a federal position, “mayors are closer to the people. These 
are the people on your street, in your city. You see them on a regular basis. 
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You’re not off to a capital somewhere. You’re in tune with what’s going on in your 
city.”91 
 But what does it mean to lead a community? Canadians elect mayors to 
represent them within the governance structures in their city. As discussed in this 
chapter, mayors are expected to provide leadership within the political arena at 
council and with other elected officials; and, they are expected to provide 
executive leadership within their municipality. What leadership is expected of 
mayors outside of City Hall? And how can one individual represent a whole city, 
which is diverse, complex and increasingly heterogeneous? As the reporter aptly 
illustrates, in smaller communities this may be easier, as mayors may actually 
know a larger percentage of their population. But in Canada’s largest cities, this 
personal familiarity is impossible. What role are Canadian mayors expected to 
play as leaders of an entire community?   
When asked to describe the role of the mayor in their own words, more 
than two thirds of interviewees described the mayor in a community leadership 
role in some way. The words used to articulate this role varied. Common 
responses described the mayor as ‘the face’ or ‘the voice’ of the city. Others 
viewed the mayor to have a more symbolic role. “The community looks at the 
mayor as a figurehead, as the symbol of the city, as the person who represents 
the city.”92 Some referred to the mayor as the ‘chief cheerleader’ or ‘civic booster’ 
or ‘head coach’ of a city. In one community member’s words, “it’s sort of like 
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being captain of a cruise ship. They try to keep everyone going in the same 
direction, and try to get everyone to stay positive.”93 Another interviewee 
expressed it this way: “The role of the mayor is to provide leadership to citizens. 
It’s ceremonial; the mayor is the first citizen of the city. He goes to a host of 
different events, presides over functions, welcomes royal visitors, meets people 
from out of town, and gives away keys to the city. It’s an important part of the 
job.”94 People look to mayors to provide leadership to the community, but what 
this role looks like remains an open question. This chapter provides a summary 
of the community leadership role of the mayor, including the frequently 
expressed expectations involved, and a discussion on what happens when 
Canadian mayors provide effective – and ineffective – community leadership.   
 
What does mayoral community leadership look like?  
 When mayors and past mayors describe their role, it does not take long 
before one common word comes up: events. Mayors will describe attending 
numerous community events every day. In the words of one mayor, “People say, 
‘oh thank goodness it’s Friday. Well, Friday doesn’t matter if you’re a mayor. 
Look at my Twitter. I think I went to 14 events on Saturday, and even more on 
Sunday.”95 One past mayor described working an average of 100-120 hours per 
week over the duration of his two terms in office, and often sleeping in his office 
between a late night event followed by an early morning event. “The mayor has 																																																								
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to be everywhere. I think that’s a big part of being effective – and it’s definitely a 
big part of being popular and getting re-elected.”96 Attending community 
functions can mean a range of things: making speeches to social clubs, schools 
or community groups; bringing greetings at fundraisers, charity runs, sporting 
events or festivals; presiding over parades and cultural festivities; attending 
openings of new businesses and buildings; participating in fundraisers, 
celebrations and other events for organizations of all types. Some mayors and 
past mayors described also attending numerous birthday parties, family reunions 
and funerals each year. One councillor commented, “he could delegate, and he 
does delegate – but really, the person people want to see is the mayor. He 
dresses up the occasion.”97 Several interviewees identified this expectation as a 
serious concern: 
The most challenging part is the meet and greets. Everyone wants the 
mayor at their event, and it’s impossible. And if you did, you would never 
get any actual work done. There’s a real social and cheerleading 
expectation from the public for the mayor, and trying to manage that is 
really difficult.”98 
 
I am stunned by how he [the mayor] is always out. There is not a day or 
an evening where the mayor is not out with the public – shaking hands, 
opening things, talking. I don’t understand this energy level. It’s mind 
blowing. It makes me nauseous just to think about it. If I had to go out and 
do that tonight – no no no, I just want to stay home and drink a cup of 
tea.99 
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The most challenging part is simply trying to satisfy the demands of the 
people who want you to be at every event. Finding time in your life to do 
that, and still having a life, would be exceedingly difficult. There are only 
so many hours in a day.100 
 
Several mayors expressed frustration about the practical challenges that an 
expectation to ‘be everywhere’ can create, including taking time away from other 
aspects of the mayor’s role. This concern was shared from many other 
interviewees. However, there was also broad recognition that this role is 
important. “It’s about a whole lot more than kissing babies!”101 In another 
person’s words, “it can’t be easy to fit everyone into a day and talk to them, but I 
think that’s incredibly important. Otherwise, people will lose faith. They don’t 
think the mayor cares about them.”102 
 Why do mayors spend so much time in the community, and what exactly 
is expected of them in their ‘outside City Hall’ role? When describing this 
leadership role of mayors, the following expectations emerged from interviewees:  
 1. Build civic pride 
2. Keep the pulse of the community 
3. Mobilize and engage diverse groups 
4. Give hope in times of crisis  
5. Project a positive image of the city  
Interviewees expressed expectations for the mayor to play a leadership role in 
each of these areas; and, that when a mayor is able to provide leadership in all 																																																								
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of these areas, it can translate into heighted civic engagement, empowered 
community organizations and increased community pride. The following sections 
provide an overview of each core responsibility, expressed by mayors and those 
who work most closely with them.   
 
1. Build civic pride 
 Many interviewees shared at least one story that connected the activities 
of the mayor and how they felt about their city. One individual described the first 
time the mayor raised the pride flag at City Hall, and feeling proud to live in an 
inclusive and welcoming community. A reporter described a tragedy in the 
community where the mayor had spoken out to support the family involved, and 
feeling proud of the outpouring of support that followed. A community leader 
shared a story about the mayor attending the opening of a friend’s new small 
business, and how important it had been to her friend that the mayor made time 
to be there. A humorous letter to an American media company sent by the mayor 
after a slight against his city’s basketball team was shared with a joyful laugh. 
One conflict between a mayor and a premier was described as embodying the 
‘Fighting Newfoundlander’ spirit. Interviewees referenced interactions between 
their mayor and other important people – Justin Trudeau, Queen Elizabeth, 
Drake, the Pope – as a mark of the importance of their mayor, or told stories 
about a renewed sense of optimism coming to their city with the election of a 
new mayor. But how exactly does a mayor shape how people feel about their 
city?  
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 As illustrated in these stories, mayors seem to play a role in building civic 
pride in many different ways. The mayor is often one of the most visible and well-
known individuals in their city. Particularly in large cities, the daily activities of 
mayors are closely followed by media, and chronicled through social media. 
What they say, what they do, whom they meet with and how they act often has a 
large audience. Interviewees provided clear examples of how mayors can use 
their prominence to build a sense of pride. They can draw attention to the 
opening of a new business simply by being there. They can raise the profile of an 
issue by speaking up. A consistent underlying theme is that mayors can make 
individuals or organizations feel like they are important to their community 
through how they spend their time and the things they say. One community 
member described it this way:  
[The mayor] is very visible in the community, and very hands on. We were 
Facebook friends before he became the mayor. He brought a real mind 
shift to the city. When downtown groups would put holiday lights out, he 
would be online right away giving kudos to the groups. He would always 
say that we have lots to offer, and we’re in a good place. He made the city 
feel like it was a gem again. We just needed to polish it up.103 
 
Another interviewee was even more direct in arguing that this area is the most 
important part of the mayor’s role. “The mayor’s job is to build love for the city. I 
know ‘love’ is an emotional word, but I think that captures the role. Once you 
have love for your city, everything else will fall into place.”104 People expressed 
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the importance of the mayor reflecting a genuine commitment to their city and 
‘believing in’ the city: 
If the mayor doesn’t believe in his or her city – if they don’t believe it’s a 
great place to live, to put down roots, to build a business, to start a family 
– then no one will. [As mayor] you have to believe in your city. You have 
to be an optimist. There isn’t always a sense of optimism in our part of the 
country, but when people listen to the mayor speak and he sounds so 
positive, it raises the spirits of the entire city.105 
 
The extent to which a mayor can influence or shape a community’s sense of civic 
pride remains an open question, and further study in this area may reveal 
interesting insight. What is clear, however, is that building civic pride in the 
community, in some way, is expected of the mayor in their capacity as a 
community leader.  
 
2. Keep the pulse of the community 
 Interviewees frequently expressed an expectation for mayors to stay 
closely attuned to the interests, needs and opinions of their community – 
appreciating that rarely does a community share a homogenous perspective. 
Often as the sole citywide elected representative, people expect mayors to 
understand the entire city in a way that is not expected of other elected officials. 
Mayors shared various strategies for staying attuned to the public ‘pulse’.  In the 
words of one former mayor, “it’s all about listening. People call you. You don’t 
need opinion polls. I’d check in with our receptionist twice a day. I’d ask, ‘what’s 
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hot today? What are people calling about?’”106 Another past mayor cited events 
as a helpful way to hear from the public: 
That’s why I went to so many events – it’s so I could hear what people 
were saying. It’s a clear message. When you go to that many things, 
you’re close to the ground. People are not shy about coming up to you 
and saying, ‘hold your ground!’ or ‘what are you doing?!’ The public is very 
forthcoming about what they think.107 
 
Other mayors and past mayors referenced social media as a tool they use to 
seek out public opinion. Staying attended to the community was articulated as 
something that people expect of mayors in their role as community leader; and, a 
role which mayor mayors appear to take very seriously. In the words of one 
former mayor, “you’re the only person in the entire city who has the privilege of 
meeting with representatives of every sector of the community, so you have to 
be really systematic about it.”108 Mayors have an obvious personal and political 
interest in staying aligned with the public. One interviewee described it this way: 
People vote to oust a mayor. If the mayor has fallen in bad with the public, 
they go to the polls not to vote someone in but to vote someone out. They 
will ram into the polls to oust someone. If the public feels the person isn’t 
doing a good job, or is controlled by a certain faction, they want to get rid 
of him. And the only way to do that is to rally behind a new guy.109 
 
 
3. Mobilize and engage diverse groups 
 Interviewees expressed that mayors, by virtue of their position, are 
uniquely positioned to engage individuals and groups in a community. One 
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interviewee shared a story about a mayor writing individual letters to a long list of 
community and business leaders to ask for their help on a priority issue. A 
community leader recalled a time when the mayor called a group of community 
organizations together. The mayor asked each organization to describe their 
requests for provincial and federal funding, and facilitated a discussion about 
how they could align funding requests so the community would appear more 
organized externally. 110 Mayors are well positioned to ask individuals and 
organizations to become engaged in community initiatives, often more so than 
any other local official. One community leader made this point succinctly. “If the 
mayor was to call and ask me for something, and a councillor was to call and ask 
me for the same thing, would my reaction be different? Yes. Yes it would. 
Because he’s the mayor.”111 Several interviewees shared similar remarks:  
The mayor has terrific levers. He can call on people from all walks of life – 
from the business community, or from labour unions, or citizen activists – 
to gain their knowledge or ask them to volunteer their efforts to tackle 
issues. People have respect for the office. The mayor has that kind of 
persuasion.112 
 
Strike a group of community leaders, and give them some resources – 
staff, maybe funding. You need to make sure the staff member is 
connected on the inside, is respected and knows who to contact and how 
to get through the silos. If there is a big priority at the top of the list, the 
mayor should rely on his staff and the community, and empower them to 
do something about it.113 
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You are the only elected official who has the chance to articulate what the 
city is, and lead a strategy to help the city achieve its potential. That 
includes establishing confidence in citizens, championing leadership of 
the community, and rising to the challenge of leading the city through the 
issues of the day. The mayor can gather a community behind the vision to 
achieve something together.114 
 
In all cities, there were examples where mayors have convened special task 
forces or directly approached individuals or organizations about contributing to a 
community initiative. The treatment and recognition of the people involved once 
the initiative was underway was also highlighted as being important. One 
interviewee shared an example where a past mayor had yelled at a group of 
volunteers after being displeased with the results of the group’s work. Most of the 
volunteers quit shortly afterwards. In her words, “when you’re getting paid in a 
muffin, you don’t need to put up with that.”115 Mayors are well positioned to invite 
diverse individuals and groups to become engaged in civic affairs, but need to be 
strategic in doing so. The politics of who is included and excluded, the issues 
selected to be addressed, and the terms of the engagement should all be subject 
to careful considerations.  
 
4. Give hope in times of crisis  
 Leadership during crisis emerged as a key expectation of, and opportunity 
for, mayors. Crises can include severe weather events such as snowstorms, 
flooding, hurricanes, fires and more; it can include tragedy and loss; it can also 
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mean events that are embarrassing for a community. In one community, 
interviewees described their city being named as the most racist city in the 
country by a national magazine and looking to the mayor to speak up. Mayors 
are often judged based on their response in crisis. A mayor who is seen to be 
active during the crisis, who communicates frequently and accessibly to the 
public, and can give a voice to the feels being experienced by a community 
during a particular event will be celebrated for doing so. In the words of one 
interviewee, “when there are major issues, people expect the mayor to be there. 
If there were any catastrophic events or major issues, people look for 
leadership.”116 
 Providing leadership in times of crisis can be challenging for mayors, 
particularly given the substantial time commitment involved. One mayor 
described his experience after his community experienced a major weather 
event, and working around the clock for days even after the event had subsided. 
In his words, “you’re the face, you’re the person who they expect to be there 
when you need them to be there. Your job is to be there. There is no such thing 
as being ‘off’.”117  
 
5. Project a positive image of the city  
 Mayors have a high profile within their community, and sometimes also 
beyond their cities. Many interviewees expressed a shared perspective that the 
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activities and behaviors of mayors can be viewed as a reflection of the city they 
serve. Mayors are expected to look, act, speak, and behave in ways that reflect 
positively on the community they serve. One seasoned city manager stated this 
expectation in this way. “It’s like being pastor of a church. You have to live a life 
that is of a higher standard. The mayor is a leader of a community. If the way 
they act doesn’t live up to what people expect – that’s how people lose faith in 
leaders, in government, in democracy.”118 There are many examples of 
Canadian mayors who have become notorious on the basis of their behaviour. 
Interviewees had varying perspectives on the impact of the mayor’s behaviour on 
their city. One administrator shared an example of a mayor who became 
embroiled in a scandal, and how the mayor lost the support of colleagues and 
projects were affected:   
With [a past mayor], his popularity was declining and the dissension 
among the ranks grew. The scandal was too broad, and things started 
going wrong on big projects. The more this happened, the more he was 
losing the room. So remaining scandal-free seems obvious, but it’s really 
important.119 
 
Others expressed a more general concern about the impact of scandals on the 
public’s perceptions of politics, politicians and government:  
We’re going through a huge change in democracy. In the old days, people 
stepped up in their communities. The position of mayor was highly 
regarded, and was seen to be a force to be reckoned with within the 
community. Politics has changed. It’s become entertainment. In the old 
days, people would step up to the job. Business leaders would run for 
office to make their community successful, because it would make their 
business successful. They understood that they needed to make the city 																																																								
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have a good reputation, because their sales depended on it. That’s not so 
today. You can live anywhere. You don’t have to make your community 
successful to be successful anymore. 120 
 
The expectation of mayors to project their city in a positive way extends beyond 
staying ‘scandal-free’; it extends to the ways in which the mayor conducts him- or 
herself in public settings. Making comments that are viewed to be offensive or 
uneducated can be taken very seriously by some in the community. As a result, 
mayors must have a strong repertoire of cultural, social and political knowledge 
suited to a diversity of settings.  
The contemporary mayor has to have a lot of bandwidth. This is not as 
true for a member of parliament, say, because their ward is not usually as 
diverse as a whole city. The mayor needs to be able to cross cultural 
communities, give greetings in many languages, understand complex 
business interests, know what to do when you walk into a Sikh temple or 
how to pronounce First Nations names. In big cities, this is absolutely 
required.”121 
 
Because urban mayors are subject to daily media scrutiny, even small gaffes can 
result in embarrassment for the mayor or others involved. Fairly or unfairly, there 
is a clear expectation that their activities and behaviors reflect positively on the 
city they represent.  
 
Summary: Mayoral Community Leadership  
Canadian mayors have a unique relationship with their cities, and are 
expected to provide leadership to their communities. This leadership role is 
highly visible and involves engaging with the community in many forums. The 																																																								
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expectation that mayors ‘be everywhere’ presents both a significant opportunity 
and a great challenge for mayors. Through events and other community 
interactions, mayors can contribute to the sense of civic pride in their community 
by raising the profile of the activities of individuals or organizations, making 
groups feel appreciated, and drawing attention to important issues. Mayors can 
leverage their profile to highlight the best parts of their city, and elevate a 
community’s own awareness of its assets. Mayors can also benefit from 
unusually frequent interactions with the public as a means of better 
understanding the needs, interests and perspectives of their community. Mayors, 
by virtue of their position, can engage diverse groups and mobilize action by 
asking people and organizations to contribute to priority initiatives or to 
collaborate with one another. During times of crisis, mayors can bring hope and 
optimism, and provide direction to a community during a time of need. Finally, 
mayors can present their city in a positive light through their actions and 
behaviors. These activities can require extraordinary investments of time and 
energy by mayors, which can come at the expense of other important elements 
of their roles. There are often challenging politics involved in making needed 
decisions about which events to attend, or who to include and exclude from 
community initiatives. Mayors may struggle with the burden of being expected to 
reflect their community in a positive light at all times, and may be challenged to 
live up to a standard of living that may or may not be attainable.   
What makes for an effective community leader? The interviewees offered 
sage advice. Prioritizing and being strategic with time management, maintaining 
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deep and strong relationships across a diverse array of community groups, being 
optimistic and hopeful about the community particularly in times of crisis, and 
remaining free from scandal are all ingredients for success. When mayors 
provide strong community leadership, the benefits are internal and external to 
the city. When mayors do not provide strong leadership in this area, other actors 
may do so – sometimes creating conflict, confusion and duplication – which 
further erodes the mayor’s ability to serve in the community leadership role.  
 
Conclusion 
Canada’s urban mayors face high expectations. The importance of 
building strong relationships emerges as an overarching theme across all 
aspects of the mayor’s role – including with council colleagues and other political 
leaders, with administration, and with groups and individuals in the community. 
The ability of a mayor to foster positive relations and maintain the support of 
these groups emerges as a critical ingredient of a mayor’s success – and the 
dominant factor in shaping perceptions of mayoral power. Strong leadership in 
one part of the mayor’s role can have positive externalities in the others. For 
example, interviewees spoke about mayors who have strong personal popularity 
with the public (community leadership) as having an easier time building support 
within council (political leadership), and with administration (executive 
leadership). Each of these groups hold different expectations of the mayor, and 
the extent to which a mayor can meet these expectations will determine how 
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supportive these groups are of the mayor – and how able the mayor will be to 
mobilize these groups to accomplish desired outcomes.  
 Building and sustaining relationships with the many actors engaged in 
local government is not without its challenges. As identified earlier in this 
chapter, actors may have personal interests which run counter to the mayor’s 
interests, such as other councillors considering a mayoral run, or staff or citizens 
who are disgruntled over a particular policy decision or action of the mayor. 
Interviewees were also quick to express the practical difficulties associated the 
role – particularly given the sheer volume of stakeholders engaged in local 
government. Some interviewees spoke of the extraordinary time commitment 
required, the lack of personal privacy, and sacrifice involved in other areas of 
one’s life in order to do the job. The pressures associated with having a high 
profile in one’s community, and the inability to live a ‘normal life’ during or after 
being a mayor was also mentioned by several individuals. One reporter who 
covered three mayors over 15 years phrased it this way:  
I think it’s probably one of the worst jobs, honestly. [laughs] There are so 
many expectations, and they come from every possible angle. You’re 
trying to please your constituents, who are in every part of the city. You 
have to represent the city on a national and international stage […] while 
answering to a lot of people. People will focus their anger on you for 
anything happening in the city. [The mayor] is a lightning rod. You have to 
work terrible hours. It’s a lot of nights and weekends. People expect you 
to be at every parade, every dinner. The hours of the job are not fully 
understood. The last mayor, he was even sleeping in his office. He loved 
all of that, but I can’t imagine a regular joe loving all of that. The pull on 
your family – it’s brutal – and the microscope you’re under. Even if you’re 
		
182 
having a hamburger somewhere, people are tweeting about it. I think it 
would be quite thankless.122 
 
Interviewees in all cities agreed that the role of the mayor is unique, and 
challenging. Expectations for leadership are high, and yet Canadian mayors 
have limited institutional power and often few institutional supports. So how can 
mayors deliver on all of that is expected of them? How do mayors fulfill 
expectations that fall far outside the defined scope of their roles? Most 
importantly, how do mayors and those who work with them understand “mayoral 
power” in practice in Canada’s cities?   
 
 
 
																																																								
122 Confidential Interview #7.  
Chapter 8 | A MODEL OF MAYORAL POWER IN CANADA 
 
 Power is a complex, challenging, and contested concept. Although the 
original Latin word potere simply means ‘to be able,’ political science and other 
disciplines have taken up the challenge to examine its many dimensions or 
‘faces,’ its sources, its properties, and its expression. When Dahl famously 
described the study of power as a “bottomless swamp”1 in the 1950s, he may not 
have been surprised to learn that today – six decades later – there are more than 
300,000 book titles including the word “power.”2 Power remains a central concept 
in the study of political science for defining relationships between political actors 
– including within local government in Canada, with respect to Canada’s mayors. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Canadian mayors have traditionally been understood 
to be “weak” reflecting a narrow definition of mayoral power which privileges 
institutional dimensions of power. In lieu of a developed literature on the 
Canadian mayoralty – or even defined systems of local government in Canada – 
the American “strong mayor / weak mayor” taxonomy has had a pervasive 
influence on how the power of Canadian mayors is understood.  Over time, the 
influence of this concept – and its narrow view of what “mayoral power” is – has 
led Canadian observers and practitioners alike to discount the power of 
Canadian mayors.  																																																								
1 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science (Vol, 2, No. 3, July 1957), 201.  
2 A search on Amazon.com for books with the word “power” in the title yields over 300,000 
results, including titles in nearly all topic categories: arts, business, biographies, education, 
health, history, law, literature, medicine, parenting, religion, romance, science, sports, self-help, 
and others. 
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 This study questions the assumption that Canadian mayors are “weak” by 
investigating a foundational question: what factors shape the power in practice of 
mayors in Canada’s cities? Part I approached the question through an 
institutional lens, comparing the legal authority of mayors in provincial legislation, 
and the extent to which local arrangements empower or disempower mayors. 
The findings of this investigation support the dominant view within current 
academic and professional discourse: that Canadian mayors have limited 
institutional power. Legislation alone would suggest that Canadian mayors chair 
meetings, sign bylaws, and have varied other duties that are primarily procedural 
in nature. The common elements of the mayoralty across Canadian cities, as 
defined in provincial legislation, remain remarkably consistent with the original 
design of the role as articulated in the Baldwin Act nearly 170 years ago. Mayors 
of cities with unique legislation, and where the role of the mayor has been 
defined in a way that is different from other cities in the province, tend to have 
more formal power. However, the variation is modest. The analysis found 
nothing to suggest that the mayor of Vancouver (on the high end, relative to the 
other cities in this sample) is dramatically more powerful – in institutional terms – 
than is the mayor of Calgary, despite the institutional differences between these 
cities. More importantly, these institutional variables appear to have relationship 
to perceptions of mayoral power – including from the public, those who work with 
mayors, or mayors themselves. In sum, while there is modest variation across 
cities, institutional variables related to mayoral power are less important factors 
in terms of the ability of mayors to get things done.    
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 A key theme emerging from the data presented in Part II, informed by 
interviews with mayors and those who work closely with mayors, is that the role 
of the mayor in Canada is described, conceptualized, and understood far more in 
terms of leadership than power. This observation marked a significant departure 
point in this study. The project began by examining the mayoralty within each city 
as the “cases” to be studied. Interviewees were asked to describe the mayoralty 
in their city, irrespective of the individuals in the role. It quickly became clear that 
this was impossible for most interviewees. The mayoralty, as a central institution 
in each city, is generally undefined. The bounds of its powers are unknown, 
uncharted, and difficult to observe. Examining the mayoralty of a specific city – 
absent of individual mayors in the job – emerged as much less meaningful (or 
interesting) than examining specific mayors. In Calgary, when interviewees were 
asked to describe the role or power of the mayor in Calgary, they would ask, “do 
you mean with Mayor Nenshi, or Mayor Bronconnier? Because it’s completely 
different.” Similar sentiments were expressed in other cities: Ford or Miller? 
Bowman or Katz or Murray? Despite the researcher’s initial effort to focus 
interviewees on the role of the mayor itself, rather than the individuals in the role, 
it quickly became clear the power of a mayor is understood to be person-specific, 
not city-specific. Additionally, the levers which were described as rendering a 
mayor more or less “powerful” were rarely cited as stemming from legislation or 
institutional structure; instead, they emerges from a more complex dynamic 
involving relationships with other actors at a particular point in time. Interviewees 
understood the role of the mayor to include working with three primary groups – 
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political actors, executive actors, and community actors – and expressed that a 
that a single mayor may be more or less “powerful” as a leader in one of these 
realms than another at any point in time, depending on circumstance. The same 
mayor may have considerable influence over council, and yet have limited 
influence over staff of individuals in the community. This dynamic was also 
viewed to be fluid and prone to change over time, as the mayor gained or lost the 
support of council, administration or the public. As a result, it would be too simple 
to conclude that a mayor is “strong” or “weak” – or that Canadian mayors are 
“strong” or “weak” generally. Mayoral power is person- and context-specific, and 
is best examined at this scale. This chapter presents a model for understanding 
mayoral power in Canada that reflects this observation.  
 
What is the role of the mayor? 
 In practice, the role of the mayor is much larger than what is described in 
provincial legislation or municipal bylaws. Mayors and those who work with 
mayors describe the role as being primarily a leadership position; and, that 
mayors have at least three distinct leadership roles. Mayors are political leaders, 
working with council and elected officials in other governments; mayors are 
executive leaders, working with city administrators and staff of other local 
government organizations; and, mayors are community leaders, working with 
citizens, community groups, businesses, organizations and more. This  
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Figure 2: The Role of a Canadian Mayor 
 
 
 
conceptualization of the role of the mayor, originally based on Svara’s model3 but 
with an important adaptation based on  this project, is presented in Figure 2. 
Svara was not trying to communicate what the role of the mayor entails; instead, 
he was describing the mayor as having a key role as an interlocutor between 
these actors. Figure 2 presents a different concept. The role of the mayor is 
represented by the triangle. Mayors occupy an important role within each of the 
																																																								
3 Svara’s “mayor in council-manager cities interactions model”, as presented in Figure 1 in 
Chapter 2, positions the mayor as being in the middle of three groups: council, manager, and 
organizations and public agencies.  
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three main groups of actors engaged in local government; mayors are uniquely 
positioned between these groups; and, the role of the mayor involves leadership 
to these groups. The political, executive and community leadership roles of a 
mayor involve different expectations – as outlined in Chapter 7 – and working 
with different actors. As a political leader, the mayor is working within a council, 
sometimes with a local political party, and with elected leaders of other 
governments; as an executive leader, the mayor is working within a municipal 
corporation, and often within other corporate entities such as boards and 
commissions; as a community leader, the mayor is working as the elected 
representative of an entire city, inclusive of numerous groups, organizations, and 
communities. These roles are not mutually exclusive nor are they necessarily 
distinct from one another in practice. Many issues, policy initiatives or activities 
may require the mayor to be working with multiple groups simultaneously. 
Effective leadership to one group may have positive externalities with the others. 
These leadership roles were widely acknowledged by interviewees in all cities, 
and across all perspectives. 
 
Defining Mayoral Power 
 What makes a mayor more or less “powerful” in Canada? This study 
investigated what factors shape the power in practice of mayors in Canada’s 
cities and finds that institutional variables are less important in practice than are 
leadership variables. Mayoral power cannot be understood based on legislative 
or executive authority alone – as the “weak mayor” taxonomy would suggest – 
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but instead, to understand power in practice, one must examine the mayor in 
relation to other actors engaged in local government. The “power” of a mayor is a 
measure of the extent to which the mayor can realize desired outcomes in 
relation to other political, executive and community actors. It emanates from both 
the institutional authority of the mayoralty – as established in legislation and 
bylaw, and defined through local arrangements – and the leadership of the 
person in the role. This is consistent with Nye’s definition of power as “the ability 
to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers,”4 and argument that nation 
states can use “hard” and “soft” powers to achieve these desired outcomes. 
Similarly, mayors draw upon the institutional authority inherent in their role, as 
well as their own ability to lead those around them, as means to accomplish 
desired outcomes in their cities. 
 Which of these sources of power – institution authority or leadership – is 
more important in Canada? This study finds that the latter, leadership, is 
considerably more important. Mayors do have institutional authority. They are 
recognized in legislation across Canada, and by a wide range of actors, as an 
important figure. Upon being elected, the mayor gains an ability to speak up on 
issues, influence others, participate in a wide range of discussions with varied 
actors, and legitimately serve as the representative of their city – simply by virtue 
of their position. This is power, and it comes from the institutional authority 
vested in the role of the mayor in Canada. This source of power is largely 
unchanging, static and stable. It is defined through legislation and bylaw, and 																																																								
4 Ibid.  
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shaped by the institutional arrangements unique to each city. It varies across 
Canada, but only modestly. Importantly, in Canada – where the mayoralty and 
forms of government are defined so vaguely – the formal or institutional power of 
a mayor is less important in practice.  
 In Canada, the more important source of power for a mayor is leadership. 
This is the variable that distinguishes a mayor who can accomplish desired 
outcomes from one who cannot. It is this variable that results in mayoral power 
being viewed as being different from one mayor to another in the same city. 
Leadership, as a source of power, is complex because it is relational; it defines 
power based on the relationships between the mayor and other actors. It is 
highly sensitive to circumstance, and can change rapidly.  
 What is “mayoral power”? It is the extent to which the mayor can 
influence, mobilize, empower, and lead other actors engaged in local 
government to achieve desired outcomes. It comes from both institutional 
authority and leadership – and in a Canadian context, the latter is far more 
important. This definition of mayoral power allows for the likely (and common, 
according to interviewees) possibility that a mayor is more powerful in one 
aspect of their role than in another – and, that mayoral power changes over time; 
it is a variable capacity. The same mayor may be more powerful when working 
with council than they are with staff, or vice versa. During a term in office, the 
same mayor can shift from being very powerful to becoming less powerful, for a 
variety of reasons. This runs counter to the dominant view of mayoral power as 
being a relatively static function of legislation or institutional arrangements, or a 
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conclusion that Canadian mayors are “weak.” Instead, Canadian mayors have 
the capacity to be enormously powerful by drawing on various resources 
available to them to influence, mobilize, empower, and lead others.5  
  In a study of economic development in North American and European 
cities,6 authors Savitch and Kantor offer a helpful analogy. They compare cities 
based on a suite of economic variables, and ultimately sort them into two 
categories: ‘driving’ and ‘steering’ variables, conjuring the image of a car. The 
‘driving variables’ are the features of a city that influence the economy but are 
relatively fixed and static, such as geography or climate. The ‘steering variables’ 
are the features over which a community has some control, such as policy 
decisions. Using the analogy, a car is built to do one thing – to drive – and 
cannot be made to swim or fly, but a driver still has agency to steer the car to 
their desired destination. This is akin to mayoral power in Canada. The mayoralty 
as an institution is like the car, formally empowered within local governments in 
Canada. The design specifications vary somewhat by city. However, the more 
important variable – the ‘steering variable’ – is leadership. Although the 
mayoralty as an institution is relatively fixed, the individual in the role has wide 
discretion in how they choose to use the resources available to lead those 
around them.  
																																																								
5 This argument is consistent with the findings of Brian McKenna and Susan Purcell, Drapeau 
(Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1980); and Tom Urbaniak, Her Worship: Hazel McCallion 
and the Development of Mississauga (Toronto: City of Toronto Press, 2009). 
6 Hank V. Savitch and Paul Kantor, Cities in the International Marketplace: The Political Economy 
of Urban Development in North America and Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002).  
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A Model of Mayoral Power  
 If mayoral power is the extent to which the mayor can influence, mobilize, 
empower, and lead other actors engaged in local government to achieve desired 
outcomes – how can it be observed? This definition understands mayoral power  
 
Figure 3: Mayoral Power in Canada 
 
 
as relational, defined by the relationship of the mayor to actors engaged in local 
government. The mayor may be more or less powerful within the arena of 
political, executive and community actors. This model of mayoral power holds 
that, to understand the power of a mayor, the position of the mayor in relation to 
these three groups must be examined. To assess “how powerful” a mayor is, one 
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must consider the mayor in the context of each group:  
• How powerful is the mayor in relation to political actors? 
• How powerful is the mayor in relation to executive actors? 
• How powerful is the mayor in relation to community actors? 
It is expected that the answer to these three questions is not the same; that, in 
practice, mayoral power presents as patterns where mayors tend to be more 
powerful in one aspect of their role than in others.  
 During the interviews, the stories from mayors and others revealed that 
mayors draw on many different resources to exercise power over political, 
executive and community actors. Interviewees rarely characterized the mayor as 
“exercising power” yet the stories demonstrated how mayors were able to 
accomplish desired outcomes by influencing and leading others. Table 25 
presents a summary of “power resources” used by mayors in their relations with 
political, executive and community actors. These were drawn from the 
Interviews. This table is surely not exhaustive of all power resources of mayors; it 
includes only the specific examples shared during the interviews. Council 
members, working with mayors in their political role, indicated that mayors use 
resources such as providing or limiting opportunities for leadership, supporting or 
hindering ward-specific priorities, preferential or diminished opportunities to 
speak during meetings, and access to information before the rest of council. 
Administrators, working with mayors in their executive role, have experienced 
mayors offering or withholding political support for key initiatives, shaping public 
opinion about municipal staff through how they communicate in the media, and  
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Table 25: Power Resources  
 Political Actors Executive Actors Community Actors 
Institutional  
Sources of Power  
Procedural 
controls; giving or 
limiting time to 
speak at meetings 
 
Appointments; 
giving or limiting 
opportunities for 
leadership 
 
Procedural 
controls; ability to 
call meetings 
 
Leadership as a 
Source of Power  
Support for ward-
initiatives 
 
Directing media to 
interview specific 
councillors 
 
Positive public 
recognition 
 
Greater access to 
information from 
staff; ability to 
share earlier 
access to 
information  
 
 
Political support 
for key initiatives 
 
Creating or 
preventing political 
challenges for 
staff initiatives  
 
Positive public 
recognition  
 
Speaking on 
behalf of city  
 
“Clarifying” council 
positions 
 
Knowledge about 
community 
interests or 
activities  
 
Sense of job 
security for senior 
administrators  
  
Ability to amplify 
an organization or 
person’s activities; 
positive political 
recognition 
 
Access to 
financial, human 
or other city 
resources  
 
Giving or limiting 
opportunities for 
public to engage 
with council  
 
Access to 
information and 
knowledge  
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having unique access to information from officials at other levels of government. 
Community members also experience mayoral power in varied ways, with 
mayors having an ability to either amplify or discredit an organization or 
individual through their actions and comments, as well as having discretionary 
access to staff or financial resources desired by a community organization or 
initiative. Chapter 7 includes examples where mayors engaged in activities 
outside of local government altogether, such as when the mayor brought 
together community groups to align their funding requests to other levels of 
government, where some planned requests were not brought forward. 
Collectively, mayors can exercise power by using these resources to influence, 
mobilize, empower, and lead others.  
Mayors occupy a privileged and central position with the political, 
executive and community realms of local government – and are uniquely 
positioned within them. No other role within local government has as many 
power resources available or as great of a potential reach across these realms, 
providing an unparalleled opportunity to influence, empower, mobilize and lead 
others. Ultimately this is what makes a mayor in Canada more or less powerful: 
their ability to activate those around them to realize desired outcomes. This view 
is consistent with Svara’s work on “non-executive” mayors in the United States, 7 
arguing that mayors without “strong mayor” powers are uniquely positioned to be 																																																								
7 James H. Svara, Official Leadership in the City: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990); James H. Svara et al., Facilitative Leadership in Local 
Government: Lessons from Successful Mayors and Chairpersons in the Council-Manager Form 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994); James H. Svara, The Facilitative Leader in City Hall: 
Reexamining the Scope and Contributions (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2009). 
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the “guiding force”  in local government through their relations with other actors: 
[T]he mayor facilitates, that is, accomplishes objectives through 
enhancing the efforts of others. This distinction makes a great difference 
in the orientation of the mayor. Rather than seeking power as the way to 
accomplish tasks, the facilitative mayor seeks to empower others.8 
 
Dahl’s oft-cited study of community power in New Haven, Connecticut reaches a 
similar conclusion about the central position of the mayor:  
If it were possible to single out any one person as the leader of the “grand 
coalition of coalitions,” the mayor was unmistakably the man. Yet it would 
be grossly misleading to see the executive-centered order as a neat 
hierarchical system with the mayor at the top operating through 
subordinates in a chain of command. The mayor was not at the peak of a 
pyramid but rather at the centre of intersecting circles. He rarely 
commanded. He negotiated, cajoled, exhorted, beguiled, charmed, 
pressed, appealed, reasoned, promised, insisted, demanded, even 
threatened, but he most needed support and acquiescence from other 
leaders who simply could not be commanded. Because the mayor could 
not command, he had to bargain.9  
 
Even individuals who have served as mayors express a similar sentiment, 
describing their position as the “lynchpin” between actors: 
When I was first elected, my tactic was to spend hours with each member 
of council, trying to understand what they wanted to get done in their term, 
what the future city looked like to them, what they wanted on the agenda. 
And then I would sit with administration, and work on what exactly our 
agenda would look like. I would talk a lot to community groups too. Really, 
the mayor’s job – it’s all about bringing council together, and then working 
with administration and others. The mayor is the lynchpin. 
 
This idea of mayors as the “lynchpin”10 between actors, the “guiding force” 11 
																																																								
8 James H. Svara, Official Leadership in the City: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 87.  
9 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1974), 204.  
10 Confidential Interview #58.  
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within local government, and the “centre of intersecting circles”12 appreciates that 
the mayoralty does not exist in isolation. Mayors who understand that they are 
uniquely positioned to empower political, executive and community actors 
around them, and use the resources available to them to do so, ultimately will be 
more powerful in practice than those who do not.   
If mayoral power is the extent to which the mayor can influence, mobilize, 
empower, and lead other actors engaged in local government to achieve desired 
outcomes, what happens when a mayor is not powerful? What happens when a 
mayor cannot lead those around them, or is unable to exercise influence over 
council, administration or the community? In practice, mayors tend to be 
unevenly powerful across the political, executive and community aspects of their 
role. This can be for a variety of reasons: because their own personal interests, 
experience or skills cause them to gravitate to one or more parts of the role more 
than others; because there is a specific need for leadership within the council, 
community or organization at a point in time, and others become more 
deferential to the mayor; because of established norms and expectations about 
the role of the mayor at a point in time or in each city; and, sometimes, because 
the scope of expectations associated with the role of the mayor exceed the 
mayor’s personal capacity to lead. When a mayor becomes less powerful in one 
aspect of their role, it leaves a gap for others to fill. When a mayor is an 
																																																																																																																																																																				
11 James H. Svara, Official Leadership in the City: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 87.  
12 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1974), 204.  
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ineffective political leader, other members of council emerge as leaders and take 
on tasks generally expected of the mayor, such as coalition building or speaking 
on behalf of council. This can cause friction among members of council and 
dysfunction within council as a whole. When a mayor does not provide executive 
leadership, senior administrators become more powerful and autonomous from 
council. This can create tension between council and administration. When a 
mayor is an ineffective community leader, others in the community will emerge 
as leaders, often speaking out against the mayor to further their own particular 
interest. This can create distrust, chaos, anger, a loss of civic pride, and 
disappointment in the community, and may cost a mayor their political career. 
The leadership, or lack of leadership, from the mayor ultimately changes the 
engagement of other actors – and shifts the power dynamics within the 
respective realm of local government. In the words of one experienced city 
manager: 
I worked with two very different mayors, back to back. One mayor worked 
continuously with council to get a majority of votes on various issues. 
Because there are no parties, and no defined agenda, a mayor working 
on the side can be very effective at getting his agenda through. So you 
have that type of mayor – and then there’s our current mayor, who is a 
180-degree flip. He doesn’t have an agenda. He wants to promote 
collective discussion in the community, but it doesn’t work that way for this 
council. So there are different styles, and they can be effective in their 
own ways. Administratively, I’ll tell you it’s a whole lot easier to follow 
someone who says, ‘I’ll get you the votes, you do what you’re told.’ But 
now with this mayor, who has no clear agenda – well, we’re 
administration, and we’re basically building the agenda.13  
 																																																								
13 Confidential Interview #59. 
		
199 
A mayor’s leadership – or lack of leadership – shapes the engagement of 
political, executive and community actors, and ultimately, the power dynamics of 
local governance in their city. This is the central argument of this study. The 
mayoralty is not as simple as being “strong” or “weak,” based on a narrow 
definition of power. Mayoral power is a larger concept involving institutional and 
leadership variables, as explored in this study. It is expressed, and best 
examined, in the extent to which the people around the mayor are influenced, 
mobilized, empowered, and led by the mayor. Mayoral power in practice is 
precious – it can be fleeting. Just ask a mayor who was at one time highly 
powerful but lost the trust of others, finding what was once simple to be much 
more difficult. Mayors have the power to shape the environment of others and 
set the conditions of their engagement in local governance. This can be 
intentional or not, and in practice is expressed in both obvious and more 
subversive ways. Mayors, in being uniquely positioned at the nexus of the 
network of these actors, have unparalleled opportunity to mobilize and lead 
others, and to influence the dynamics of local governance in their cities. This is 
the power of a Canadian mayor.  
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PART III: APPLYING THE MODEL 
 
 
“If Steve Jobs was the mayor of Toronto, what would Toronto look like? Would 
we have more technology? Would we be the start up capital of North America? 
Would we have a more effective council?  
 
The real question here is, does it matter who the mayor is?” 
 
 
                              - Community Leader 
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Chapter 9 | TORONTO: A TALE OF THREE MAYORS 
 
 
 It was a busy morning at the headquarters of one of Canada’s largest 
daily newspapers. The reporter sat on a couch in the middle of the newsroom, 
leaning in to be heard over the steady hum of typing and conversation. The 
reporter had lived in Toronto for all of his life, and had spent almost his entire 
professional career covering the politics of Toronto City Hall. When asked to 
speak about the role of the mayor in Toronto, he leaned back and smiled. “I’m 
sure you know, the Toronto mayor – well, it’s a relatively weak office. The mayor 
doesn’t have any legislative power beyond other councillors, and all that. But, 
you know, what I’ve noticed is that the mayor can really set the tone.” 14 The 
reporter continued. “It’s the mayor who sets the agenda. The mayor appoints 
who sits on committees, and who chairs committees; what get on the agenda, 
and what gets attention on the agenda. They can build coalitions and get things 
done. But more importantly, it’s often the mayor who sets the terms for public 
debate – but, it’s a bit different with each mayor.”15  
 The reporter reflected on the mayors he had covered over the years, 
starting with Mayor Mel Lastman, the first mayor of the City of Toronto following 
the amalgamation of Metropolitan Toronto and its constituent municipalities in 
1998. “With Lastman, the budget process went like this: we need you on board, 
what do you need? These are your goodies, now vote for the rest. It was a more 																																																								
14 Confidential Interview #45.  
15 Ibid. 
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explicit kind of horse-trading. He would build coalitions by putting his strongest 
opponents and fiercest critics into important roles, and by doing that, he gained 
their support. When it came time to get things done, they got done.”16  
The reporter paused for a moment, and began speaking about David 
Miller, who followed Lastman as the Mayor of Toronto from 2003 to 2010. “Now 
Miller, he was more strategic, choosing who he wanted to be on his coalitions. It 
would be behind the scenes. When he brought something up, it would already be 
done. Leadership took place at an earlier stage, less of an issue-by-issue basis – 
but more in setting the tone. […] David Miller never lost a significant vote his 
entire time in office. The only vote I can remember that he lost, on a land transfer 
tax issue, they just voted to defer, and then later on when it came back in the 
summer, he won. He was very successful in leading public debate on terms he 
wanted. Building a ‘magnificent city.’ Being ‘a transit city.’ [Using] buzz words like 
that, and lining up his ducks behind him.”17  
The reporter smiled, thinking about the next mayor, the infamous Rob 
Ford who served as Mayor for one term from 2010 to 2014. “Ford, well, I don’t 
think council actually supported him, even at the beginning. No, they were afraid 
of him! They were afraid of the voters, or the mayor, shaming them. He also 
defined the parameters of the debate. This is not about a transit system, or 
moving a bike lane. Every debate with Rob Ford was about respect for the 
taxpayers. And then, of course, he lost them. […] The example of Rob Ford is so 
																																																								
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
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crystallizing, not just because he’s a celebrity, but because the extent to which 
he lost control of council was so profound. But even after he was gone, council 
basically appointed [Deputy Mayor Norm] Kelly as a caretaker, and I can’t think 
of anything significant that they did that was against Rob Ford’s wishes, really. 
It’s because there was no alternative agenda. It was just an anti-Ford agenda. 
Success was taking down the mayor, not implementing a different agenda. Sure, 
he lost significant votes, but I can’t think of a single initiative brought forward that 
actually passed without his support.”18  
The reporter then turned to speak of the current mayor, John Tory, 
elected as Mayor of Toronto in 2014. “Tory, from what I can tell, actually does try 
to meet people and shape his agenda on what he thinks there will be consensus 
on. In the Uber case, for example, he was meeting with the right and the left, and 
they wanted two very different bylaws. According to some people in his office, 
they had two separate bylaws written and ready to go, and just hours before the 
council meeting they decided which one should go forward. It’s a different form of 
leadership. The debate was taking place, it was being negotiated, people were 
filibustering to delay the vote so what they really wanted to could be written in. 
They went to lunch, and council’s left was told that their deal was off. It’s a 
crystal clear example of what I mean. The mayor has things he wants to 
accomplish, and he’s working with people to see how he can get things done, 
finding constituencies to support what he wants.”19 The reporter leaned back on 
																																																								
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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the couch, seeming satisfied with having given a thoughtful response to the 
question, before offering one final comment. “People will say the mayor only has 
one vote and all that. But, he has the bully pulpit. He can psychologically set the 
agenda and tone for the whole city. That’s what’s really important.”20  
 This chapter investigates the mayoralty in Toronto by examining three 
specific stories involving three different mayors. The purpose of this chapter is to 
apply the model advanced in Chapter 8 by exploring it through real events in a 
Canadian city involving the exercise of mayoral power. The chapter begins with a 
brief overview of the City of Toronto and the mayoralty in Toronto, for context. A 
descriptive overview of the Mayor of Toronto in three specific circumstances is 
then presented: Mayor David Miller in the quest for increased power and 
autonomy from the Government of Ontario for the City of Toronto; Mayor Rob 
Ford in his efforts to “stop the gravy train” at City Hall; and, Mayor John Tory in 
the pursuit of a SmartTrack commuter rail line. These examples were selected 
for several reasons: first, because they are all high profile examples of initiatives 
desired and championed by the Mayor; second, because they were examples 
mentioned by interviewees in the City of Toronto when describing mayoral power 
in practice; and, third, because each situation involved the mayor working with 
other political, executive and community actors, and thus provide an opportunity 
to examine the relationships between the mayor and those around them. This is 
not an exhaustive summary of the mayoralty or leadership of David Miller, Rob 
Ford and John Tory, as this would be beyond the scope of one chapter. Instead, 																																																								
20 Ibid. 
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this chapter explores mayoral power “in practice” through an examination of 
three situations involving three mayors. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of mayoral power in Toronto, examining how mayors can shape the engagement 
of other actors around them, and ultimately their city. 
 
The City of Toronto 
 On March 12, 1795, a boy named William was born in Springfield, 
Scotland, to be raised by his 45-year old twice-widowed single mother. As a 
young man, he trained as a tradesperson and later opened a general store. After 
a recession caused his store to go bankrupt, 25-year old William lacked stable 
employment and emigrated from Scotland to British North America. William took 
a job writing for a newspaper, and four years later, established his own. He 
became involved in the reform movement, speaking out against upper class 
domination of the government in Upper Canada. In January of 1829, William was 
elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada for York. On 
March 6, 1834, the township of York incorporated as a city, taking the name “The 
City of Toronto” in effort to differentiate itself from many other places with York in 
their name.21 The City of Toronto’s first elections were held three weeks later, 
and William was elected as an alderman. The new council met to select a mayor 
																																																								
21 The council of the township of York was petitioned regarding the name “Toronto” during the 
incorporation process, and the Incorporation Acts allowed for the new council to change the 
name if desired. During the debate, the Speaker is quoted as saying “this city will be the only 
Toronto in the world!” securing majority support for the name. 
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from amongst themselves, and on March 27, 1836, William Lyon Mackenzie 
became the first Mayor of Toronto.22  
 Sixty-four mayors later, the City of Toronto today has grown into Canada’s 
largest city. As home to 2.7 million people, and the hub for a region of nearly 6 
million, Toronto is arguably Canada’s sole “global city”23 and is widely recognized 
as one of the most multicultural, diverse and livable cities in the world.24 Nearly 
half of Toronto’s population is foreign-born, ranking it second in the world,25 with 
more than 100,000 immigrants arriving in the region on an annual basis.26 The 
city is Canada’s leading financial, industrial and cultural centre.  
 As Toronto has grown, its legal structure has also evolved. In 1954, the 
Government of Ontario created a new regional government. Metropolitan 
Toronto included twelve lower-tier municipalities, which were later amalgamated 
into six larger lower-tier municipalities in 1967. In 1998, the Harris Government, 
as a part of a larger municipal reform agenda,27 amalgamated Metropolitan 																																																								
22 For a comprehensive account of Mackenzie’s mayoralty, see: John Sewell, Mackenzie: A 
Political Biography (Toronto: Lorimer, 2002); Victor R. Russell, Mayors of Toronto: Volume I 
1834-1899 (Erin, Ontario: The Boston Mills Press, 1982).  
23 The term “global city” is often attributed to Saskia Sassen for her 1991 text, The Global City: 
New York, London, Tokyo, which defines the term as referring to cities which serve as the 
leading geographic nodes in the global economy. Other cities in Canada, namely Vancouver, 
Montreal and Calgary, are also sometimes considered to be “global cities.” 
24 Toronto has consistently ranked in the top among the most livable cities in the world by 
indexes such as The Economist’s Global City Liveability Report (available online: 
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=liveability17) and the Mercer Quality 
of Living Survey (available online: https://mobilityexchange.mercer.com/Insights/quality-of-living-
rankings) 
25 United Nations World Development Program. 
26 Statistics Canada, 2016 census.  
27 In 1995, Ontario elected a new Premier, Mike Harris, on a “common sense revolution” platform 
which included a promise of “less government.” From 1996 to 2001, the Harris government led 
sweeping reforms to municipalities in Ontario, implementing 160 restructurings that reduced the 
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Toronto and its six constituent municipalities into a single-tier City of Toronto.28 
Although the amalgamation into a “megacity” was met with considerable local 
opposition29 and criticism,30 it holds as the current legal structure today. The 
amalgamation contributed to a political cleavage between the residents of the 
core urban area (the former City of Toronto) and the suburban surrounding areas 
that unwillingly joined the City of Toronto, which remains a defining feature of 
Toronto politics. It is particularly pronounced through mayoral elections, as will 
be outlined later in this chapter. Today, the single-tier City of Toronto is governed 
by an elected council comprised of a mayor elected at-large and 44 councillors, 
has an annual operating budget exceeding $12 billion and more than 33,000 
employees,31 and is one of the largest governments in Canada.   
																																																																																																																																																																				
total number of municipalities in Ontario from 885 to 445 (and later, 444). The Toronto 
amalgamation was the first during Harris’ tenure. 
28 It is unclear to what extent the megacity decision was linked to this broader platform. Sancton 
(2000) argues that the Harris government “stumbled into the megacity solution” and that the CSR 
agenda was too vague to directly account for the resulting structural changes. However, prior to 
becoming Premier, Harris led a task force on “Bringing Common Sense to Metro Toronto,” taking 
particular interest in municipal reform in Ontario’s largest city. 
29 A non-binding referendum demonstrated that 76% of Toronto and area residents opposed the 
amalgamation.  
30 Although municipal reform was aimed to reduce the size and cost of municipal government, 
many have argued that the promised benefits never transpired. Hollick and Siegel (2001), among 
others, have since argued that the promised savings and efficiencies did not actually transpire as 
a result of amalgamation. Kushner and Siegel (2003) found that citizens in most jurisdictions 
perceived a decline in value for taxes following amalgamation.  A study by Slack and Bird (2013) 
finds that while amalgamations may have enabled some small municipalities to achieve new 
economies of scale, this was not possible in large cities such as Toronto. In the words of one 
media observer, “Harris’ government said amalgamation would save tons of money; critics said it 
would likely increase costs. The critics have been proven right. Most of the services that would 
provide economies of scale through bundling into a larger organization were already 
amalgamated [through] the Metro government. Meanwhile, what was lost under Harris’ 
amalgamation was regional identity, local control over issues like zoning and garbage pickups 
and parks, and political representation.” (Keenan, Some Great Idea, 60-61).  
31 City of Toronto budgets. Available online: www.toronto.ca/budget 
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 The Toronto mayoralty is a unique role, in several respects. Unlike the 
Prime Minister of Canada or Premier of Ontario, the Mayor of Toronto leads a 
nonpartisan government, does not have the equivalent of a party caucus or 
cabinet, and is subject to considerably higher requirements for openness and 
transparency. Depending on the individual in the role, the Mayor also tends to 
have a public profile and media demands that would rival those of a Premier or 
Prime Minister. The Mayor of Toronto is directly elected by more citizens than 
any other politician in Canada, and the process of becoming the mayor is a 
major undertaking – arguably, among the most challenging political campaigns to 
run in the country.32 Without party banners to differentiate themselves, Toronto 
mayoral candidates must campaign on a platform that captures the support of 
hundreds of thousands of people 33 against more opponents than in any other 
political race in the country.34 Through the election of a new mayor, Toronto 
expresses its preferences on major policy issues by selecting an individual who 
embodies what the majority of voters desire for the future of their city. The 
individual elected, in turn, has a powerful influence over the dynamics of 
governance of the city – in obvious, and less obvious, ways.  
																																																								
32 Mayoral campaigns in Toronto require significant financial resources. In the 2014 election, 
John Tory raised $2.8 million dollars, of a total $6.7 million raised by all 65 candidates. Doug 
Ford raised $1.9 million in the 2010 election, of a total of $7.1 million raised by all mayoral 
candidates. There are no other campaigns of this scale in Canada without the support and 
structure of organized political parties.  
33 In the 2014 municipal election, John Tory won with 394,775 votes (40%). In 2010, Rob Ford 
received 383,501 votes (47%). No other directly political role in Canada requires securing this 
volume of votes.   
34 Over the past four elections, no fewer than 38 candidates have run for mayor in Toronto 
(specifically: 44 candidates in the 2003 election, 38 in 2006, 40 in 2010, and 65 in 2014). 
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Mayor David Miller (2003 – 2010)  
 David Miller was born in California. When his father passed away two 
years after his birth, he and his mother moved to England where he received a 
scholarship to attend a prestigious private school. Miller went on to graduate with 
degrees from Harvard and the University of Toronto, and began a career in law 
at a large Bay Street firm. As an articling student, Miller represented residents of 
Toronto Island in an arbitration, which he later described as his introduction to 
local government. Miller’s first campaigns for office, both locally and provincially, 
were unsuccessful. In 1994, Miller was elected to Metro Toronto Council, and he 
was a vocal critic of municipal restructuring under Premier Mike Harris. After 
serving two terms on council in post-amalgamation Toronto, Miller ran for mayor 
in the 2003 election. On December 1, 2003, David Miller became the 63th Mayor 
of Toronto.  
 The 2003 mayoral race was notable for a number of reasons. First, the 
election signaled a shift in the fault lines of Toronto politics, countering the 
dominant contention at the time that the suburbs of the amalgamated city had 
the balance of votes to select the mayor and council.35 After a series of 
controversies, 36 Mayor Mel Lastman announced he would not be seeking re-																																																								
35 Bill Freeman, “Toronto,” in Dimitrios Rousopoulos, The Rise of Cities (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2017), 118.  
36 Mayor Mel Lastman was the subject of numerous controversies during his time in office, which 
are well chronicled in media reports: threatening to kill a reporter after a story about the Mayor’s 
wife being caught shoplifting at Eaton’s store in Toronto was aired (Timothy Appleby, "The mayor 
goes ballistic: Death threat against report has Lastman in hot water", Globe and Mail, p. A1, A3, 
13 May 1999); making racist comments following a trip to Kenya in support of Toronto’s bid to 
host the Olympics (James Rusk, "Lastman apologizes for cannibal joke on eve of Kenya trip", 
Globe and Mail, p. A1, 21 June 2000); and a lawsuit from two adult children, conceived during an 
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election. With no incumbent contender, a record 44 mayoral candidates entered 
the race, including several high-profile individuals: Barbara Hall, the former 
Mayor of the pre-amalgamation City of Toronto, who was defeated by Lastman 
for Mayor following amalgamation; John Nunziata, a former Member of 
Parliament; John Tory, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Rogers 
Cable and former conservative strategist at the national and provincial level; and 
Tom Jakobek, a former City Councillor who resigned in disgrace in 2000. When 
David Miller entered the race, he had only 8% support, and as a left-wing 
progressive candidate who primarily appealed to downtown voters, he was 
widely considered to have little chance of winning.37 Miller used a trademark 
broom throughout his campaign, promising to literally and figuratively “clean up 
the city.”38 As the campaign progressed, support consolidated around two 
candidates: Miller, and the prominent conservative candidate, Tory.39 Miller 
ultimately won with 43% of the vote over Tory’s 38%, with no other candidate 
receiving more than 10%. The election of a downtown, progressive mayoral 
candidate was cited by observers as “a revolution”40 and “fresh oxygen into the 
political life of Toronto.”41 
																																																																																																																																																																				
extramarital affair with a former employee, for unpaid child support (Lisa Priest, "Lastman 
'mortified': Facing lawsuit, mayor reveals affair but doesn't admit paternity", Globe and Mail, p. 
A1, A19, 1 December 2000).  
37 Edward Keenan, Some Great Idea, 72.  
38 For helpful overview of Miller’s first campaign and term, see: Bill Freeman, “Toronto,” in 
Dimitrios Rousopoulos, The Rise of Cities (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2017). 
39 Ibid, 117-118. 
40 Edward Keenan, Some Great Idea, 72. 
41 Freeman, “Toronto,” 118. 
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 The second notable aspect of the 2003 mayoral election was that it 
coincided with a change in Ontario’s Premier and Canada’s Prime Minister. 
Dalton McGuinty defeated Mike Harris in the Ontario general election on October 
2, 2003. David Miller was elected as Toronto’s mayor on November 10, 2003. 
Paul Martin succeeded Jean Chretien as leader of the reigning Liberal Party of 
Canada on November 13, 2003.42 The near simultaneous emergence of new 
leaders at all levels presented a unique opportunity to re-establish 
intergovernmental relationships for the City of Toronto – an opportunity not lost 
on Miller. A campaign to increase revenues and empower cities was already well 
underway in Canada, 43 with decades of discussion about the appropriate level of 
authority and autonomy for the City of Toronto.44 Miller quickly prioritized the 
																																																								
42 The swearing in of the new leaders also fell within weeks of one another. Dalton McGuinty was 
sworn in as Premier of Ontario on October 23, 2003. David Miller was sworn in as Mayor of 
Toronto on December 1, 2003. Paul Martin was sworn in as Prime Minister on December 12, 
2003. 
43 In May 2000, Jane Jacobs met with the mayors of five of Canada’s largest cities (Toronto, 
Montreal, Calgary, Vancouver and Winnipeg) at what later became known as the “C5 Summit”. 
The Summit, convened by urban advocate and business leader Alan Broadbent, followed a 
nearly two-year exploration about the powers of cities in Canada. Jacobs positioned the meeting 
as emerging from concern about each city’s economy being “at risk” due to “outdated, paternal 
relationships” with senior levels of government. The C5 continued to meet and host delegations 
with federal officials until the New Deal for Cities was announced in the 2004 federal budget. For 
an excellent overview of the C5 Summit, see: “Report of the C5: Historic meeting of mayors of 
Canada’s hub cities with Jane Jacobs,” Ideas That Matter (September 2001). For a broader 
argument about empowering Canada’s cities by C5 facilitator, Alan Broadbent, see: Alan 
Broadbent, Urban Nation: Why we need to give power back to the cities to make Canada strong 
(Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2008).  
44 Some sources cite the origin of this conversation as dating back to the founding of Toronto. 
The first chapter of Broadbent’s Urban Nation (2008) includes reference to the uprising led by 
Toronto’s first mayor, William Mackenzie, against the Family Compact in 1837, and events 
leading up to the anti-amalgamation Citizens for Local Democracy (C4LD) movement in the 
1990s, including a 1993 rally about whether Toronto should seek to declare its independence 
from Canada, tapping into the larger narrative about Quebec’s separation. For an excellent 
collection of essays on Toronto’s quest for greater financial and political empowerment, see: 
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renegotiation of Toronto’s relationships with other governments as “a centerpiece 
of his governing platform.”45Just three days into Mayor Miller’s term, a senior 
member of his advisory team published an editorial titled “New deal for cities 
critical” in The Globe and Mail,46 praising Paul Martin for his “farsighted and 
enlightened” work as Finance Minister and artfully questioning whether similar 
leadership would be extended through financial support of Canada’s cities: 
Cities are also, disastrously, at the wrong end of a constitutional anomaly, 
having little political power or ability to raise the taxes they need to pay for 
the services they must provide. […] As our cities go, so goes Canada. 
Federal government goals to ensure a national effort at improving our 
quality of life, of rendering our cities affordable, healthy and competitive, 
would then have a real chance of being met. It is time not only to fund our 
cities adequately, but also to see to it that the funds are effectively 
invested, propelling Canada once again to the forefront of urban 
excellence.47 
 
The call for greater revenues for Toronto and other cities was well timed. Just 
three months later, the new Prime Minister Paul Martin announced a “new deal” 
for Canada’s cities, including a $7 billion tax rebate in the 2004 federal budget.48  
 The negotiation of Toronto’s provincial relationship was more complex, 
and given the arrangements of Canadian federalism, perhaps more significant. 
																																																																																																																																																																				
Jane Jacobs and Mary Rowe, eds., Toronto: Considering Self-Government (Toronto: Ginger 
Press, 2000).  
45 Martin Horak, “Success and Failure in Multilevel Governance in Toronto,” in Martin Horak and 
Robert Young, eds., Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and Policy Making in Canada’s 
Big Cities (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2012), 233.  
46 Jack Diamond, “New deal for cities critical,” The Globe and Mail  (December 3, 2003). 
Available online: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/new-deal-for-cities-
critical/article774172/.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Government of Ontario. Budget 2004: A New Deal for Communities. Available online: 
https://www.fin.gc.ca/budget04/PDF/pacome.pdf 
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At the time of David Miller’s election as Mayor, all municipalities in Ontario, 
including Toronto, were governed by a single Municipal Act, 2001; and, 
importantly, consulted with the provincial government through a signed 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Association of Municipalities 
of Ontario (AMO) and the Government of Ontario. The new Mayor’s 
discontentment with this arrangement became clear. 49 In the words of the 
Mayor, “as the sixth largest government in Canada, we need a new deal that can 
only be negotiated government to government.”50 Within the first year of his term, 
Mayor Miller and the new Premier Dalton McGuinty launched a joint task force to 
“develop recommendations to provide Toronto with comprehensive, enabling 
new powers,”51 and the City of Toronto announced its intention to leave AMO.52  
 The joint Ontario-City of Toronto Task Force was co-chaired by the 
Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, and the City 
Manager of the City of Toronto, supported by staff working groups from both 
governments.53 Work began in the fall of 2004, with consultation and a progress 																																																								
49 In a January 2004 article on the New Deal, journalist Nick Swift describes Miller’s 
dissatisfaction: “Mr. Miller has also expressed disagreement with the idea that Toronto, by far the 
largest city in Canada, should be expected to interact with the government solely through the 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario.”  
50 Jennifer Lewington, “Convention leaving city, AMO says,” The Globe And Mail (January 29, 
2005).  
51 According to the Terms of Reference, these powers were intended to: “[be] commensurate with 
the city’s size, needs, responsibilities and capacity; recognize Toronto’s importance as the 
economic engine of Ontario and Canada; and, recognize that Toronto is a mature order of 
government capable of exercising its powers in a responsible and accountable fashion.” 
52 In a statement issued by AMO in 2005, Miller is cited as saying that “AMO could no longer 
represent Toronto’s interests as well as Toronto could represent themselves.”  
53 Joint Ontario-City of Toronto Task Force to Review the City of Toronto Act, 1997 and other 
Private (Special) Legislation, Staff Progress Report, May 2005. Available online: 
http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/10000/252927.pdf 
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report issued in the spring of 2005. By the fall of 2005, legislation was drafted 
and introduced at Queens Park. In June 2006, the Stronger City of Toronto for a 
Stronger Ontario Act, 2005 received Royal Assent,54 and the new City of Toronto 
Act, 2006 came into force on January 1, 2007. The new Act expanded the City’s 
taxation and legislative powers,55 and introduced new governance requirements 
for the mayor and council, such as establishing an executive committee.56 City 
council publicly celebrated their victory57 in the Act,58 with Mayor Miller calling it 
the beginning of a “new era”59 for Toronto. “This legislation is the most important 
and significant change for the City of Toronto in the past century. It recognizes 
Toronto as a mature government and provides it with much-needed tools to meet 																																																								
54 The bill received support from the Ontario Liberals and New Democratic parties in a 58-20 
vote, with opposition from the Ontario Progressive Conservatives. In the words of leader John 
Tory, “This is a bill that is focused on new powers to tax and new ways to get money from 
taxpayers […] I hope the city doesn’t use those powers to tax going forward, because taxpayers 
are paying enough.” 
55 Under the authority of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, Toronto City Council implemented two 
new direct taxes in October 2007: a land transfer tax, generating more than $300 million per year 
in revenue and still in effect today; and, a vehicle ownership tax, which generated more than $60 
million per year before it was discontinued following the election of Mayor Rob Ford in 2010. 
56 Interpretations of the motivation behind these new requirements vary. Keenan (2013) argues 
that the governance changes were aimed to strengthen the power of the mayor by giving the 
mayor the ability to establish a group similar to a cabinet as a base of support. Others (Broadbent 
2008) suggest the underlying motivation was to encourage the city to get its “house in order,” 
stemming from a general disregard for local politicians within provincial and federal governments, 
who may view municipal politics as “messy” and municipal politicians as “bumpkins – 
unsophisticated and undisciplined hacks.” (163)  
57 The extent to which the City of Toronto Act (COTA) can be considered a “victory” is up for 
debate. In an article titled “The False Panacea of City Charters?” Sancton (2016) argues that, in 
practice, the COTA leaves the City of Toronto more at the mercy of the provincial government 
than other Ontario municipalities.  
58 A media story cites Council Chambers as “erupting” with applause at the time, and one 
councillor even being “chided” for being too enthusiastic in her applause (Rachel Mendleson, 
“The law said we could think big. So why didn’t we?” The Toronto Star, March 2, 2014).  
59 “Ontario Capital City Begins new Era,” Government of Ontario, Media Release, January 1, 
2007. Available online: https://news.ontario.ca/archive/en/2007/01/01/City-of-Toronto-Act-2006-
proclaimed.html 
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its responsibilities to its residents.”60In the words of one media observer: 
“[A]lthough I say Miller did these things, perhaps it’s more accurate to say that 
council did them under his leadership. For all of Miller’s time as mayor, the two 
concepts seemed synonymous. He never lost a single major vote at city council 
in his entire two terms as mayor, an accomplishment that in retrospect seems 
like a masterwork of negotiation and persuasion.”61 
 
 
Mayor Rob Ford (2010 – 2014)  
 Rob Ford62 was born in Etobicoke, Ontario, as the youngest of four 
children. His father, Doug Ford Sr., co-founded a successful business making 
plastic labels for grocery products, which grew to generate more than $100 
million in annual sales. As a child, Rob had a close relationship with his siblings, 
and aspired to be a professional football player. After graduating from high 
school in Etobicoke, Rob attended Carleton University to study political science, 
but dropped out after one year. Rob began working alongside his siblings at the 
family business. In the 1995 provincial election, Doug Ford Sr. was elected 
alongside leader Mike Harris on a “common sense revolution” platform to serve 
as a Member of Provincial Parliament, the first political step by a member of the 
Ford family and the dawn of a movement which later became known as “Ford 																																																								
60 Ibid.  
61 Edward Keenan, Some Great Idea, 77. 
62 Summary of Rob Ford’s life based on biographical content in: Robyn Doolittle, Crazy Town: 
The Rob Ford Story (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2014); John Filion, The Only Average Guy: Inside 
the Uncommon World of Rob Ford (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2015); and, Rob Ford and 
Doug Ford, Ford Nation: Two Brothers, One Vision, The Story of the People’s Mayor (Toronto: 
HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2016).  
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Nation.” 63 Rob followed suit by running in the 2000 municipal election, and was 
elected as the Toronto City Councillor for Etobicoke North (Ward 2), later 
succeeded by his brother Doug Jr. in the same ward. The Fords became an 
important and influential part of the Toronto political landscape.64 Rob Ford 
served three terms on City Council. In September 2009, Mayor David Miller 
announced that he would not be seeking re-election, opening the field for new 
mayoral candidates to enter the race. Rob Ford, along with 39 other candidates 
including prominent politicians George Smitherman and Joe Pantalone, ran for 
mayor in the 2010 Toronto election. Ford campaigned on a fiscal conservative 
platform to “stop the gravy train” at City Hall, seeking to reduce the size and cost 
of government.65 The election drew the highest turnout (51%) in Toronto’s post-
amalgamation history, and Rob Ford won handily with 47% of the vote. 66 
Perhaps the most striking part of Ford election, however, was the pronounced 																																																								
63 Doolittle (2014) cites the plans for a political family dynasty date back to Rob Ford’s childhood. 
“According to those who knew him well, Rob Ford always knew he would run for mayor once he 
got elected to city council. But he dreamed even bigger. One day, he wanted to become leader of 
the federal Conservative party, and ultimately prime minister. Brother Doug Jr. planned to run 
provincially and eventually be elected as premier.” (47-47). A family friend of the Fords’ is cited 
as saying, “The Fords think of themselves as the Kennedys. They talk about it. They’re the 
Canadian Kennedy’s.” (48) 
64 Doolittle shares a story from John Tory from during his run for mayor in the 2003 election. 
“Tory was a conservative. And to win an election in Toronto as a right-winger, you needed the 
suburbs. His advisors explained that the Fords were the gatekeepers to Etobicoke. ‘It was ‘Fords’ 
plural,’ Tory remembers. […] ‘We like you. You’ll get elected, because we’re going to help you in 
Etobicoke,’ Tory remembered [Rob’s mother] Diane saying. ‘You’ll serve for a period of time, and 
then it will be Robbie’s turn’.” (47) 
65 Rob Ford’s campaign mantra of  “Respect for Taxpayers” included a four-part platform to: (1) 
reduce the size of Council; (2) reduce the size of government; (3) reduce the cost of government; 
and (4) “save our city” defined as “identify opportunities to save money and improve the value 
taxpayers receive for their money.” The language of “stopping the gravy train” appears frequently 
in Ford’s campaign materials and speeches, both during the election and while in office.    
66 City of Toronto, 2010 Municipal Election Results, Available online: 
www.toronto.ca/elections/results/results_2010.htm (accessed March 23, 2013).  
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geographic concentration of his support. The suburban wards formerly outside 
the City of Toronto voted for Ford, and the urban core of the city – the former 
City of Toronto – did not.67 Many viewed Ford’s election as a response to 
escalating costs under Mayor Miller, largely due to expansions in Toronto’s 
transit system and urban infrastructure.68 On election night, Ford interpreted his 
victory as “a clear call from taxpayers: enough is enough.”69  
Within weeks of the election, the City Manager and Chief Financial Officer 
of the City of Toronto presented a budget report to the new Mayor and Council 
which identified that “achieving a balanced budget in 2012 will be challenging 
[…] an ambitious program to find offsetting cost savings will be required 
immediately following the passage of the 2011 budget.”70 This recommendation, 
which closely mirrored Ford’s campaign platform, was met with support from the 
Mayor: 
Since amalgamation, Toronto has added new services, programs and 
activities that added significantly to our cost base. Our expenses grow at a 
rate much faster than our revenues. […] The gap keeps getting bigger and 
bigger because we have not addressed the root cause. To address this 
																																																								
67 Ford’s election reflected the growing post-amalgamation cleavage between the suburban and 
urban neighbourhoods of Toronto. Keenan (2013) writes, “To the so-called ‘downtown elites’ who 
opposed Ford, his campaign slogans didn’t event cohere into a rational argument. As anyone 
who followed city hall at all could tell you, the billions of dollars in waste he claimed he could cut 
simply did not exist. And the combination of massive tax cuts and slashed government spending 
appeared nonsensical when considered in combination with his insistence that no city services 
would be cut. […] When you add all of that up, the election of Rob Ford to the mayor’s office 
looked to a lot of his opponents like a kamikaze vote from people who hated the city.” (107). 
68 When Ford took office in 2011, City Council passed a $9.4 billion operating budget, 
representing 150% growth over the past decade from $6.1 billion in 2001.  
69 Rob Ford, speech on election night (October 25, 2010) at Toronto Congress Centre.  
70 City of Toronto, “2011 Budget Process” Report to Executive Committee from the City Manager, 
Deputy City Manager and Chief Financial Officer, December 6, 2010.  
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gap, we must find permanent reductions in our cost base: either by 
changing what we do, or by doing it more efficiently.71 
 
In March 2011, just weeks after the passage of the 2011 budget by the new 
Mayor and Council, City Manager Joe Pennachetti recommended an ambitious 
process to review every single one of the City’s over 150 services within six 
months – cited as the most aggressive review of any government in Canadian 
history.72 Pennachetti identified that the City was facing a $774 million budget 
gap heading into the 2012 budget, and that an extensive service review would 
identify opportunities to address this gap.73 The recommendation was approved 
unanimously by the Executive Committee, and supported by Council in April 
2011.74  
Toronto’s service review program included three components: first, a core 
service review, to determine which services the City should be providing; 
second, service efficiency studies, to examine service levels, and, third, a user 
fee review, to examine all of the City’s 3,700 user fees.75 The program timeline 
identified that the core service review recommendations would be taken to 
Council three months later, in July 2011; and, that the full process would be 
complete by November 2011 when the 2012 budget process was to be 
launched.76 In an internal email to all City of Toronto staff, Pennachetti wrote:  
																																																								
71 Mayor Rob Ford comments to the Toronto Executive Committee, March 21, 2011. 
72 Marcus Gee, “Turns out it’s not all gravy,” The Globe and Mail (July 11, 2011).  
73 City of Toronto, Executive Committee Minutes from March 21, 2011.  
74 City of Toronto, City Council Minutes from April 12, 2011.  
75 City of Toronto, “Core Service Review Program,” July 11, 2011.  
76 City of Toronto, “Service Review Program 2011 Timeline.”  
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I understand that this will be a very different and challenging year for the 
Toronto Public Service. There is a great deal of work that must be 
completed in a relatively short time. My goal is to reach perfection in our 
service delivery methods and I believe that these service efficiency 
reviews will move us closer to that target.77 
 
Pennachetti opted to personally manage the review, supported by a team of 
external consultants.78 An accompanying public consultation process, facilitated 
by City of Toronto staff, occurred alongside the review, drawing nearly 13,000 
Toronto residents to participate.79 Not surprisingly, participation heavily weighted 
from residents in the downtown area80 with more than half of participants 
indicating they would like to an expansion, not reduction, in service.81 In July 
2011, Pennachetti delivered the consultants’ final report to the Mayor and 
Council, identifying that 90% of the City’s services were considered core or 
essential, and 85% were delivered at or below standard when compared to other 																																																								
77 Email from Joe Pennachetti to all City of Toronto employees, dated March 21, 2011.  
78 Toronto City Council authorized a $3 million consulting budget to support the first part of the 
process, the core service review. The City hired KPMG, a private consulting firm, to undertake 
this work. KPMG’s scope included reviewing the 105 services directly provided by the City and 
the 50 services provided by the City’s agencies, boards and commissions; and, to research and 
analyze several comparable municipalities and jurisdiction. KMPG was asked to evaluate each 
service based on whether it was mandatory (required by legislation), essential (critical to the 
operation of the City), traditional (provided by virtually all municipalities for many years), or other 
(a service provided by the City to respond to particular community needs or specialized purpose). 
KMPG was also asked to evaluate the level of service against that in comparable other 
municipalities (classified as either below standard, at standard, or above standard), and examine 
the City’s role in providing the service (classified as regulator, funder, manager-contract, 
manager-partnership, designed service manager, or delivery by city staff).78 
79 City of Toronto, “Core Service Review Public Consultation Report,” July 2011.   
80 For a map of participation by postal code, see: City of Toronto, “Core Service Review Public 
Consultation Report,” July 2011.   
81 Participants rated transit, fire, water, health and garbage as the highest priority services; and 
placed theatres, the zoo, provincial offences court management, and Exhibition Place as the 
lowest priorities. When asked how much more property tax they would be comfortable paying to 
support services, the responses were divided, with an response of 5.15%. Most participants felt 
that the City of Toronto should provide services that are better than most other cities (35%) or 
than all cities (24%). 
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Ontario municipalities.82 The report identified over 200 “opportunities” for cost 
reductions.83  
 The release of the report sparked outcry from Toronto residents and 
interest groups in opposition to the “opportunities” presented, including 
numerous protests at City Hall and community-led campaigns.84 Keenan (2013) 
describes the community response this way:  
The Core Service Review made the conversation about everything at 
once […] the heritage preservation folks and the AIDS supporters, the 
library users and the dental health advocates, the labour unionists and the 
people who own small businesses, all kinds of people who are not 
typically on the same side of things suddenly found themselves rowing in 
a single boat against the cost-cutting tide.85 
 
On July 28, 2011, the Executive Committee held a special meeting to hear 
directly from the public. Three hundred and forty-four citizens requested 
delegation status.86 It turned out to be the longest continuous committee meeting 
in the City of Toronto’s history,87 lasting 22.5 hours when it was adjourned at 
7:55am on July 29.88 Citizens spilled into the hallway and overflow rooms waiting 
for their three minutes to speak. Some Council members spoke positively about 
the level of engagement demonstrated, one quoted as saying, “in two decades of 
activism […] I have never seen public participation like this. […] People are 
																																																								
82 KPMG, “City of Toronto Core Service Review: Final Report to the City Manager,” July 7, 2011.  
83 Ibid.  
84 Friends of the Toronto Public Library, for example, launched a campaign to mobilize opposition 
to reducing library hours, a campaign that was prominently supported by famed Canadian author 
Margaret Atwood.  
85 Keenan, Some Great Idea, 128.  
86 Ibid, 128. 
87 Ibid, 126. 
88 City of Toronto, Executive Committee Minutes from July 28, 2011.  
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talking to each other about the kind of city they want. It’s amazing.89 The Mayor, 
however, had less positive remarks, as quoted in The Globe and Mail following 
the meeting. “[A]ll the people who were getting grants saying don’t take my free 
money, my grant money. All the special interest groups. Again, let’s call it for 
what they are, they are the left-wing NDP people who always got this money 
handed to them year after year after year.”90 
In September 2011, Pennachetti reported back to the Executive 
Committee with numerous recommendations: reduce library hours, reconsider 
service improvements to the subway system, reduce the number of funded 
childcare spaces, discontinue windrow and sidewalk snow clearing, divest the 
Toronto Zoo and Heritage Toronto, and many more.91 Pennachetti opened the 
meeting by saying “[w]e heard clearly from Toronto residents that they cherish 
our services. However, at the same time, as all are aware, we have a massive 
projected deficit that must be addressed. My objective in the recommendations 
to Council is to balance both these opposing realities.”92 Over the next several 
months, Council debated and made decisions on Pennachetti’s 
recommendations. Ultimately, only 19% of his recommendations were directed 
by Council to come forward as business cases for consideration in the 2012 
																																																								
89 Keenan, Some Great Idea, 131. 
90 Patrick White, “Toronto mayor to city staff: take a buyout or face layoffs,” The Globe and Mail, 
August 12, 2011.  
91 City of Toronto, “Final Report to the Executive Committee: Service Review Program and 2012 
Budget,” September 19, 2011.  
92 City Manager Joe Pennachetti, speaking to the Executive Committee, September 19, 2011.  
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budget.93 Some recommendations, such as divesting the Toronto Zoo, were 
approved by Council during the service review, only for the decisions to be 
reversed during the budget process.94 The majority of the recommendations and 
“opportunities” were referred back to administration for further feasibility studies 
or to be subject to a further efficiency study.95 In the end, the core service review 
saved about $20 million during the budget process96 – considerably short of the 
initially stated $774 million gap. In July 2011, The Globe and Mail concluded 
“turns out, it’s not all gravy.”97 By early 2012, Mayor Ford was facing a conflict of 
interest lawsuit and the beginning of what would become a challenging 
remainder of his term.98 Ford opted to run again for mayor in the 2014 election, 
but withdrew part way through the race due to a battle with cancer, which later 
ended his life in March 2016. In the words of his brother, Doug, “Rob may be 
gone, but Ford Nation remains. […] Ford Nation is about standing up to the 
political elite; the same old, same old; wasted money; and unacceptable and 
																																																								
93 City of Toronto, “Status of Council Decisions on the Core Service Review,” January 6, 2012.  
94 Interview with an executive from the City of Toronto. 
95 City of Toronto, “Status of Council Decisions on the Core Service Review,” January 6, 2012. 
96 City Manager Joe Pennachetti, Presentation to the Institute on Municipal Finance and 
Governance, May 17, 2012. 
97 Marcus Gee’s July 2011 article states, “If there is anybody left in Toronto who still thinks the 
city can solve its money troubles simply by stopping the gravy train, the results of the city's core 
service review should disabuse them. The review of city public works programs by KPMG 
consultants gave Toronto its first good look at what it will take to get city finances in line and it 
has nothing to do with cutting back on hired chipmunk suits, overpriced plant waterers or any of 
the other fluff that Rob Ford went on about during last year's election campaign. […] What we are 
facing instead is the prospect of cuts on things as practical as grass cutting, snow shovelling and 
recyclables collection. Even fluoridation of the water supply is being flagged as potentially 
dispensable. […] The easy and obvious cuts that Mr. Ford talked about are simply not to be had. 
The report presents city council with a menu of tough choices.”  
98 See introduction section in Chapter 1. 
		
223 
unreachable leadership. Rob knew what this is all about; the question for the rest 
of us is what comes next.”99 
 
Mayor John Tory (2014 – Present)  
 John Tory was born in Toronto in 1954, as the oldest of four children born 
into a lineage of successful Canadian businessmen. Tory’s great-grandfather 
founded Sun Life Canada, his grandfather founded the successful law firm Torys 
LLP, and his father was president of Thompson Investments and a director at 
Rogers Communications. As a child, John became politically active by joining the 
Young Conservatives at the age of 13, and later worked for Premier Bill Davis 
and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.100 Professionally, Tory was trained as a 
lawyer and later served as the President and CEO of Rogers Media. He ran as a 
mayoral candidate in 2003 and was defeated by David Miller. From 2004 to 
2009, he served as leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, and 
the MPP for Dufferin-Peel-Wellington-Grey from 2005 to 2007. In 2009, Tory 
resigned his post and took on a variety of community leadership roles, including 
as Chair of CivicAction Toronto during Rob Ford’s tenure as Mayor from 2010-
2014. In February 2014, Tory registered as a mayoral candidate in the 2014 
election, initially challenged by incumbent Mayor Rob Ford and later his brother, 
Doug Ford, after Rob’s withdrawal from the race; and, Olivia Chow, a well known 
																																																								
99 Rob Ford and Doug Ford, Ford Nation: Two Brothers, One Vision, The Story of the People’s 
Mayor (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2016), 271. 
100 Linda Diebel, “Mayoral candidate John Tory a leader from childhood,” The Toronto Star 
(October 25, 2014).  
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former City Councillor, Member of Parliament, and wife of the late New 
Democratic Party of Canada leader Jack Layton. Tory won the election with 40% 
of the vote,101 and on December 1, 2014, was sworn in as the 65th Mayor of 
Toronto.  
 The central plank of Tory’s mayoral platform was a proposal for a “city-
wide transit relief” plan called SmartTrack, a “London-style surface rail subway 
system that moves the most people in the shortest time, across the entire 
city.”102 The $8 billion plan103 promised a 53-kilometer line104 with 22 stations, 
aimed to reduce commute time for suburban passengers, with service beginning 
in 2021.105 The plan committed that no existing roadways would be displaced, 
and the fares would remain the same as the current rate of the Toronto Transit 
Commission.106 An interactive “Smart Tracker” website was also launched during 
the campaign, where users could click on an origin and destination on a map, 
and the website would calculate timesavings that SmartTrack would provide to 
the user.107  
																																																								
101 Election Results, City of Toronto. Available online: https://www.toronto.ca/city-
government/elections/general-information/election-results/ 
102 See John Tory’s Smart Tracker website: smarttracker.ca.  
103 Tory’s plan proposed that the City of Toronto’s one-third share of the costs would be paid 
through tax increment financing (“One Toronto: Financing the Smart Track,” John Tory campaign 
brochure. Available online: http://www.johntory.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/OneToronto_Backgrounder_Four_Finance.pdf) 
104 According to Tory’s campaign materials, 90% of the proposed line would be on existing GO 
trackage. 
105 “The One Toronto Transit Plan: The SmartTrack Line.” John Tory campaign brochure. 
Available online: http://www.johntory.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/OneToronto_Backgrounder_Three_Smart_Track_Line.pdf 
106 Ibid.  
107 John Tory’s Smart Tracker website: smarttracker.ca. 
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 Mayor Tory was sworn in as Mayor on December 1, 2014. On December 
4, 2014, the Mayor issued a letter to Council, stating: 
The SmartTrack plan is a cornerstone of my election platform. Moving 
forward on SmartTrack requires an informed public debate and City 
Council’s direction to proceed with this vital transit expansion initiative. 
[…] During my first meeting with Premier Wynne we agreed that the City 
of Toronto must work closely with the Province when considering and 
implementing SmartTrack which we both see as complementary to the 
Province’s vision for transit in our region. […] With the support of City 
Council, I will be formally asking the City Manager to work with my office 
to coordinate a review of the SmartTrack plan in close collaboration with 
the Toronto Transit Commission and the Provincial Government and its 
agencies.108 
 
A proposed motion was attached to the letter. On December 5, 2014, the 
Mayor’s motion to direct the City Manager, Toronto Transit Commission, and 
relevant provincial agencies to bring forward a report within two months with an 
“accelerated work plan for a review of the SmartTrack”109was endorsed by the 
Executive Committee. On December 11, 2014, at their first meeting, the new City 
Council voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Mayor’s resolution, with now Ward 
2 Councillor Rob Ford as the sole dissenting vote on all parts of the resolution.110 
 In January 2015, the City Manager reported back to the Executive 
Committee, reporting that the City had established a joint committee with the 
Ministry of Transportation, Metrolinx, and the Toronto Transit Commission “to 
																																																								
108 Letter from Mayor John Tory, December 4, 2014. Available online: 
https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-73931.pdf 
109 City of Toronto Executive Committee minutes from December 5, 2014.  
110 City of Toronto Council Minutes, December 11, 2014.  
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integrated the SmartTrack plan with RER [Regional Express Rail].”111 Expansion 
of RER service was already underway, stemming back to “The Big Move,” a 
2008 regional transportation plan developed by an agency of the Ontario 
government.112 The report recommended a work plan for 2015 and 2016, and 
identified elements of the SmartTrack plan such as service frequency, 
electrification, integration with other services, and additional stations.113 
Councillor Rob Ford moved for the report to be received for information with no 
further action, losing 41-2. Council ultimately approved the work plan and 
recommendations 42-2.114 During the summer of 2016, an initial business case 
was presented and conditionally approved by City Council, including a modified 
concept for SmartTrack and a reduced number of new stations (from 22, to 6).115 
An updated report was received in November 2017, recommendation more 
detailed parts of the plan regarding station design and network connections, 
reflecting continued development of the SmartTrack plan.116 The City of Toronto 
now has a website which provides the public with updates on the plan.117 
																																																								
111 “SmartTrack Work Plan (2015-2016),” Report to the Executive Committee, January 16, 2016. 
Available online: https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-74826.pdf 
112 “The Big Move: Transforming Transportation in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area,” 
Metrolinx, November 2008. Available online: 
http://www.metrolinx.com/thebigmove/Docs/big_move/TheBigMove_020109.pdf 
113 “SmartTrack Work Plan (2015-2016),” Report to the Executive Committee, January 16, 2016. 
114 City of Toronto Council Minutes, February 10, 2014. 
115 “Developing Toronto’s Transit Network Plan to 2031,” Report to Toronto Executive Committee, 
June 28, 2016. Available online: 
http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX16.1 
116 “SmartTrack Project Update and Next Steps,” Report to Toronto Executive Committee, 
November 28, 2017. Available online: 
http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2017.EX29.1 
117 See: smartrack.to  
		
227 
 Tory’s SmartTrack plan has not been without critics. Freeman (2017) 
describes SmartTrack as a election-driven strategy which is “disastrous” and 
“irresponsible” as a means to develop major infrastructure projects: 
It is now clear that SmartTrack was designed on the back of an envelope 
in the heat of the election to show that John Tory was knowledgeable and 
in control of this difficult issue. No transit experts were consulted. It was a 
scheme to win votes in the election, no more. An experienced politician 
and administrator like Tory would or should have known that it is very 
dangerous and even irresponsible to make political promise on technically 
complicated, expensive projects like transit without careful study by transit 
experts, and yet he did it anyway.118 
 
A recent Toronto Star article, “Has John Tory’s SmartTrack come off the rails?” 
argues that the Mayor’s transit plan has changed so significantly since the 2014 
election that it is difficult to track actual progress.119 In the 2018 Toronto election, 
Tory is opposed by former Chief Planner of the City of Toronto Jen Keesmaat, 
and has faced significant criticism for the SmartTrack plan.120 As with all major 
transit projects which span numerous years, the outcome of SmartTrack remains 
to be seen – but will surely be influenced by the outcome of the October 2018 
mayoral election.  																																																								
118 Bill Freeman, “Toronto Politics and the Possibility for Change,” in Dimitrious Roussopoulos, 
The Rise of Cities (Toronto: Black Rose Books, 2017), 132.  
119 Edward Keenan, “Has John Tory’s SmartTrack come off the rails?” The Toronto Star (April 16, 
2018).  
120 Keesmaat’s campaign website states, “Four years after John Tory pitched SmartTrack to 
voters in the last election, what remains bears little resemblance to his lofty promises. Revision 
after revision of the original plan has left us with little more than GO train service the province 
was already planning, with a handful of added stations coming at a huge cost to Toronto 
taxpayers. “SmartTrack no longer exists as John Tory promised it to you during the last election,” 
says Keesmaat. “It is nothing more than a mirage that was designed to get him elected. I will 
ensure efficient use of Toronto’s $1.4 billion investment in the context of a realistic GO Regional 
Express Rail plan, and not a SmartTrack smoke screen.” (see: 
https://www.jenniferkeesmaat.com/transit-relief)” 
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Mayoral Power in Canada’s Largest City   
 Canadians generally believe that their mayors hold power – and this is 
particularly true in Canada’s largest cities such as Toronto. A survey of 12,000 
Canadians121 found that 72.8% of urban dwellers – compared to 68% of rural 
dwellers – believed that their mayors had the power to make things happen in 
their communities. In Toronto, 73.7% of residents believe their mayor holds 
power. The sample size of the survey was large enough to further disaggregate 
the data in Toronto, as illustrated in Table 26, finding that 905 area residents 
(suburban) were most likely overall to perceive their mayor as having power, but 
416 area residents (urban) were more likely to indicate a strong belief in mayoral 
power. Toronto residents generally believe their mayors have the power to make 
things happen in their city.  
 
Table 26: Perceptions of Mayoral Power within the Greater Toronto Area 
 416 Region  
n=898 
905 Region  
n=1,082 
Toronto 
GTA  
n=1979 
Rest of 
Ontario  
n=3103 
Strongly agree 
 
19.5% 17.2% 18.2% 15.5% 
Somewhat agree  
 
52.5% 57.9% 55.4% 54.4% 
Somewhat disagree 
 
19.2% 15.6% 17.2% 18.6% 
Strongly disagree 
 
4.5% 4.9% 4.7% 6.1% 
Don’t know / not sure 
 
4.3% 4.4% 4.4% 5.4% 
																																																								
121 For more details on this survey, see Appendix B.  
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 The reporter’s narrative at the beginning of this chapter well articulated an 
obvious point: each Toronto Mayor is a distinctly different person, elected by 
Torontonians at a specific point in time in a specific set of circumstances. In 
many ways, the election of each Mayor reflects something about Toronto at that 
point in time: the victory of Harvard-educated, left-leaning David Miller with a 
broom in hand was described as a “revolution” and “fresh oxygen” signaling an 
uprising of the progressive movement in Toronto and a desire for change in the 
way politics is done in the city; the election of Rob Ford was a result of record 
voter turnout and an uprising of “Ford Nation” with a leader articulating the sense 
that “enough is enough” and a desire to respect the taxpayers; the successful 
campaign by John Tory, a seasoned politician from a well established Toronto 
family, often regarded as a steady hand and described by the reporter as 
someone who can “work with people.” The election of each Mayor also reflects 
something of their predecessor: Ford’s “respect for taxpayers” may have 
resonated with voters angered by the escalating costs of municipal services or 
the highly disruptive outdoor worker strike during Mayor Miller’s term; Tory as a 
“steady hand” is a stark contrast to the chaotic time at the end of Mayor Ford’s 
tenure. The individual characteristics of a Mayor often reflect the unique 
dynamics of their community at a specific point in time – and shape how they 
operate in the role as Mayor. 
On paper, all three Toronto Mayors occupied the same job with the same 
“power” on paper. They held the same role, with similar formal authority and 
organizational arrangements, and had similar resources at their disposal – and 
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yet their ability to actually realize their desired outcome varied. Each Mayor had 
a specific desired outcome: Mayor Miller was on a quest for greater autonomy 
and empowerment for the City of Toronto; Mayor Ford campaigned and 
promoted his mandate to “stop the gravy train” at City Hall; and, Mayor Tory 
campaigned to construct a city-wide transit relief plan for commuters. Each of 
these Mayors operated within, generally, the same legal and institutional 
environment. Only Mayor Miller was able to achieve his desired outcome, with 
the passing of the City of Toronto Act. Both Mayor Ford and Mayor Tory were 
able to initiate action towards their desired outcome, in the Core Service Review 
and the creation of the joint transit committee, but it would be difficult to argue 
that either Mayor fully achieved their desired outcome. Why?  
The model of mayoral power advanced in this study (presented in Chapter 
8) argues that mayoral power is the product of both institutional variables and 
leadership – and in a Canadian context, the latter is far more important. As 
illustrated in Figure 3 (reprinted here from Chapter 8), the more important factor 
shaping mayoral power in practice is leadership. As such, mayoral power is 
defined as the extent to which the mayor can influence, mobilize, empower, and 
lead other actors engaged in local government to achieve desired outcomes. The 
final part of the definition, to achieve desired outcomes, is particularly important. 
Considering our three Toronto mayors and these three specific examples, what 
was their desired outcome, and to what extent was the mayor able to influence, 
mobilize, empower, and lead other actors in order to achieve it?  
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Figure 3 (repeat): Mayoral Power in Canada 
 
 
Toronto Mayors do not have the institutional authority to accomplish any 
of these three objectives on their own. As a source of power, institutional 
authority provided each Mayor with the legitimacy that comes by virtue of being 
in their role, but few other power resources by which to accomplish their desired 
outcomes. Instead, the ability to achieve their desired outcomes becomes a 
question of leadership – and specifically, to what extent could each Mayor 
influence, mobilize, empower, and lead other actors engaged in local 
government to achieve what they wanted. Table 27 presents a summary of these 
three examples, starting with the desired outcome of each Mayor and followed 
by an indication of whether that objective was achieved. Mayor Miller’s desired 
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Table 27: Mayoral Power in Practice – Mayors Miller, Ford and Tory   
 Mayor Miller Mayor Ford Mayor Tory 
Desired Outcome  Secure new 
legislation for City 
of Toronto  
Save tax dollars 
and reduce cost of 
government 
Implement a city-
wide commuter 
relief  
Achieved? Yes – new 
legislation 
approved in 2006  
No – realized only 
modest cost 
savings  
Unknown – still in 
progress  
To what extent 
was the mayor 
able to lead 
political actors?  
 
High - Leveraged 
good timing and 
built relationships 
with new Premier 
and Prime 
Minister; received 
support from 
Council for 
direction; bill 
received support 
at Queen’s Park  
 
Moderate – 
Council supported 
the Core Service 
review, but did not 
vote in favour of 
many of the cost 
savings presented 
from the review 
High – Letter to 
Council four days 
into the term to 
create joint 
committee 
received near 
unanimous 
support;  
To what extent 
was the mayor 
able to lead 
executive actors?  
 
High – Supported 
by staff to create 
Joint Task Force 
and supporting 
working groups  
 
Low – City 
Manager designed 
and executed their 
own Core Service 
program  
Moderate – Staff 
supported joint 
committee, but 
have not 
implemented the 
SmartTrack plan  
 
To what extent 
was the mayor 
able to lead 
community 
actors?  
 
Moderate – Public 
support from 
community 
members on 
advisory team; 
editorial printed in 
Globe and Mail  
 
Moderate – Public 
support during 
campaign; but, 
participants in 
Service Review 
consultation were 
mostly downtown 
residents who 
wanted increase 
in services 
 
Unknown – Will be 
a central question 
in the October 
2018 election  
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outcome to secure new legislation for the City of Toronto was achieved. Mayor 
Ford’s desire to “stop the gravy train” and reduce the cost of government 
resulted in only modest cost savings – far short of the $774 million annual budget 
gap identified. The final outcome of Mayor Tory’s hallmark platform plank 
remains unknown and is featured as a central question in the 2018 election 
campaign. These results can at least in part be explained by examining the 
extent to which the mayor was able to influence, mobilize, empower, and lead 
others – including political, executive and community actors with an interest in 
each initiative.  
 Mayor Miller was able to accomplish his desired outcome, marking one of 
the most significant steps forward in terms of empowering an Ontario city in the 
history of the province. He led his Council to support this direction, and leverage 
the opportunity of a new Premier and Prime Minister, in order to accomplish what 
he wanted. The policy window122 emerging from the near simultaneous elections 
of new leaders at all three levels of government created a unique opportunity, 
and Mayor Miller had the skill to identify these opportunities, and capitalize on 
them towards realizing his objective. Staff also supported the Mayor’s direction 
by creating and participating in the Joint Task Force and working groups. This 
was unquestionably aided by the existing work that had been done by the past 
council, and the base of support within the administration. The quick assembly of 
a staff team to lead the negotiation with the Ontario government would not likely 																																																								
122 Pal (2006) describes policy windows as “unpredictable in the policy process that create the 
possibility for influence over the direction and outcome of that process.” Kingdon (1995) argues 
that taking advantage of a policy window is a matter of skill and chance.  
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have been nearly as prompt if the interests of Mayor Miller and the City’s senior 
administrators were not so clearly aligned. There is at least some evidence of 
public support given the editorial written by a prominent community member and 
the Globe and Mail editorial board’s decision to publish the letter. Although 
Mayor Miller lacked the institutional authority to establish new provincial 
legislation, he was able to realize his desired outcome by leading others.  
 Mayor Ford, on the other hand, found organized opposition at every step 
of his efforts to “stop the gravy train.” Mayor Ford had broad public support for 
his campaign platform but he quickly ran into challenges starting with the 
proposed process from City of Toronto City Manager for an aggressive review of 
all of the City’s services. Following Ford’s election, the City Manager would have 
been well aware of the political pressure ahead to make dramatic cuts to 
services and staff. He would also have a greater knowledge about the practical 
realities and constraints of managing a multi-billion corporation with costs largely 
driven by arrangements outlined in provincial legislation or in collective 
agreements. By proposing a highly visible and aggressive political process, the 
City Manager was able to both respond to the new Mayor’s stated interests, and 
protect against dramatic or uninformed changes to municipal services. The 
public outcry began once specific changes were being contemplated, and council 
did not support most of the cost savings opportunities identified through the 
review. Mayor Ford was not able to realize his desired outcome because he was 
unable to successful lead those around him – a challenge which intensified later 
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in his term when his personal struggles eroded his ability to lead council, 
administration or the community. 
Mayor Tory’s ability to implement the SmartTrack remains unknown, in 
large part because Tory’s mayoralty is not yet complete and because the 
outcome of the 2018 mayoral election remains unknown. Progress on a city-wide 
transit projects has occurred, and Tory has secured political support at key 
stages of the process. However, allies and critics alike have been quick to 
acknowledge that Tory’s original plan is becoming further distorted as it merges 
into the regional transit plans already underway.  
Importantly, in all three examples – whether they are ultimately successful 
or not – the Mayor was able to focus considerable energy from political, 
executive and community actors towards outcomes they desired. They were able 
to garner sustained media attention and public dialogue on issues that were 
important to them – and, importantly, defined in terms set by them. As Mayors, 
they leveraged their unique position within local government and the power 
resources at their disposal to shape the agenda, to define the efforts of other 
actors (either in support of the mayor, or in opposition), and powerfully influence 
the prevailing narrative about the priorities of their city. In other words, they were 
able to leverage the resources available to them – such as the ability to capture 
media attention, drawing on personal relationships, speaking on behalf of a 
community by virtue of the uniqueness of their election as mayor – in effort to 
influence, mobilize, empower, and lead other actors. This is mayoral power, and 
it is clearly evident in this tale with all three Mayors of Toronto. 
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However, the ability of the Mayors to achieve their desire outcome varied. 
Is it to be concluded, then, that Mayor Miller was “more powerful” than was 
Mayor Ford? In the case of these specific situations, the answer is yes. Mayor 
Miller was able to accomplish his desired outcome and Mayor Ford was not. 
Both Mayors shared the same institutional authority, but the important difference 
was leadership. One Mayor was able to successfully mobilize resources and 
lead those around him; the other was not. However, to conclude broadly from 
these specific stories that one Mayor was more powerful than another would be 
unfounded. Only three specific examples were explored. There would be many 
other issues, situations and events taking place simultaneously to these stories 
that may have also shaped the relationships and relative power of the mayor. 
Mayor Miller also advocated for one cent of the sales tax for the City of Toronto, 
and this effort was unsuccessful. The purpose of this chapter is not to assess the 
relative power of Mayors Miller, Ford and Tory as an assessment of that scale is 
beyond the scope of this single chapter. Instead, the purpose was to explore the 
model as to demonstrate how it could be applied in a “real world” context. The 
most important aspects of the model advanced in this paper have been affirmed 
through this exploration. 
First, mayoral power is the product of both institutional variables and 
leadership – and in a Canadian context, the latter is far more important. The 
three examples presented in this chapter affirm this argument. Mayors Miller, 
Ford and Tory benefitted from the legitimacy and institutional authority 
emanating from position, but the important variable in terms of actually realizing 
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a desired outcome was leadership. The extent to which the mayor can influence, 
mobilize, empower, and lead other actors engaged in local government emerges 
as the distinguishing variable for realizing desired outcomes.  
Second, mayoral power is relational, dynamic, and person- and context-
specific. Describing the mayoralty in Toronto as uniformly “weak” would be an 
almost meaningless way to conceive of the position. Instead, mayoral power 
must be understood by examining the mayor in relation to others. The definition 
of mayoral power allows for the likely possibility that a mayor is more powerful in 
one aspect of their role than in another – and, that mayoral power changes over 
time. It may also vary depending on the circumstances and issues at hand. Other 
actors have independent interests which also play a role. The important point is 
that mayoral power is more complex, nuanced and fluid than the traditional 
institutional frame of “strong/weak” would suggest. The model of mayoral power 
proposed in this study requires observers to think more broadly about mayoral 
power inclusive of institutional variables and the leadership of the individual in 
the role, appreciating its highly fluid and context-specific nature. 
Finally, in being uniquely positioned at the nexus of actors engaged in 
local government, mayors have unparalleled influence over local governance in 
their cities. This tale of three mayors illustrates this argument. All three mayors 
were able to dominate the agenda and focus sustained attention from political, 
executive and community actors on their desired initiative. In turn, this shaped 
the engagement of those actors in local government. Interviewees from the City 
of Toronto acknowledged the significance of the mayor in the “shifting power 
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dynamics” 123 at City Hall and beyond. Several interviewees commented 
specifically on Mayor Ford’s term, as the most pronounced example of a shift in 
a mayor’s ability to lead others, and as a result, hold power: 
David Miller pushed, pushed, pushed for more powers, and [Premier] 
McGuinty said yes, that’s where we’re going. And then Toronto ended up 
with Rob Ford, whose actions were not met with approval from the public 
or council. Even with all of the powers of the City of Toronto Act, Council 
was able to largely remove the major powers of the office of the mayor. 
Council was able to function, and continue with the major functions of the 
organization. A number of initiatives went through, despite the dysfunction 
of the political environment. […] My take on it is that the system has 
worked.124  
 
The power of mayors in Toronto is all about the power of position, the 
power of direct and unfettered access to the media; not the powers set out 
in law. We know that a mayor who squanders these powers can be 
sidelined by their council. In the period where Mayor Ford was absent or 
disgraced, Council exerted itself, the system righted itself, and we carried 
on. We had a mayor who was basically absent and doesn’t do large parts 
of their job – well, it didn’t bring the city to a halt. My view on the Rob Ford 
situation is that the system worked beautifully. A mayor who abused the 
power of the office was basically contained by the system.125 
 
A change in the mayor can change how people view the city. As strange 
as it may sound, under our last mayor [Ford], I think people really started 
caring about the city. The drama brought things into perspective. It 
sparked a new generation of civic activists.”126 
 
Mayors shape the environment for others and set the conditions of their 
engagement in local governance. Sometimes this is through active leadership, 
coalition building, and intentionally aligning interests – such as Miller’s leadership 																																																								
123 Confidential Interview #40.  
124 Confidential Interview #39.  
125 Confidential Interview #42.  
126 Confidential Interview #44. 
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with other levels of government to renegotiate relationships for the City of 
Toronto. Sometimes it is unintentional, where a mayor ceases to meet the 
expectations of those around them, and other actors begin to take on new 
leadership roles. Rob Ford is the most acute example, both in how the City 
administration ultimately took over the leadership of the service review process, 
and later in the appointment of another member of Council to take on several of 
the mayor’s duties after Mayor Ford became embroiled in scandal. It is through 
shared experience and circumstance that mayoral power is tested, negotiated, 
defined and expressed between mayors and those around them. The landscape 
can shift quickly, and profoundly, and when it does, it shifts the dynamics of local 
governance.  
  This chapter has limitations. A more in depth examination of mayoral 
power in Toronto could involve a more rigorous measurement of one or more 
mayors in relation to others, perhaps by surveying the perceptions of how 
powerful each mayor is in relation to political, executive and community actors, 
or by developing a scale against which to assess each mayor. Further, a more 
detailed study of a single mayor over time, using the model presented in this 
study, would surely reveal interesting shifts over the course of the mayoralty. 
This assessment is outside of the scope of this study, but would be a worthy 
future pursuit. The important contribution of this chapter is to emphasize the key 
elements of the model and demonstrate how it can be a useful theoretical and 
empirical tool for understanding mayoral power in practice.  
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Nearly two decades ago, in reflecting on the C5 meeting of Canada’s big 
city mayors with Jane Jacobs, Alan Broadbent argued, “Our mayors have the 
ability to mobilize political power in ways that are yet untried for the most part; 
they can significantly improve the way most Canadians are governed.”127 The 
reporter cited at the beginning of this chapter made a similar claim: “importantly, 
it’s often the mayor who sets the terms for public debate [… they] can 
psychologically set the agenda and tone for the whole city.”128 Toronto’s mayors 
hold power that is less obvious, but more important, that what has been 
traditionally understood. Discounting Toronto’s mayors – or the mayors of any 
Canadian city – as being “weak” fails to appreciate the complex nature of 
mayoral power in Canada, and more importantly, underestimates the power that 
Canadian mayors can and do wield in Canada’s cities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
127 Alan Broadbent, ““Report of the C5: Historic meeting of mayors of Canada’s hub cities with 
Jane Jacobs,” Ideas That Matter (September 2001). 
128 Confidential Interview #45. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“[B]eing in municipal politics is much harder. It’s more demanding, more 
frustrating, but also more rewarding. […] It’s a different form of government, but I 
also think it’s much better. It’s more transparent, more open, less rehearsed. 
[Laughs] It’s more real.” 
 
- Canadian Mayor (and former Member of Parliament)  
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Chapter 10 | LEADING CANADA’S CITIES?  
 
In every Canadian city, the mayor is an important figure. Mayors lead 
elected councils, serve as chief executives of municipal corporations, and are 
generally the most well known local officials. Big city mayors are directly elected 
by more people than any federal or provincial politician in Canada.1 In times of 
celebration and crisis, mayors are the voices of their cities on the provincial, 
national and international stage. They are praised for their communities’ 
successes and blamed for their failures. In many ways, the mayor is “the living 
symbol of [their] city.”2  
Despite the significance of the position, there has been remarkably little 
study of mayors in Canada, particularly when compared to other political leaders. 
The current literature admits this knowledge gap, describing the Canadian 
mayoralty is “vague”3 and the responsibilities of mayors as “generally quite 
unclear.”4 Because Canada’s mayors have not been well studied, conventional 
knowledge about the Canadian mayoralty has necessarily drawn from other 
jurisdictions. The dominant assumption about Canada’s mayors has been their 																																																								
1 There are 28 mayors in Canada whose municipalities’ populations were greater than the most 
populous federal or provincial electoral districts, and therefore directly represent more citizens 
than any federal or provincial politician in Canada. This number has almost doubled in the two 
decades since Sancton (1994) produced the same calculation, finding that there were 16 mayors 
in Canada in 1991 directly representing more residents than any federal or provincial politician.    
2 Leonard I. Ruchelman, Big City Mayors: The Crisis in Urban Politics (Bloomington: Indiana 
University press, 1969), 4.  
3 James Lightbody, City Politics, Canada (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 156. 
4 Andrew Sancton, “Mayors as Political Leaders,” in Maureen Mancuso, Richard G. Price and 
Ronald Wagenberg, eds., Leaders and Leadership in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 175.  
		
243 
perceived “weakness.” This stems from a comparative American convention 
about the role of the mayor in various forms of local government in the United 
States. In strictly technical terms, a “weak mayor” in the United States exists only 
in a variant of the mayor-council form of government, which is not present in 
Canada. More importantly, labeling Canadian mayors as “weak” reveals 
problematic underlying assumptions about mayoral power, where it is 
understood primarily in institutional and legal terms. The assumption that 
Canada’s mayors are “weak” – an assumption which to date has largely been 
untested – has had a pervasive influence on how the role of the mayor is 
understood in academic and professional discourse alike. An examination of 
mayoral power in Canada is long overdue.  
This study investigates a central question about Canada’s mayors, asking: 
what factors shape the power in practice of mayors in Canada’s cities? Two 
parallel investigations were pursued. First, the institutional dimensions of 
mayoral power were examined through an assessment of provincially and locally 
granted authority – or, power “on paper.” Mayoral power, understood in these 
terms, was found to be limited. While variation is present across cases, it tends 
to emerge from institutional differences such as the presence of local political 
parties rather than stemming from legislative differences. Provincial municipal 
legislation across Canada is relatively vague with respect to the role and power 
of mayors. The basic shared responsibilities of urban mayors across Canada 
remain those enumerated in the Baldwin Act in 1849. Importantly, when mayoral 
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power is understood in institutional terms, it can be accurately concluded that 
mayoral power in Canada is quite limited.  
The second investigation explored mayoral power “in practice,” informed 
by the perspectives of mayors, past mayors, councillors, municipal 
administrators, members of the media and public who frequently interact with 
their mayors. This approach yielded rather different results, where mayoral 
power was defined in more complex, relational, and person- and context-specific 
terms. Mayors are expected to simultaneously serve in political, executive and 
community leadership roles, with each role involving different responsibilities. For 
an individual mayor, their ability to lead – and as a result, their power – may vary 
across these roles, and at different points in time. Mayors can set the agenda, 
define the narrative, limit or enable the participation of others, and generally 
shape the engagement of political, executive and community actors. They have 
unique resources to draw upon, and are uniquely positioned at the nexus of the 
network of these actors engaged in local government. Their leadership, or lack of 
leadership, shapes the engagement of others. Mayors have unparalleled 
influence over local governance in their cities. This is the most important 
dimension of mayoral power in Canada.  
To the central research question: what factors shape the power in practice 
of mayors in Canada’s cities? This study finds that the institutional variables 
associated with mayoral power are less significant factors than the leadership of 
the individual in the role. It finds agency to be more important than institution. 
This is a significant finding, particularly given the global emphasis on institutional 
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reform and strengthening the formal dimensions of the role and power of mayors. 
Benjamin Barber’s popular book, If Mayors Ruled the World, goes to far as to 
suggest that institutional changes to bolster mayoral power could be the solution 
to a whole host of global social and economic issues.5 This dissertation began 
with a story about Toronto City Council removing power from then Mayor Rob 
Ford in response to his personal struggles. Two years after Rob’s death, his 
brother Doug has been elected as Premier of Ontario, and has focused early 
efforts on institutional reform in the City of Toronto, including a stated interest in 
creating a “strong mayor” in Toronto.6 The concept of mayoral power as an 
institutional product, reflected in language such as “strong” or “weak” and 
expressed through interest in institutional change as a vehicle to empower 
mayors, reflects a limited understanding of mayoral power in Canada’s context. 
Mayoral power is broader than institutional authority; it also encompasses 
leadership. Mayoral power is the extent to which the mayor can influence, 
mobilize, empower, and lead other actors engaged in local government to 
achieve desired outcomes. Mayors shape the dynamics of local governance in 
Canada’s cities. This is mayoral power.    
The examination of three high-profile initiatives championed by mayors in 
Toronto further illustrates the relational and context-specific nature of mayoral 																																																								
5 Benjamin R. Barber, If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).  
6 Ontario Premier Doug Ford was elected on June 7, 2018. Within the first 100 days of his term, 
Ford made unprecedented changes to the composition of Toronto City Council, reducing the 
number of wards from 47 to 25. This change took place during an ongoing municipal election. 
Premier Ford spoke publicly several times during the campaign and after being elected about 
introducing “strong mayor” powers in the City of Toronto. 
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power. The legislative power of Mayors Miller, Ford and Tory was relatively 
similar (save the limits imposed by Toronto City Council on Mayor Rob Ford 
toward the end of his tenure), and yet their ability to realize desired outcomes 
depended on their ability to lead others, and was sensitive to the context and 
climate around them. This reveals perhaps the most important point of this study: 
local governance in Canada involves a large network of actors, operating in a 
largely undefined environment; power is dispersed across these actors, subject 
to constant shifts in the relationships between actors; and, the mayor occupies a 
central position within this network of actors. Without formally defined 
parameters, the nature and limits of power is defined through constant testing 
and retesting of boundaries in the relationships between actors.  
In the United States, there are defined forms of local government, which 
set parameters for the individuals occupying specific roles. It establishes the 
power of various actors relative to one another. “Weak” and “strong” mayors 
refer to the extent to which power is concentrated in the mayoralty, relative to the 
rest of council and administration. No similar forms of government or established 
classifications exist in Canada. Instead, local governance in Canada involves a 
network of actors with varying interests, and various power resources that can be 
used by actors to achieve their desired outcomes. This is true for mayors, 
councillors, administrators, members of the media, local special interest groups, 
and other actors alike. Mayors are uniquely positioned at the nexus of these 
actors, and have an unparalleled ability to shape and condition their engagement 
in local government.  
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Canadian mayors, in practice, can be enormously powerful. Given the 
right conditions, they can exercise tremendous influence over the people around 
them. They have unique resources, which a skillful mayor can and will use to 
their benefit – and a greater span of influence than any other actor engaged in 
local government. In the largely undefined environment of local government in 
Canada, a mayor who is a skillful leader can have significant impact in their city. 
Mayors can shape the dynamics of governance in their city, and drive the 
agenda in a way that no other individual in the city can. In the Toronto reporter’s 
words, the mayor can “psychologically set the agenda and tone for the whole city 
[and] that’s what’s really important.”7 
This is not intended as the final word on mayoral power in Canada. 
Instead, the findings of this study are aimed to be helpful for further studies of 
mayoral power and urban politics in Canada. It argues for a broadened thinking 
about the important role of the mayor in Canada’s cities that may inform an 
ambitious research agenda ahead. In an age where cities are central to 
Canada’s prosperity, and where many of the most pressing social and economic 
issues facing the country are concentrated in cities, continued urban research is 
particularly relevant and necessary. A few important areas for further exploration 
are worth highlighting.  
 First, although Canada does not have “weak mayors,” it does have weak 
cities. Canadian federalism does not recognize a local level of government and 
does not include any formal collective role for Canadian mayors in making 																																																								
7 Ibid. 
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decisions to advance urban interests and participate in national policy 
discussions. The extent to which mayors can and should play a greater role in 
national decision-making on urban issues has been a topic of debate for 
decades. This topic could be the subject of its own dissertation. Canadian 
municipalities have long worked through associations to advocate for local 
interests and participate in provincial and federal policy discussions. The 1901-
formed Union of Canadian Municipalities, which later became the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities (FCM), has long convened mayors to “lobby” the federal 
government on various priorities. Similar efforts have materialized within 
municipal associations in each province.  FCM’s Big City Mayors Caucus played 
a particularly active role during the 2015 federal election, prominently advocating 
for investments in transit, infrastructure and housing. All federal parties 
responded to this effort, and these areas were featured as priorities within each 
party’s platform. Other prominent BCMC work has included work on the Syrian 
refugee crisis, as noted at in Chapter 7. There is evidence of mayors working 
together, but the long-term impact of this work remains a question worthy of 
further study. More fundamentally, the organization of mayors for lobbying efforts 
– akin to what various sector associations and private interests undertake – 
reveals the underlying power imbalance between levels of government. 
Canadian cities, and their leaders, need to be acknowledged as vital parts of 
Canadian federalism, and accordingly extended the opportunity to participate in 
shared decision-making. Many of the most pressing issues facing Canadians 
are, in one way or another, local issues. Cities play an increasingly important role 
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in many policy files traditionally considered within federal and provincial 
jurisdiction, from immigration to healthcare to the economy. Canada’s urban 
mayors are uniquely positioned to understand the local dynamics of a wide range 
of policy issues, and to mobilize key actors in their communities to address them. 
However, the collective capacity of mayors to play a meaningful role in 
addressing major issues facing Canada’s cities – economic inequality, social 
exclusion, environmental degradation, political disengagement, or more – 
remains an open question. The continued failure to address these problems will 
hinder the ability of Canada’s mayors to provide the needed collective leadership 
to address the most pressing issues facing Canada’s cities.  
Second, mayors – and local governments, generally – continue to struggle 
to be appropriately resourced to meet the growing expectations, particularly in 
Canada’s largest cities. There was broad recognition among interviewees that 
mayors are critically under resourced, with expectations far exceeding the 
mayor’s capacity. One media commentator described it this way: 
There are just so many files, and we don’t have a proper cabinet in the 
way a prime minister or premier has a cabinet. So you have to be 
constantly up to speed on all of the issues. That’s why city councillors look 
like such buffoons, because they speak on every single issue and they 
have so few staff to bring them up to speed on them. So when they are 
talking about issues, they just talk off the cuff, so they look stupid. The 
mayor does have some people, but the number of files and issues and 
priorities – it’s a lot. It’s a full time job, even in cities where it’s a part time 
job. It’s a really really full time job.8 
 
																																																								
8 Confidential Interview #45.  
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What resources do mayors need to be successful? An investigation into this 
question would be an important and practical contribution to the literature in 
Canada, and would address the significant pressure experienced by many 
mayors. The answer would differ across cities for many valid reasons, but a 
review of appropriate level of resources – including remuneration, staff support, 
budgets, and otherwise – should be undertaken. The perennial question of 
whether mayors and councillors should be considered part-time or full-time 
positions is an important part of the discussion, albeit rife with political challenges 
and important theoretical considerations. Mayors may also benefit from greater 
educational and institutional supports. There are executive education programs 
available to leaders in most other sectors, but few are tailored to Canadian 
mayors. In particular, these forums could provide helpful opportunities to connect 
past mayors with current mayors to share learnings and best practices. In a 
practical context, municipalities should periodically and deliberately review the 
roles and related expectations of their elected officials, including both mayors 
and councillors. Neither cities nor municipalities are well served by having 
unclear but exceedingly high expectations of their leaders, and then not 
resourcing them to a level where they can be successful. 
Finally, many aspects of the mayoralty in Canada remain unstudied. This 
project has advanced arguments that would benefit from more empirical study. 
This could include more focused case study research examining mayoral power, 
such as by applying the model to the mayoralty or political career of a single 
individual, or closely examining the mayoralty in one city. It could also involve a 
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larger quantitative study to better understand the patterns in mayoral leadership. 
For example, a study to identify electoral or governing patterns across mayors in 
their political, executive or community roles would be a helpful contribution. 
There may also be significant differences in the role of the mayor in small 
communities, or rural communities, or mid-sized communities in larger provinces. 
A study of non-urban mayors, the heads of council in upper-tier and regional 
governments, or mayors in Canada’s territories would also provide needed 
insight. 
 The exclamation, “you don’t understand the job of the mayor!” captures a 
foundational issue facing Canadian local governments, and the study of local 
government. Mayors are among the most important, and least understood, 
political leaders in Canada. This study offers what is intended to be a helpful 
starting point for a much larger exploration into the role and power of Canada’s 
mayors and the conditions for effective local leadership. Fortunately, it remains 
an active conversation within and across Canadian communities. The 
opportunity to travel to cities and interview local leaders across Canada was a 
profound learning experience for this researcher. In the words of one community 
member interviewed, “Many mayors are unsung heroes. You hear about the 
charismatic ones, or the outlandish ones. But there are a lot of mayors out there, 
just doing their job – running the city well. They don’t get the attention they 
deserve.”9 This researcher could not agree more. Although there is much work to 
do towards deepening the understanding local government in Canada, and in 																																																								
9 Confidential interview #37.  
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building the conditions for strong leadership in Canada’s cities, the foundation of 
a shared commitment to seeing Canadian cities prosper is an excellent place to 
start. 
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APPENDIX A: MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION, BY PROVINCE 
 
 
British Columbia  
Local Government Act, RSBC 1996, c 323 - http://canlii.ca/t/847v 
Community Charter, SBC 2003, c 26 - http://canlii.ca/t/84m0 
Indian Self Government Enabling Act, RSBC 1996, c 219 - http://canlii.ca/t/8441 
Vancouver Charter, SBC 1953, c 55 - http://canlii.ca/t/84hz 
Resort Municipality of Whistler Act, RSBC 1996, c 407 
 
Alberta 
Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26 - http://canlii.ca/t/8239 
City of Lloydminster Act, SA 2005, c C-13.5 - http://canlii.ca/t/81t1 
The Lloydminster Charter, Alta Reg 212/2012 - http://canlii.ca/t/8r3k 
The City of Calgary Charter, Alta Reg 40/2018 - http://canlii.ca/t/91ct 
The City of Edmonton Charter, Alta Reg 39/2018 - http://canlii.ca/t/91cs 
 
Saskatchewan 
The Northern Municipalities Act, 2010, SS 2010, c N-5.2 - http://canlii.ca/t/8ntl 
The Municipalities Act, SS 2005, c M-36.1 - http://canlii.ca/t/wkp 
The Cities Act, SS 2002, c C-11.1 - http://canlii.ca/t/wrm 
The Lloydminster Charter, OC 595/2012 - http://canlii.ca/t/8r5l 
The City of Lloydminster Act, SS 2004, c C-11.2 - http://canlii.ca/t/wch 
 
Manitoba 
Municipal Act, CCSM c M225 -  http://canlii.ca/t/526xg 
The Portage la Prairie Charter Act, SM 1989-90, c 77 - http://canlii.ca/t/8lm8 
The City of Flin Flon Act, SM 1989-90, c 72 - http://canlii.ca/t/8lm2 
The Northern Affairs Act, CCSM c N100 - http://canlii.ca/t/8ggn   
The City of Winnipeg Charter, SM 2002, c 39 - http://canlii.ca/t/8j26 
The Brandon Charter Act, SM 1989-90, c 71 - http://canlii.ca/t/8lm1 
 
Ontario 
Municipal Act, 2001, SO 2001, c 25 - http://canlii.ca/t/311 
City of Toronto Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 11, Sch A - http://canlii.ca/t/33l 
 
Quebec 
Municipal Code of Québec, CQLR c C-27.1 - http://canlii.ca/t/xkg 
An Act respecting Northern villages and the Kativik Regional Government, CQLR 
c V-6.1 - http://canlii.ca/t/xq0 
Cities and Towns Act, CQLR c C-19 - http://canlii.ca/t/xr2 
Charter of Ville de Gatineau, CQLR c C-11.1 - http://canlii.ca/t/xw1 
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Charter of Ville de Longueuil, CQLR c C-11.3 - http://canlii.ca/t/xd0 
Charter of Ville de Lévis, CQLR c C-11.2 - http://canlii.ca/t/x6m 
Charter of Ville de Montréal, CQLR c C-11.4 - http://canlii.ca/t/xlh 
Charter of Ville de Québec, CQLR c C-11.5 - http://canlii.ca/t/z1d 
Municipal Powers Act, CQLR c C-47.1 - http://canlii.ca/t/xtm 
 
New Brunswick 
Municipalities Act, RSNB 1973, c M-22 - http://canlii.ca/t/88nh 
Control of Municipalities Act, RSNB 1973, c C-20 - http://canlii.ca/t/88nf 
 
Nova Scotia 
Halifax Regional Municipality Charter, SNS 2008, c 39 - http://canlii.ca/t/885f 
Municipal Government Act, SNS 1998, c 18 - http://canlii.ca/t/87dk 
 
Prince Edward Island 
Municipalities Act, RSPEI 1988, c M-13 - http://canlii.ca/t/8d3n 
Charlottetown Area Municipalities Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-4.1 -
 http://canlii.ca/t/8d91 
City of Summerside Act, RSPEI 1988, c S-9.1 - http://canlii.ca/t/8dfm 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador  
Municipalities Act, 1999, SNL 1999, c M-24 - http://canlii.ca/t/8b19 
City of St. John's Act, RSNL 1990, c C-17 - http://canlii.ca/t/89xx 
City of Corner Brook Act, RSNL 1990, c C-15 - http://canlii.ca/t/8b17 
City of Mount Pearl Act, RSNL 1990, c C-16 - http://canlii.ca/t/89qd 
Municipal Affairs Act, SNL 1995, c M-20.1 - http://canlii.ca/t/8b2q 
 
Yukon 
Municipal Act, RSY 2002, c 154 - http://canlii.ca/t/8j80 
 
Northwest Territories  
Cities, Towns and Villages Act, SNWT 2003, c 22, Sch B - http://canlii.ca/t/8hsq 
Charter Communities Act, SNWT 2003, c 22, Sch A - http://canlii.ca/t/8j0b 
Hamlets Act, SNWT 2003, c 22, Sch C - http://canlii.ca/t/8hsl 
 
Nunavut 
Hamlets Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c H-1 - http://canlii.ca/t/8l85 
Cities, Towns and Villages Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c C-8 - http://canlii.ca/t/8l4z 
Settlements Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c S-9 - http://canlii.ca/t/8l93 
 
 
 
		
256 
APPENDIX B: IPSOS SURVEY RESULTS 
 
In October 2015, Ipsos Public Affairs conducted a survey of more than 
12,000 Canadians. In support of this research project, one question was included 
in this study regarding attitudes about mayoral power. Respondents were asked 
to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the statement “Canadian mayors 
have the power to make things happen in their communities,” using a standard 
Likert scale. This data was collected to provide a glimpse on whether 
perceptions of mayoral power vary across Canada. The survey results found that 
most Canadians believe that mayors have the power to make things happen in 
their communities. Overall, 72.1% of respondents agreed with the statement, 
including 17% who indicated strong agreement and 55.1% who indicated 
moderate agreement. 22% of respondents disagreed with the statement, 
including 4.9% who strongly disagreed, and 17.1% who moderately disagreed.  
 However, perceptions of mayoral power are not equal across Canada. 
Chart 3  (provides an overview of the variation by province. Respondents in 
Prince Edward Island, Alberta and Saskatchewan were most likely to perceive 
mayors as powerful. Respondents in Nova Scotia, Manitoba, New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland were the least likely to perceive mayors as powerful. 
Respondents in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec fell close to the national 
average. Interestingly, there are also differences within provinces in perceptions 
of mayoral power. As illustrated in Table 27, respondents from urban  
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Chart 2: Perceptions of mayoral power, by province  
 
areas were more likely to consider mayors to have power than were respondents 
from rural areas. Overall, 72.8% of urban dwellers believe mayors have power to 
make things happen in their communities, compared to 68% of rural dwellers. 
There was little difference in responses based on many other demographic 
characteristics including gender, age, income, education, employment status, 
union membership, religion, and immigration status.  
Canadians’ perceptions of mayoral power are uneven and may reflect 
more of other variables such as political culture, the personality of specific  
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Table 28: Perceptions of Mayoral Power, Urban vs Rural  
 Urban Dwellers 
n=10,282 (84.7%) 
Rural Dwelling 
n=1,852 (15.2%) 
Strongly agree 
 
17.5% 14.2% 
Somewhat agree  
 
55.3% 53.8% 
Somewhat disagree 
 
16.7% 19.4% 
Strongly disagree 
 
4.7% 5.8% 
Don’t know / not sure 
 
5.7% 6.8% 
 
mayors, particular point-in-time circumstances, or otherwise. Regardless, 
Canadians generally believe that mayors have the power to make things happen 
in their communities.  
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWS BY CITY AND PERSPECTIVE 
 
 Political Executive Community Total  
St. John’s, NFL 4 1 2 7 
Halifax, NS 4 2 3 9 
Charlottetown, PEI 4 1 1 6 
Saint John, NB 4 1 2 7 
Montreal, QC 3 1 1 5 
Toronto, ON 6 2 4 12 
Winnipeg, MB 3 3 1 7 
Saskatoon, SK 3* 0 1 4 
Calgary, AB 2 2 0 4 
Vancouver, BC 4 1* 2 7 
Total  37 14 17 68 
 
Note: a total of 68 interviews were conducted, but two interviews included two 
people, at their request. These cases are denoted with an asterisk (*). 
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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
The following questions were provided to all interviewees in advance of the 
interview, and used to guide the discussion: 
1. In your own words, how would you describe the role of the mayor? 
a. Follow up: how powerful do you think the mayor is?  
2. Do you think the role of the mayor is well understood? Why or why 
not? 
3. What do you think is the most important part of the mayor’s role? 
4. What do you think is the most challenging part of the mayor’s role? 
5. Based on your experience, what enables a mayor to lead? 
6. Based on your experience, what can limit a mayor’s ability to lead? 
7. Do you think there is anything unique about the mayor’s role in [city], 
compared to other cities in Canada? 
8. Is there anything else you would like to share with me related to the 
role of the mayor in Canadian cities?  
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